

# An Anthropology of Images

PICTURE ▼ MEDIUM ▼ BODY

HANS BELTING



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Guy Le Querrec, Guinea, Macenta. Painting on the wall inside the shop of Italian photographer Angelo PEPE. 4th day of the "Raid(Trek) 88—Renault 19 / Conakry-Cap Nord." Monday, September 5th, 1988. Photo: Le Querrec/Magnum Photos.

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*Hans Belting*

Translated by Thomas Dunlap

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# AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF IMAGES

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## A New Introduction for the English Reader

The present book was first published in German in 2001 and caused quite a lot of discussion in the humanities, especially, though reluctantly, in the field of art history. Its title, *Bild-Anthropologie*, indicated the choice of an anthropological viewpoint in speaking of “images,” a term used in its broadest definition, for *Bild* means in German both “image” and “picture.”<sup>1</sup> The first chapter is an exercise in theory, admittedly a rather daunting one, and its rigors should not discourage the reader from consulting the rest. It served a practical purpose in 2001, as a guideline for the research group “Image, Medium and Body” at the School for New Media in Karlsruhe, where members representing several disciplines—including art history, philosophy, and psychology—met to study images in widely disparate contexts. The second chapter looks, in more concrete terms, at the human body, with its capacities for memory, dream, and imagination, as a living medium for images.

The remaining chapters offer case studies in which the theoretical approach described in the first two chapters is applied. They function as independent essays and need not be read in sequence. The third chapter analyses the genesis of the independent human portrait as a picture subject second in importance only to religious themes. The fourth chapter traces the origin of human picture-making back to the funereal realm. Though the discussion covers nothing later than antiquity, this chapter represents, in my view, the nucleus of the book. The

fifth chapter investigates, for the first time, a neglected aspect of Dante's picture theory, based on the model of the human shadow. The last chapter deals with photography, more specifically with photography's social uses and private meanings, and reveals that this modern branch of picture-making has in fact a long prehistory.

The question "What is an image?" requires an anthropological approach because, as we will see, the answer is culturally determined and thus a fit subject for anthropological inquiry. The art historian normally addresses other questions. A work of art—be it a picture, a sculpture, or a print—is a tangible object with a history, an object that can be classified, dated, and exhibited. An image, on the other hand, defies such attempts of reification, even to the extent that it often straddles the boundary between physical and mental existence. It may live in a work of art, but the image does not necessarily coincide with the work of art. The English-language distinction between "image" and "picture" is pertinent, but only in the sense that it clarifies the distinction between the "image" that is the subject of our quest and the "picture" in which that image may reside. At a fundamental level, the question of what an image is requires a two-fold answer. We must address the image not only as a product of a given medium, be it photography, painting, or video, but also as a product of our selves, for we generate images of our own (dreams, imaginings, personal perceptions) that we play out against other images in the visible world.

I do not use the term "anthropology" in the sense of "ethnology," but rather according to its European definition, which needs some explanation. In Europe the term has the broader meaning of a "cultural anthropology," embracing the Kantian definition of a human being and of human nature in general. I insist on these distinctions, just as I insist on the distinction between "images," which are the subject of this study, and "art," which is not, in order to avoid wrong expectations. English anthropologists have accused the so-called "anthropology of art" of lacking any distinctive subject matter and have voted to break with aesthetics in order to

overcome “an exaggerated respect for art.”<sup>2</sup> I do not want to interfere with this debate as it lies outside the interests of this book.

In Germany, the recent battle cry is *Bildwissenschaft*, heralded by Tom Mitchell as a new kind of iconology. Its newness lies not so much in methodology as in the claim that it enables the study of iconic media not based on texts. The debate, however, centers on the question of whether or not image studies are a part of art history. To my mind, this sets up an unnecessary dichotomy. Even Ernst Gombrich lived comfortably in two disciplines, in his case classical art history and a psychology of perception. Aby Warburg would have developed his own anthropology of images had his thinking not been narrowed by the iconology of Erwin Panofsky and Edgar Wind. I dare to take up Warburg’s anthropology, as well as his *Kulturwissenschaft*, without quoting or historicizing him, as his initiatives need to be appropriated for our own time. The same applies to the meaning of “iconology,” which has to be redefined for new and broader applications that transcend the borderlines of art history properly speaking.

Historical anthropology—in particular, the research group with this name at the Freie Universität, Berlin—cleaves strongly to the philosophical tradition of Norbert Elias, Helmuth Plessner, and Victor Turner, whose “anthropology of performance” has served as a frequent inspiration.<sup>3</sup> In France there is a similar group, founded by Marc Augé, at the École des hautes études.<sup>4</sup> Augé’s position is best studied in his book *Anthropology for Contemporary Worlds*. His is a social anthropology centered on what he calls “supermodernity” rather than “postmodernism.” In his book *La guerre des rêves* (The war of dreams), Augé explicitly refers to Serge Gruzinski’s work *La guerre des images* (The war of images), in which the author traces the colonization of images in Mexico and its later impact.<sup>5</sup> An issue of the *Revue de l’Homme*, edited by Carlo Severi, assembles a number of contributors from the disciplines of ethnology, social history, and art history under the heading “Image et anthropologie.”<sup>6</sup>

At the College de France, Jean-Pierre Vernant in studying ancient Greece initiated what he termed an “anthropologie historique de l’image,” which was concerned in the main with “le statut de l’image, de l’imagination et de l’imaginaire” (the status of the image, of the imagination, and the imaginary).<sup>7</sup> Vernant brought to light close links that exist between the history of visual artifacts on the one hand and, on the other, the evolution of Greek thought to encompass, within the concept of the image, notions of symbol, resemblance, imitation, and appearance. Greece is a unique case, as we have access not only to its early images but also to the writings of its philosophers, which show us how its art was mirrored in contemporary thought. Our access to the common ground between the terminology of Greek art and Greek philosophy may explain why the heritage of Greece still looms large in our terminology and epistemology.<sup>8</sup>

My aim is to respond to Vernant’s configuration in proposing a close and fundamental interrelation (and even interaction) of image, body, and medium as components in every attempt at picture-making.<sup>9</sup> I made my entrée to this anthropological discourse with the topic “Image and Death” when, in 1995, I participated in a colloquium dedicated to the meaning of death in the different religions and cultures of the world.<sup>10</sup> It soon became clear that I had hit upon a fruitful area of research for a study of the making of images. Body and medium are both involved in the meaning of funereal images, as it is the *missing body* of the dead in whose place images are installed. But these images in turn are in need of an artificial body in order that they might occupy the vacant place of the deceased. This artificial body may be called the “medium” (and not just “material”) in the sense that images needed embodiment in order to acquire visibility. To this end, a *lost body* is exchanged for the *virtual body* of the image. Here we grasp the roots of that very contradiction which will forever characterize images: images make a physical (a body’s) *absence* visible by transforming it into iconic presence. The mediality of images is thus rooted in a body analogy. Our bodies function as media themselves, living media as opposed to fabricated media. Images rely on two symbolic acts which

both involve our living body: the act of *fabrication* and the act of *perception*, the one being the purpose of the other.

In our times we expect that the death of a public persona will be a media event. The picture of the deceased is meant to introduce the dead in their new (only pictorial) status. The picture occupies the same (or a corresponding) place in the mass media as did the portrayed when alive. But whereas the picture represented presence when the person was alive, at the moment of death its meaning changes and it represents absence. We thus experience, even today, the survival of that “symbolic exchange” to which Jean Baudrillard dedicated a famous book.<sup>11</sup>

It is however not the meaning of death but the quest for the image that is our topic here. A somewhat similar perspective, at least in part, characterizes Régis Debray’s book *Vie et mort de l’image*.<sup>12</sup> In the preface, he calls the image a domesticated “terreur,” because its origin “is strongly linked to death.” He rightly insists on the importance of the technological and historical evolution of public media and therefore can say “that any fabricated image is dated by its fabrication as well as by its subsequent reception.” But Debray gives equal weight to images that live only in our thinking and in our imagination. He cites Gaston Bachelard’s formula that “death had first been an image, and it will ever remain an image,” since we do not know what death really *is*.<sup>13</sup>

In order to cope with the intangible nature of the mental image, Debray introduces the gaze in its place, for he considers the gaze as the vector for transmitting mental images to material picture and back. While David Freedberg in *The Power of Images* singled out the “response” to images, Debray insists on the gaze as the force that turns a picture into an image and an image into a picture.<sup>14</sup> “The image draws its meaning from the gaze, much as the text lives from reading.” The gaze, rather than being a mere tool, implies the living body as a whole. The French term *regard*, with the implication of *prendre garde*, has different connotations than the English terms “gaze,” “look,” and “glance.”<sup>15</sup> In English “regard” and “regardful” come closer to what Debray means by “gaze,” as



do the words “watch” or “watch out,” which appear in the linguistic vicinity of the French *regard*. We are condemned to live in the labyrinth of our own languages, which so often restrict and even close off parts of the semantic spectrum, thereby limiting our ability to describe and at the same time also narrowing our very thinking. The same kind of aporia applies to the vocabulary for the practice of transmitting images (rather than producing pictures). It is not by chance that Debray dedicated another book to the process of transmission (*Transmettre*), a term to which he gives a meaning that transcends the banal sense of “communication.”<sup>16</sup>

In anthropological terms, I would argue against the rigid dualism that so often claims to distinguish between “internal” and “external” representation, or “endogenous” and “exogenous” representation to use the terminology current in neurobiological research. Our brain certainly is the site of internal representation. Endogenous images, however, react to exogenous images, which tend to dominate in the ongoing back-and-forth. Images do not exist only on the wall (or on the TV screen), nor do they exist only in our heads. They cannot be extricated from a continuous process of interactions, and that process has left its traces in the history of artifacts. This never ceasing interaction continues even in our era of digital images (*images discrètes*), as Bernard Stiegler has rightly pointed out. “There have never existed physical images (*images objet*) without the participation of mental images, since an image by definition is one that is seen (is in fact *only* one when it is seen). Reciprocally, mental images also rely on objective images in the sense that they are the *retour* or the *rémanence* of the latter. The question of the image is always related to that of the trace and of the inscription.”<sup>17</sup> In other words, mental images are inscribed in external ones and vice versa. Augé, for example, speaks of the “dreams” that the individual has, as against the “icons” derived from the public realm that live on in our dreams.<sup>18</sup> In the realm of dreams, the give and take between the private and the collective *imaginaire* is fodder for those who desire political control; in other words, for manipulation by politicians.

I argue in this book that the interaction between our bodies and external images includes a third parameter, one which I call a “medium,” in the sense of a vector, agent, *dispositif* the French would say. The medium functions as a support, host, and tool for the image. This notion may meet with some resistance, as we are familiar with the term “media” only in the sense of “mass media.” Two observations may help to clarify my argument. First, I do not speak of images *as* media, as is often done, but instead of their need *for* and use *of* media in order to be transmitted to us and to become visible for us. The same images may even migrate in history from one medium to the other, or they may accumulate features and traces of several media in one and the same place. Second, I would contend that our bodies themselves operate as a living medium by processing, receiving, and transmitting images. It is on account of this in-born capacity of our bodies (our minds as part of our bodies) that we are able to distinguish media from images, so that we understand an image to be neither a simple object (a photographic print, for example) nor a real body (the body of the loved one in the photograph). The evolution of pictorial media, in other words, is one thing (the invention of photography, say) and mental disposition (the memory of earlier media or the memory of older images in newer media) another thing. The distinction between image and medium also explains our deliberate, intentional shifts of focus from the one to the other. The role of the human user in choosing what to consider often remains forgotten in the theory of media, but it is this very part of the equation that helps us to understand the “anachronism,” to quote G. Didi-Huberman, that is inherent in human imagination and that counteracts the mere linear progress of technical evolution as shown by the visual media.

Two examples will serve to clarify the distinction between image and medium. Iconoclasm, which is violence against images, only succeeds in destroying the medium or medium-support of an image; i.e., its tangible and material or technical aspect. It leaves untouched the image itself, for the image remains with the viewer—and this is so even though it was the destruction of the image that was intended by the act of iconoclasm. Iconoclasm, by depriving an image of its physical

presence, aims also to deprive it of its public presence, its existence in the public sphere. Destruction in such a case is as symbolic as the original installation or introduction of the image into the public space. The destruction is directed against the image (an icon of the enemy in the public imagination, for example), but in fact it damages only the stone or bronze of the medium. When the colossal Saddam statues in Bagdad were overturned, the destroyers were enacting a symbolic victory over the tyrant via his image. But the mere elimination of a public statue or a picture cannot guarantee what it ultimately intends; namely, oblivion or contempt for the image in the minds of the people.

The distinction between image and medium becomes equally apparent when we consider the inherent nature of images as the *presence of an absence*. The image is present to our gaze, certainly. But that presence, or visibility, relies on the medium in which the image appears, whether on a monitor or embodied in an old statue. In their own right, images testify to the absence of that which they make present. By virtue of the media in which they are produced, they already *own* the very presence that they are meant to transmit. The stone or bronze or photograph now owns the only *presence* that is possible, which is in fact the *absence* of the real object. In this lies the paradox of images—in the fact that they *are* or *mean* the presence of an absence—and this paradox is in part a result of our capacity to distinguish image and medium. We are willing to credit images with the representation of absence, because they are present by virtue of their chosen medium. They need a presence as medium in order to symbolize the absence of what they represent. The body analogy here comes into play again. The relation between absence, understood as invisibility, and presence, understood as visibility, is in the final instance a body experience. Memory is a body experience, as it generates images of absent events or people remembered from another time or place. We tend to *imagine* as present what in fact has long been absent, and we impute the same ability to the pictures (such as photographs of the dead) that we fabricate. The mediality of pictures is thus the missing link between images and our bodies.

To illustrate what this book intends to do, I will use as an example a 1974 work by the Korean-born video artist Nam June Paik. The archetype of his long series of TV-Buddhas, this work employs the short-circuit technique, which was state-of-the-art at the time ([Fig. I.1](#)).<sup>19</sup> A short circuit, produced by a video camera, projects the same image twenty-five times a second onto a TV monitor. That image is of a Buddha statue, which itself is placed in front of the TV screen. The work reflects (and parodies) the relation between TV and TV viewer. It also is reminiscent of the then-current fascination with life images, which J. C. Bringuier in the *Cahiers du cinéma* called the “mystique du direct.” Bringuier illustrated immediacy in time between picture and viewer with a 1961 photograph of a newscaster on French TV whose image is caught on the monitor while he speaks.<sup>20</sup> In his TV Buddha, Paik offers a configuration of image, medium, and body that looks like a subversive demonstration of the way in which their interaction works.



Fig. I.1. Nam June Paik, Installation view of the exhibition “Projects: Nam June Paik” at the Museum of Modern Art, New York. August 29, 1977 through October 10, 1977. Gelatin silver print, 17.8 x 24.1 cm. Photographic Archive. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Digital image © The Museum of Modern Art/ Licenced by SCALA/Art Resource, NY.

There are two media here (statue and TV), but only one Buddha image—for the Buddha Figure already is an image, and it creates or reflects the same image, as if in a mirror. A viewer is included as well, who receives an image of his or her own. Paik does not address the usual viewer, but instead represents Buddha as a viewer. By means of the so-called Buddha statue (which incidentally is not actually a statue of a Buddha but of a Buddhist monk), and the mirror (which is not actually reflecting but rather simulated by the short circuit between the camera and monitor), Paik creates a deceiving tautology between the speed of the new medium (TV) and the sculptural immobility of the old medium (the statue), both of Japanese origin but the one recent, the other several centuries old. As we compare the dual medium (the one old and three-dimensional, the other new and electronic), the non-identity of image and medium is confirmed. The image we see twice is neither in front of the TV (the statue) nor on the TV screen. It emerges in our gaze, and with a paradoxical ambiguity, for it straddles the boundary between two media which both receive it and yet do not catch it. In a 1974 performance, which took place beside the work, the artist himself replaced the sitting statue in front of the TV, thus offering yet another variant of the circular interrelation of image, medium, and body.

A note on how the present book, originally published in German in 2001, fits into the context of my long-term research may be of some interest to the reader. Its antecedents were such publications as *Likeness and Presence* (in German, *Bild und Kult*) whose reach excluded antiquity and also bypassed modern picture practice, and thus seemed to restrict my inquiry to picture-making.<sup>21</sup> In 2003, lectures at the Collège de France opened my eyes to the significance of the human gaze in picture theory. They took me into a *histoire du regard* (history of the gaze) and thus expanded my understanding of the three concepts—image, medium, and body—which guide the present book. The first products of the Paris lectures were two essays published in an anthology titled *Bilderfragen* (Picture issues).<sup>22</sup> Essays on the window paradigm in the history of looking and on our changing view of the heavens followed.<sup>23</sup> The most important result, however, was a book

published in 2008 with the title *Florenz und Bagdad. Eine westöstliche Geschichte des Blicks*,<sup>24</sup> due to be published in translation by Harvard University Press in 2011, with the new subtitle: Arab Science and Renaissance Art. Its main arguments have been summarized in English in the short essay “Perspective: Arab Mathematics and Renaissance Western Art,” which appeared in a 2008 issue of *European Review*.<sup>25</sup> Finally, a book should be mentioned that exists in German and French only (*Das echte Bild*), which asks the question why humans, despite all evidence that the quest is hopeless, nonetheless continue to search for something like a *true* image, especially in the religious sphere.<sup>26</sup>

I cannot let the present book go without a few remarks on the unavoidable pitfalls of translation. Despite a close collaboration with the patient translator, Thomas Dunlap, who was an incredible help, the results are far from what I would like them to be. A book that has been thought and written in German, should be rewritten, and reconceived, as a new book in English—a task impossible for me to even consider. Nam June Paik, a great artist and a playful user of such languages as German, English, French, Korean, and Japanese, once wrote that we believe we think *with* or *in* languages, but more often languages think with us. I subscribe to the truth of this statement wholeheartedly. My desperation with the translation grew to a point where I decided to omit an entire chapter because it seemed to resist any meaningful translation. That chapter, “*Das Körperbild als Menschenbild. Eine Repräsentation in der Krise*,” can be found only in the French, Spanish, and several other translations. The reader may be startled or irritated by some passages in the present translation. I therefore offer the following chapter in hopes that it will clarify at the outset some of the fundamental ideas developed in the rest of the book. Also of possible help are two essays published in English in *Critical Inquiry* and in the *Clark Studies in the Visual Arts*, both in 2005.<sup>27</sup>

# An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body

## Pictorial Theory and Media Theory

While it has become fashionable in recent years to speak about “images,” this discourse has brought to light considerable confusion in the language that people use, a confusion that is merely glossed over by the word “image.” In German, for example, *Bild* is used for both “image” and “picture.” Though people are not talking about the same thing, they are nonetheless using the same word. Some authors create the impression that images circulate in disembodied form, which is not even true of images in imagination and memory, for they, after all, colonize our bodies. Others associate images broadly with the visual realm, as if to suggest that everything that is visual is an image. The “image,” however, is defined not by its mere visibility but by its being invested, by the beholder, with a symbolic meaning and a kind of mental “frame.” Still others identify images wholesale with iconic signs, thus disregarding the difference between the semiotic and the iconic. Finally, there is a school of thought that seeks to protect art from being contaminated by images from mass media or other sources. This confusion of words and meanings gives rise again and again to new controversies in which

definitions are contested. As a result, we not only speak in the same way about very different images, but we also apply very different modes of discourse to the same kinds of images.<sup>1</sup>

If one chooses an anthropological approach—understanding anthropology in the European sense of historical or cultural anthropology—one cannot ignore the inherent dual meaning of the symbolic entity we call the “image.” It is a phenomenon that is both internal and external, and this very duality betrays its anthropological grounding. An “image” is more than a product of perception. It is created as the result of personal or collective knowledge and intention. We live with images, we comprehend the world in images. And this living repertory of our internal images connects with the physical production of external pictures that we stage in the social realm.

An anthropological approach has a different aim than an approach based on the evolution of, say, technical media or art. From the perspective of anthropology, we are not the masters of our images, but rather in a sense at their mercy; they colonize our bodies (our brains), so that even if it seems that we are in charge of generating them, and even though society attempts unceasingly to control them, it is in fact the images that are in control.<sup>2</sup> Images both affect and reflect the changing course of human history. They leave, for example, no doubt about how changeable human nature is. Societies discard images that they have invented themselves as soon as they no longer do their intended service. Instead of reinventing themselves, people reinvent the images they live with. Uncertainty about themselves creates the desire to change the images of their self-representation. The alleged permanence of human nature is in fact soundly contradicted by the history of images.

Picture-making, a social practice in which all cultures engage, has to be distinguished from visual perception or the generation of inner, mental pictures, for example. The question “What is a picture?” seems to ask what is it that a picture consists of, what subjects or themes does it portray, and so forth. But this “what” of the picture cannot be understood



without the “how,” without in other words some understanding of the visual strategy by which the “what” is carried out. It is also doubtful whether one can isolate the “what” in the sense of content or theme from the “how” of its creation, its mise-en-scène. The “how” is the true statement, the real speech of pictures.

However, the “how” is, in turn, influenced by the chosen media through which we perceive pictures in the external world and with the help of which they become visible. Although images themselves can be seen as mediums of cognition whose transmission differs from that of texts, they are visual because of what makes them visible; because, that is, of their carrier mediums, regardless of whether they appear in a painting, a photographic print, or on a monitor. But the concept of pictorial media, the media of pictures, still needs a proper discourse. Pictorial theories do not belong to the same intellectual tradition as media theories, and this makes it necessary to accord the mediality of all images a separate place within the “physics of the image.”<sup>3</sup> This raises the question of whether the digital image as well fits in such a media history, or whether—as seems to be the preference today—it calls for an entirely new discourse. Digital technologies generate mental images, such as imaginary spaces and fictitious narratives, and they therefore call for an observer trained in the digital realm to explain how image-medium cooperation works in this new world. The synthetic image invites us to a different synthesis than did analogue image media. And for that very reason Bernard Stiegler has placed it within a new “history of representation” that “would be, above all, a history of media, of the carriers of representation.”<sup>4</sup>

I propose to speak of image and medium as two sides of the same coin, though they split in our gaze and mean different things. *The picture is the image with a medium.* The latter, understood in this way, encompasses both “form” and “matter,” which are discrete concepts when we talk about works of art and aesthetic objects. Here, however, that familiar discourse about form and matter, which is at bottom a variant on the age-old schism between spirit and matter, is not what

interests us.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the distinction between “idea” and “execution” that so exercises students in the art field, does not apply to the relationship between image and medium, with its still largely unexplored dynamic. The picture calls instead for a new discussion with reference to its place within the history of pictorial media. But it also requires a spectator who is able to animate the media as though images were living things. Image perception, a form of animation, is a symbolic act that is guided by cultural patterns and pictorial technologies.

The concept of media, in fact, complements that of image and body. It provides the “missing link,” as it were, for *the medium helps us to see that the image neither equates with living bodies nor with the lifeless object*. The distinction between image and medium is rooted in the self-experience of our body. The images of memory and imagination are generated in one’s own body; the body is the living medium through which they are experienced. In turn the distinction between *memory* as the body’s own image archive, and *remembrance* as the body’s own generation of images has implications for this body experience.<sup>6</sup> In situations of iconoclasm, pictures are prohibited from taking material form (from being given a visible medium) in an effort to protect people from what are deemed false images. Magical practice operates in the opposite direction, consecrating pictures in order to overcome dead matter and put the material substance of the picture to work. In other words, iconoclasm tries to render the medium powerless, while magic endows the medium with power.

The mediality of images involves a two-fold body reference. First, we conceive of media as symbolic or virtual bodies. Second, the media inscribe themselves upon our body experience and teach us self-perception or self-oblivion: in other words, they both remind us of our body and make us forget it. As a result, we are primed *to acknowledge pictures as different kinds of bodies*. This is true even for electronic media, which engage in the disembodiment of images. Yet a disembodiment is nothing but another form of body-experience for which historical parallels exist. Even the virtual

body, an extended self perception, happens with the sensory organs of our bodies.

The notion that pictures are images embodied in media brings our body, a living medium of its own, back into the discussion.<sup>7</sup> Semiotics, one of modernity's great achievements in abstraction, has separated the world of signs from the world of bodies.<sup>8</sup> And signs belong to the cognitive rather than the sensory realm, so much so that in semiotic discourse even pictures often seem to be reduced to iconic signs, a symmetry between linguistic and visual signs (as well as the primacy of language as the guiding system) being elementary for semiotics. Such a functionalist approach was soon imposed on the concept of image. It did away with the body, just as it discarded language.

Today, many media theories assign images a secondary role or limit themselves to a single pictorial medium, such as film or photography. A *general* theory of pictorial media does not exist, and there are historical reasons for this. Medieval iconology, which made a critical theological issue of the materiality or lifelessness of images, was discarded during the Renaissance in favor of art theory that turned the discourse in a different direction: toward the artist and the autonomous work of art. The Reformation further widened this gap. Modern art history, in its turn, has studied the picture as "art work." By contrast, philosophical aesthetics diverted the gaze from the artifact and favored an abstract way of speaking about images. Psychology—in Gestalt theory—examined the image as the construct of a spectator. Other disciplines favored a history of progress and invention. In the course of these various shifts of focus and fashion, media theory with respect to images was not given a proper chance.

The old iconology is still waiting to be updated. When Erwin Panofsky introduced the term "iconology" in art history, he narrowed it to the text-based reading of Renaissance art. But it is one thing to speak of the meanings of pictures with the help of texts and another to address pictures for what they are and how they operate.<sup>9</sup> W.J.T. Mitchell reconsidered the concept of iconology in his book of the same title, seeing it as

a method by which images are not so much explained via texts as distinguished from them. However, his “critical iconology,” as he calls it, does not distinguish between images and “visual culture” in general. That was a distinction he made in a second book, titled *Picture Theory*. Here *pictures* are set apart from *images*; pictures are physical images, or “representational objects in which images appear.” I would prefer rather to speak of *media* in which images appear.<sup>10</sup>

In art history, images are treated as almost synonymous with art works. When Theodor Hetzer in 1931 lectured “On the History of the Picture,” he was looking for the picture solely in painting, the formal principles of which he intended to examine. He went so far as to see in photography, the modern pictorial medium par excellence, “the end of the picture,” for this medium no longer favored Gestalt form.<sup>11</sup> Art history had come about as the analysis of art works. This limitation of the discipline was the reason why Aby Warburg sought to turn it into a history of culture. During World War I, he called himself a “picture historian,” studying the visual propaganda of the warring parties. A few years later he explored word and image in the printed media of the Reformation period. Warburg’s followers, however, soon broke ranks with this use of “picture history” and restored the approach to the exclusive service of art history.<sup>12</sup>

In 1931, two years after Warburg’s death, Edgar Wind revised Warburg’s concept of *Kulturwissenschaft* (culture history), narrowing its focus to aesthetic questions. For Wind, images only served the “conceptual understanding of the essence of art,” with the Renaissance furnishing a supposedly timeless paradigm of what art *is*. In the process, the project of founding a new kind of iconology was deliberately given up. This explains as well why Wind avoided media theory by equating the carrier medium of pictures with “any manner of form palpable to the handling (*hantierenden*) person” in which the “works of art are transmitted.”<sup>13</sup>

Ernst Cassirer had a different concept of media. In his *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, which he developed in Warburg’s shadow, he distinguished the verbal from the

pictorial, describing the latter as “sensuously visual” while the former is “not burdened with a sensuous existence of its own.” In his world of symbols, images, like words, must serve insight and understanding. Cassirer charged that the “gaze of the mind” was too easily distracted by them, so that it failed to make the proper use of them, failed to use them as a “medium” for cognition. For Cassirer, images themselves were a medium and as such inferior to language.<sup>14</sup>

The art historian Julius von Schlosser developed an anthropology of pictorial media in the course of his early work on ceroplastics. However, he identified in the creation of lifelike waxworks an undercurrent of magical thinking. His notion of “pictorial magic” (*Bildzauber*) diverted the discussion, so that in the end, Schlosser failed to distinguish representation from magic. It is in the same vein that he misunderstood the symbolic function of the pictorial medium as a material condition. The problem with wax models lay with their “use of natural materials,” such as hair and clothing, which he saw as an insult to the idea of art, art being an autonomous form set apart from life. Schlosser reminded us that Schopenhauer had rejected the wax image because it had not redeemed form from matter. Schopenhauer equated the picture with the work of art, and therefore was able to say that the latter “stands nearer to the Idea than it does to reality.” In his view, it was this nearness to the Idea that made possible genuine aesthetic experience.<sup>15</sup>

However, it is not only in the realm of art that we like to distinguish matter from representation. That is why we are frightened by *lifelike* dolls, which escape the unequivocal distinction between body and picture, as it exists, for example, in stone or bronze representations. *What in the realm of bodies and objects is their matter, in the world of pictures is their medium. As images by definition have no body, they need a medium in which they become embodied.* Pictures from early funereal cult have materialized, through stone or clay, in an artificial medium that they trade for the decayed bodies of the dead.<sup>16</sup> The antithesis of form and matter, which has become a law in art, is rooted in the difference between image and medium.

Already in the Renaissance, the concept of art excluded wax images, death masks, and hybrid votives that could not quite fit the definition of sculpture, as Georges Didi-Huberman has demonstrated in reading Giorgio Vasari's verdicts.<sup>17</sup> The dichotomy between art works and pictures was finally codified with the emergence of academic art history in the nineteenth century. New pictorial technologies, such as photography, were excluded from its purview, and thus the door was closed on the majority of modern media.

### The Contemporary Polemic against Images

Michel Foucault was the first to speak of what he called a "crisis of representation," a crisis for which he held the new world of pictures responsible. Jean Baudrillard has gone so far as to call pictures "murderers of the real." The real here is turned into an ontological certainty before which pictures capitulate—as they should. Only past ages, he seems to believe, were able to reconcile pictures with the real. But we forget that those ages, too, constructed their social reality in pictures, whose authority shaped the collective imagination. The crisis of representation is actually a crisis of reference, something we are no longer certain pictures are capable of. Pictures fail only when we no longer credit them as representations of the real. Baudrillard blamed pictures in which we cannot read proof of the real (calling them "simulacra"), just as he suspected that simulation subverts the equivalence of sign and meaning.<sup>18</sup>

The crisis of representation comes to the fore also in the *digital image*, where ontological issues seem to have been replaced by issues of production technology. We mistrust pictures that are brought into being by methods that no longer rely on re-presentation. Do these synthetic images or, better, virtual pictures, fall outside the bounds of our definition of the image, or do they perhaps lay the foundations for an entirely new conception of the image, one that departs radically from the past history of this concept? We seem to have reached a juncture where we can either proclaim the end times of the image or rejoice over the advent of something completely new.



In such circumstances, we clearly are forced now to rethink our notions of the image. “Without any doubt, we know less and less what an image is,” Raymond Bellour remarked in summarizing a contemporary discussion, but he admitted that it is not easy, either, “to be certain what it was at other times.” For Éric Alliez the need for some continuity with the past of the image is a need for a history, a need that anthropology and technology share. Only when continuity exists, he argues, will the synthetic image be recognized as a legitimate new mode of perception for which new criteria are needed.<sup>19</sup>

In regard to film and video, where sound and movement seem to appropriate privileges once reserved for life alone, Derrida speaks of “the living image of the living” (*image vivante du vivant*), a paradox that seems, in a manner of speaking, to steal the show away from life.<sup>20</sup> But film and video are in the end only another chapter in the old story of competition between art and real life. To be sure, a definitive break came when virtual technology gave us pictures of virtual worlds, for these pictures do indeed seem to sever all dependence on real life by creating life on their own. The problem here is that pictures lose their authority the more they operate on a level of unreality that ignores our basic need for the real. We want to do more with images than merely to play with them, for (in secret, perhaps) we do still believe in the image. But the more the image serves a fiction, the more it loses its authority as symbol. Even virtuality requires a link back to reality as a meaningful background against which to operate.

Are our own images betraying us? Do they still represent something beyond themselves? There are plenty of reasons to raise these questions. But we must resist the temptation to proclaim that we have reached so radical a juncture that comparison with past ages is no longer possible. We all too easily confound images with the fact of their mass production and with their semantic hollowness, features that we ourselves impose upon them. If the images of our own making are misused for political or economic purposes, whose fault is that but our own?<sup>21</sup> We encounter a similar problem when we abolish the distinction between images and their media and

thus disregard a distinction that has played a vital role in history. The new “technologies of images” of which Jacques Derrida speaks “undoubtedly call for new modes of perception.” And yet, Derrida’s observation pertains more to the surfaces on which images appear than to the images themselves.<sup>22</sup> It is quite clear then that we need an anthropological perspective to ground the double nature of images. Without such solid ground we risk reducing images to mere artifacts of technology.

## Mental and Physical Images

Images are produced and transmitted by the media current in their own times. The interplay between image and technology, old and new, constitutes a symbolic act. The response, the audience’s perception of the image, is also a symbolic act. This dynamic is best illustrated by pictures that occupy public space and do so by virtue of a medium chosen by some authorized agency. It is this official *mise-en-scène*, be it religious or political in nature, that initiates the collective act of perception. Within the triad image-medium-body, medium refers to the technology or artisanship that transmits the image and to whatever it is that gives visibility to the image; “body” refers to the living body, the spectator. Images should neither be separated from nor confounded with their medial technologies.<sup>23</sup> In the former case they are reduced to mere phantoms, in the latter to mere technique. This false dichotomy is, in part, the result of a false dualism between internal (endogenous) images and external (exogenous) pictures, the latter having a technical or man-made body that catches our eye. This dualism is nothing more than a new twist on the old distinction between mind and matter.<sup>24</sup> In fact, the mental and physical images of any given age (dreams and icons) interact so closely that it is difficult to separate them neatly. Public images have always controlled personal imagination; and the personal imagination, in turn, either cooperates with them or resists them.<sup>25</sup>

Neuroscience has identified the locus of “internal representation,” to quote Olaf Breidbach, in the perceptual



apparatus and, above all, in the brain's neural structures.<sup>26</sup> And of course the sciences themselves today make use of imaging technologies to generate artifacts that function not in a neutral or objective, but in a culturally specific way. James Elkins considers such "nonart images" from the perspectives of history and formal analysis.<sup>27</sup> Our internal images are not necessarily personal in nature, but even when they are collective in origin, we internalize them in such a way that we come to consider them as our own. We perceive the world as individuals, all the time making use of the collective conventions of the day. The same holds true for the changing modes of media that allow us to date pictures to a given moment in history. However much they may represent an individual experience, they are time-bound just as their media (photography, film, etc.) are time-bound. We endow them with personal meaning, pass them through the filter of what might be termed our own personal censorship. As perceived pictures they turn into remembered images that henceforth become part of the archive of our memory. When external pictures are re-embodied as our own images, we substitute for their fabricated medium our own body, which, when it serves in this capacity, turns into a living or natural medium.<sup>28</sup> The given medium that shapes our attention, not only has a physical constitution, but also a station in history. Media, that is, are subject to historical tides, to the forces of progress and the caprice of fashion. The pictures that media transmit are therefore also subject to change, even though our sensory organs do not change. Plainly then, pictorial media are not extrinsic to pictures, but inseparable from them.

Inherent in every medium is its capacity either to catch our attention for its own sake, or just the opposite, to conceal its presence within the picture. The more attention we pay to the medium and its navigating force, the less we concentrate on the image it carries. Conversely, the less we take notice of a medium's presence, the more we are captured by the image, until it seems to us that the latter exists by itself. There is, then, an ambiguity in the relationship between image and medium, arising from the fact that the relationship is ever-changing. Today, for example, it is not unusual for an image to

acquire appeal because it presents itself to us via a seductive carrier medium, perhaps one that presents technological novelty. Critics of pictures always point to the deceptive and “blind” power of images, alleging that they are “dead matter,” reducible to nothing more than their media. When pictures have exerted an illegitimate effect or disseminated false ideas, their opponents have, accordingly, sought to destroy them, only to find that what they could destroy was only their media. Deprived of their media, however, pictures do cease to have a social presence.

### The Analogy between Bodies and Media

When we celebrate history as progress from a magical to a rational attitude, we are expressing the opposite of an anthropological stance.<sup>29</sup> The same is true of the attitude that considers picture-making an archaic exercise. Images, we often read, either mature into language (with its control of symbols) or into art.<sup>30</sup> The making of images seems thus a relapse into magical ages, and an anthropology that deals with such practices comes under suspicion as betraying history’s progress. But, as we shall see, the history of images is ongoing, persisting or even flourishing alongside the other media and symbols that all cultures employ to generate meaning, and “historical anthropology” offers new insights into this continuing history.<sup>31</sup>

In the history of pictorial media, images migrate across the boundaries that separate generations and cultures. Any given picture belongs of course to a particular point in time and is datable by the media and technology that it employs; all the same, the respective image can transcend such boundaries by symbolizing recurring human experience or the ever-changing experience of the body. The history of images, then, can also be read as a cultural history of the human body. To be sure, the physical body does not change over historical time, but body concept has been redefined time and again, and these redefinitions require visualization. The record of humankind’s ever-changing view of the human body is thus recorded in the history of images.<sup>32</sup> An image may either affirm or deny the

physical, asserting either the immanence of the body or the transcendence of it. But these are only two of many ways of dealing with the body as a social subject. Pictures—including digital media, and in fact all media before or after—can alter the perception of our bodies, representing us as we wish we could be. They can, for example, turn into *artificial bodies* that cannot die.<sup>33</sup>

Already in antiquity *mirrors* represented bodies as they were not. The mirror presents us with a flat surface of metal or glass, a medium in other words, and one that, although it is in fact the blank opposite of our bodies, yet returns our body as image (Fig. 1.2). We receive an image that we take for a body.<sup>34</sup> Alberti's "symbolic window," which symbolizes the Renaissance picture, became—as a transparent surface—the ancestor of the screen. Mirror and easel pictures both serve to "translate" three-dimensional bodies into a medium whose flat surface contradicts the body. Such a two-dimensional projection of a three-dimensional body is already described in the ancient tale, recorded by Pliny, of a Corinthian woman who held on to her lover by outlining the shadow his body had cast on the wall at his departure. The wall served as medium, securing the trace of a body that once stood before it and left behind an indexical image, prefiguring in a sense a modern photograph.<sup>35</sup>

Bodies are revealed to the light by the shadows that they themselves create. Of themselves light and shadow are without corporeality, and yet it is with their help that we see bodies in their three-dimensionality. They are, as it were, the natural media of the gaze. In his writings, Leonardo da Vinci confronted this paradox that lies between the body and the way we perceive the body. "The shadow," he observed, "is the medium through which the body reveals its form." He noted also that shadows follow the body everywhere, but also extend beyond the outlines of the body. The uses of light and shadow, however, vary from medium to medium. Whereas modern photography captures the body by tracing light, ancient Greek shadow painting (*skiagraphia*) was understood as the use of shadow to represent bodies. *Skiagraphia* picks up shadow whereas photography picks up light.



Fig. 1.1. Elliott Erwitt. Italy, Venice, 1965. Photo: Elliott Erwitt/Magnum Photos.

Pictures have always been dependent on a given medium, whether it was a lump of clay or the smooth wall of a cave. Artificial bodies (media) give them birth, control their visible appearance. It is their media that furnish them with both visibility and physical presence in the public realm. Today we may see them on monitors that are placed in hotel rooms, sited as if they were house altars transmitting images into a private sphere.

The terms “multimedia” and “mass media” so dominate today’s discourse, that if we are to use “media” in a different sense it will be necessary to clarify what exactly it is that we now mean by the word. Marshall McLuhan speaks of media as prostheses that improve our body’s grasp of time and space.<sup>36</sup> In art historical parlance “medium” is commonly used either of the genre in which an artwork is produced or of the material used by an artist. When I speak of a “medium,” however, I am talking about that which conveys or hosts an image, making it visible, turning it into a picture. Media are time-bound and have histories of their own. We speak of the history of artistic styles (George Kubler), but pictorial media are equally defined by their history.<sup>37</sup>

The terminology we use to talk about pictorial media lacks a means for making the kind of distinction that we can draw between writing and speech. Spoken language is tied to the body that speaks, while written language detaches itself from the body. The corporeal act of speaking, in which voice and ear take part, is replaced in the act of reading script by the linear motion of the eye that travels across an artificial medium. The further step away from the body and toward abstraction took place in the era of the invention of mechanical printing.<sup>38</sup> In the case of pictures, media are needed to provide images with a visible, external support. The mediality of pictures, however, is insufficiently noted. In our discourse we do not distinguish the image from the medium the way we distinguish writing from speech.

Mediality has yet another meaning when it comes to the images that provide scientists and doctors entrée to a world not directly accessible to our senses. The capacity of such images surpasses that of our “naked” eye.<sup>39</sup> They arm us with a kind of optical prosthesis, a tool (a technology, if you will) that expands our natural powers of perception. As a result, our vision escapes our corporeal control. Much the same holds true for the mass media. Their mediality attracts more attention than their message. In current thinking about media, it is often the technology that takes center stage. As a result, the triangle image-body-medium usually lacks one of its three components—most often the body. Thus, too, the collective imaginary still lacks a link both to physical pictures and to the human body.<sup>40</sup> But the body, it seems, remains the connecting link between technology and mind, medium and image.

## The Difference between Image and Medium

The use of pictorial media can be traced back to funeral cult ([chapter four](#)). In cult usage, the dead exchange their bodies for an image that remains present. In order to give that image a presence, to make possible the re-presentation of the lost body, a medium becomes essential. We may speak of it as a medium between death and life. For such archetypal images, presence was far more important than likeness to the person



represented. A relative latecomer to this tradition of death rituals was the modern “medium,” of nineteenth-century spiritual séances.<sup>41</sup> A living person offered his or her body to a dead person as a “medium,” who would transmit the voice of the departed. Here the ancient notion of giving embodiment to the dead (not in an image, but in a living person) returned in a hybrid form.

The use of a medium to experience an image is analogous to the way in which we experience our own bodies as media through which we both give birth to inner images and receive images from the outside world. These mental images happen within our bodies, like dreams, and in both cases—that is, in the case of dream and mental image—we perceive the image as if it were using our body merely as a host medium. The mediality of images however stems from another body experience: we transfer the visibility that bodies possess to the visibility that images acquire through their media. The latter create presence, just as invisibility denotes absence. Presence and absence are inextricably intertwined in the riddle of the image. The image is present in its medium (otherwise we could not see it), and yet it refers to the absence of that entity of which it is a representation. The “here and now” of images coincides with the medium in which they appear to us.<sup>42</sup>

Yet the difference between the image and its medium is more complex. The image always has a mental quality, the medium always a material one, even if they both form a single entity in our perception. The presence of the image, however, entails a deception, for the image is not present the same way its medium is present. It needs the act of animation by which our imagination draws it from its medium. In the process, the opaque medium becomes the transparent conduit for its image. Thus the ambiguity of presence and absence extends even to the medium in which the image is born, for in reality it is not the medium but the spectator who engenders the image within his or her self.

There was in the Middle Ages considerable interest in the consonance of presence and absence in pictures that had survived from earlier periods. By their visible presence these

old works made it possible for bygone ages to subsist into the present; the work contained, as it were, the period in which it was created, as if in suspension. An old Madonna, for example, continued to remain present as an image, because through its physical presence in a statue it shared the time of its creation with its beholders.<sup>43</sup> Today, by contrast, we are fascinated less by bridges across time than by the crossing of space, as for example by television images that transport us to another place “out there.” TV bridges an absence in space, not in time. In the process, we exchange the place where we are for the place we are looking at. The “here and now” is changed into a “there and now,” where we can, we think, be present without our bodies. But a global newscast still requires a validating eyewitness in the person of the reporter who occupies, as it were, the site of the events in our name. The illusion of our presence on the scene in real time breaks down, moreover, when a few moments later the same segment is rebroadcast; for now, in spite of its “live” appearance, we know it for a memory and realize that it in fact does not “live” any longer.

The screen is the dominant pictorial medium of our times, but its function is a complicated one. It does not present us with simple images, but rather transmits images by means that are under the control of commercial and political interests. Régis Debray distinguishes “transmission,” with its political overtones, from disinterested “communication.”<sup>44</sup> Transmission takes place via a medium that channels the perceptions of a mass audience. To the extent that the audience takes such images for the real world, it disregards the strategies employed by the medium. We expect pictorial media to fulfill our desire to see things as they really are, and not merely as the medium would have them appear. But we are more familiar with the medium, the means of transmission, than we are with the images that are transmitted. In fact in order to *believe* images, we require that they come to us through familiar, accepted media. Such symbolic frames, however, are inherently selective; they dance to tunes of which we are hardly aware. Images do not come into our awareness

absent their media; absent, that is, a contemporary mode of representation. Such is their condition.

One might say that images resemble nomads. They migrate across the boundaries that separate one culture from another, taking up residence in the media of one historical place and time and then moving on to the next, like desert wanderers setting up temporary camps. The spectacle of images on the move to ever-newer media forces the audience to adjust its perception, to stay on its toes if it is to remain in the game. Today, however, the much-lamented excess of image-production, while it stimulates us, at the same time anaesthetizes us from the onslaught of images. They come at us at a rapid pace, but they disappear from our sight with equal speed, and so our body, the “locus of images” puts forth its own defenses. It endows some images with symbolic meaning and admits them to memory, others it consumes and forgets. Throughout history, whenever an attempt is made to curb the power of images, it is their medium that is the focus of attention. Iconoclastic movements exercise their destruction on media, dead matter, thinking that they might thereby deprive images of life. Some, guided by spiritual interests, rejected pictorial media as an interference of matter and technique in the spiritual realm. Those guided by political interests, accused their opponents of misusing images for their own purposes or of disseminating false images.<sup>45</sup> Whatever the exact nature of their motivation, it was always at times of conflict, when an image became controversial, that people began to pay attention to the media that gave it its pictorial presence. Under other circumstances media are tacitly accepted if they are noticed at all.

It is only in the realm of aesthetics that we take pleasure in the ambiguity of fiction and fact, of image and medium. As soon as we find ourselves intrigued by the contrast between the illusion of depth in a painting and the flat surface of the canvas, we enter this realm of the consciously aesthetic in which our appreciation shifts from image to medium. Cognizant of this dynamic, Venetian Renaissance painters began to work on an especially rough canvas that would draw attention to the way in which the paint lay on the surface, thus



granting to the medium, to painting itself, a presence of its own.<sup>46</sup>

The art critic Clement Greenberg took this further, arguing that painting had to free itself completely from images of the world and henceforth exhibit only its mediality; namely, canvas and color.<sup>47</sup> His stance amounted to an unusual kind of iconoclasm. In the face of the explosion of images in the mass media of his day, the phenomenon that so interested his contemporary Marshall McLuhan, Greenberg admonished artists to turn away from images, to leave them to the mass media. Art should instead concentrate on its own proper medium; meaning that artists should turn to abstraction.

### The Body as Picture

As we have seen, the body is a “site” where mental images take place. But thanks to its outward appearance, the body can also carry a picture in its own right. The oldest example of this is body decoration, such as we find in so-called “primitive” cultures. Here decoration functions as a kind of mask, and the mask, whether it is paint or an actual artifact that can put on and taken off, serves as a *pars pro toto* for the transformation of our body into a picture. But the picture that we produce with our body or on the body does not represent the body as such; rather, it uses the body as a carrier medium. In other words, the body can function both as a medium for its own images and as a medium that carries a picture. The mask is again the most concrete example. When it is worn by the body, the mask exchanges the latter (the body) for an image in which the invisible (the body), and the visible (the picture) form a single entity.<sup>48</sup>

Artifacts that represent a person rupture this somatic unity, substituting an artificial medium for a living body. What in the one case is displayed on the body itself, in the other is transferred to an artificial body that we call a medium. This transfer has the well-known drawback of rendering the body mute. Artifacts, such as sculptures, forfeit the life that a living body displays, and as a result they require animation. In other words, we are called upon to supply to the artifact our own

empathy. Today we possess technological methods that can simulate life, but a measure of empathy is still required.

The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss explains the relationship between body and image using the ornamented face. When a face is ornamented, the painting makes a (new) face. In some early cultures, the face does not even function as a social entity until it has been decorated or covered by a mask. Lévi-Strauss believed that the mirror-like symmetry of many decorative patterns—as found, for example, on vessels and textiles—points back to their origin as designs used in face painting ([Fig. 1.2](#)). Through the doubling of the design on either side of the vertical (facial) axis or the horizontal (eye) axis, the symmetrical design represents, as it were, the social body on the physical body ([Fig. 1.3](#)).<sup>49</sup> In this sense the ornament, usually explained as decoration, is in fact an early attempt at moving the body from the realm of the Natural to the realm of the Social, a transition effected by transforming the body into a pictorial medium. In its social reconstruction, the body assumes a dual existence as both medium and image.

The body participates in this process as it not only carries but also produces images, in the sense that it undertakes to transform itself into an image. And that image may even assume a form antithetical to that of the human body; namely, the form of an abstract geometrical pattern. It is this abstraction that makes it possible to detach such images from the body-medium and transfer them to media unconnected to the body. The sculpture of a human and a human body painting have analogous relationships to the body, for the sculpture is fashioned after the model of a human body, while the latter is a design painted on a human body. In his essay *Gesture and Speech*, the anthropologist A. Leroi-Gourhan draws a parallel between early human picture-making and language. Language, too, has a dual identity: it is both a corporeal act (speaking) and a social act (communication). It is both body-based and systemic; that is, abstract. The voice generates language, the hand visual signs. Writing came as a next stage in the evolution of cultures and, much like pictures, it involved the hand, thus emerging as a secondary medium analogous to the mimetic image.<sup>50</sup> The so-called “ornament”

probably functioned as a kind of language *avant la lettre* by transmitting social codes that were not yet written down.




Fig. 1.2. (left) Design for a Maori tattoo. From H. G. Robley, *Moko or Maori Tatting*, 1896 (reprinted in Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*). Fig. 1.3. (right) Face painting of a Caduveo woman. From Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*. Photo © Claude Lévi-Strauss.

When it comes to the relationship between body and image, the phenomenon of the facial mask deserves special attention ([Fig. 1.4](#)). Its relation to the face cannot be reduced to either concealment or redefinition and change. The real face is not necessarily the one hidden by the mask; if by “real” we refer to a shared, social meaning, it may be the face created by the mask that is “real.”<sup>51</sup> This also explains why the natural face lends itself to mask-like behavior: It does so in order that it might conform to social codes. The incarnation of the mask—to borrow Georges Batailles’ words—lies in the mask-like transformation of the naked face, by which the latter turns into a “facial mask.”

The skulls from Jericho play a key role in my discussion of the image and death ([chapter four](#)). On the surface of these skulls a “live” face is reconstructed using clay and paint. It is clear that the face is already being identified by this Neolithic society as a sign with social significance.<sup>52</sup> The face, in other words, is in its own right an image residing on the body, a living image that in the funeral realm must be substituted by an artificial, man-made image. We may speak of the transformation of the face into a mask, a transformation that, in retrospect, we now see as equating face and mask also for the living.



Fig. 1.4. Man Ray (1890–1976), “Noire et Blanche” (Black and White), 1926. Gelatin silver print. Gift of James Thrall Soby. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. © 2010 Man Ray Trust/Artists Rights Society (ARS), NY/ADAGP, Paris. Digital image © The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by SCALA/Art Resource, NY.

The Neolithic skulls of Jericho are considered together with the oldest stone masks known to us, those from seventh-millennium BCE Israel. The latter are suited equally well to ritualizing the living face and to “recapturing” the lost face of the deceased. Though the masks are intended to be worn, they are independent constructions and can be removed from the body without losing their impact on the viewer. A mask in this sense is related to a portrait, a fact that comes to the fore when we consider Egyptian mummy masks. In Greco-Roman period in Egypt portrait panels representing the deceased were bound onto the mummy in the same place previously occupied by the mummy mask. One might go so far as to suggest that the portrait is in essence a mask that has lost its dependence on the body and moved on to a different carrier medium.

Finally, body painting and the facial mask also provide keys to the riddle of animation. We feel that pictures of people are looking back at us. This exchange of the gaze, normally experienced only by the beholder, becomes a reciprocal experience in the case of the living mask or the painted face. Here the image involves—visibly or invisibly—the eyes of the other person who lives behind the image. This experience of the image, in which the beholder’s awareness of an answering gaze animates the image, has to be set against the experience of gazing at oneself in a mirror, which involves a different attitude.

## The Digital Image

In our digital age, images have lost their physical connection to a carrier medium, such as a photographic print. They are instead stored in the electronic data set of the computer’s “black box.” When images appear on a monitor, they no longer emerge from the matrix of a physical medium but rather from digital code. As a consequence, their mediality has become discontinuous; it is, to use the technological term, “discrete.” Photography was once a “representational medium by means of which all other media could be subsumed and analyzed.”<sup>53</sup> Today, this role has passed to the computer, which generates images with digital codes and processes them through input. The images are produced in a hyper-medium whose abstract information is distinct from old-style media, much in the same way as today’s data banks differ from the physical products of industrial culture. The question therefore arises whether the media concept we have followed in the preceding pages, still applies to digital media. Many theorists of digital culture deny such a possibility and reject any comparison with traditional media.<sup>54</sup>

And now the plot thickens. For if the concept of the medium is in question, the concept of the image must be questioned as well. Can we continue to speak in the same way of the image, when we, as spectators, have lost connection to traditional ways of image perception, when we no longer perceive images via physical media but rather through virtual

media? The virtual world subverts analogy with the empirical world through transcorporeal transmissions. The role that remains for the body in the activity of perception has become as uncertain as the mediality of images. It would appear that in the conflict between body and medium, digital hypermedia have won. Does this mean that the traditional history of the image—indeed, every history of the image—has come to an end? Are we left with nothing to study but the archeology of historical pictorial media?

Lev Manovich claims “that the image in the traditional sense no longer exists.” We need to remind ourselves, however that the “traditional sense” was itself subject to historical forces that constantly altered it. Even Manovich concedes that “a new relationship between body and image” is taking shape in the video installation, one that is once again enlisting the body. Moreover, he admits that we are still “staring at a flat, rectangular surface” that opens like a window “in the space of our bodies.”<sup>55</sup> Images continue to be tied to the screen. Alliez believes that the synthetic image dissolves the “link between image, subject, and object.” However, the reference of the image to the object, which was grounds for aiming at a likeness, was not a universal characteristic of historical images, not even in the case of photography, for photographers soon abandoned mimesis as a strategy aimed at mere reproduction. In the end, Alliez admits that digital images also “have their place among all other images.” In the final analysis, he argues, the “virtual image” (but what exactly is a “virtual image”?) merely reflects the rich panorama of our own imagination.<sup>56</sup>

The so-called “schism” between body and digital media—as Alliez involuntarily confirms—rests on a rather narrow concept of the “natural” body. Much the same is true for “the real,” which has likewise been declared obsolete by those who would proclaim a radical break with the past. The declared and, in fact, often celebrated death of the so-called “analogous image” is equally suspect, for there has never in the entire course of history been as much as “analogy” (between image and world) as there is in modern photography with its mechanisms of camera and dark room. Bellour points out that



“analogy” is a variable quantity, that the degree to which the “potential for resemblance and representation” is put into practice is ever-changing, for “likeness” is itself an idea, and it is in the nature of ideas that they are continuously redefined throughout history. “Nature expands by means of analogy.” What is analogizable (reproducible) and what is not is determined by historical forces.<sup>57</sup> Bellour therefore concedes that the way in which we use the digital image is different from what its technology might suggest: “The synthetic image, too, always remains tied to what it represents,”<sup>58</sup> and what it represents is in turn dependent on what the observer desires, be it the reproduction of reality or the simulation of an artificial “reality.”

There is no denying, however, that the synthetic image is in many ways unprecedented. It does need to be situated in the history of images in a way that takes account of its new users and of the new kind of perception that they experience. Stiegler has offered a possible model for such a discourse in his essay on the “discrete image.”<sup>59</sup> “The image by itself does not exist,” Stiegler argues. “Our mental image is always an afterglow (*remanence*),” a “trace and inscription” of images we encounter in the media world. A digital image first deconstructs the visible realm, after which a second stage is required in which a synthesis on the part of the viewer brings an image into being. According to Stiegler, the digital technique “simulates” images that differ from anything that existed before, but the end result is nevertheless an image. His discussion of synthesis and analysis helps us to understand that synthesis, as the part of the viewer, serves to generate images in ourselves, while in the preceding stage of analysis we “read,” as it were, the part of the technology. The perception of digital images is thus equal parts analysis and synthesis. As Stiegler states, “the new technology initiates a new era of analytical skills.” As a result, new technologies alter our perception as much as they alter our imagination.

The escape from mimetic truth, however, predates digital technology. It preoccupied twentieth-century avant-garde artists. One need only think of the way in which collage and montage introduced an analytical dimension to the experience



of a modern art that had long since rejected mimetic realism. The mass media did their part in shaking confidence in visual truth and in creating their own visual reality through the use of special effects. Video technology, though distinct from digital technology, is able to create hybrid images that defy chronological time and disrupt the traditionally linear narrative of film stories. With these forerunners in mind, we can see that in the end the digital image is not an isolated phenomenon. It has roots in earlier developments. It has, in fact, staked a claim on the territories of photography, film, television, and video, so that it in fact epitomizes (and includes) the previous history of pictorial media.

### An Anthropology of Visual Media?

In dealing with technological images, it is still customary to concentrate on the technology, on the methods by which they are produced, rather than on the relationship between the medium and the beholder and his experience of a new kind of image. Visual technologies are often discussed—for example, in the writings of Villem Flusser—as though they marked so radical a departure from earlier tradition as to put an end to the previous history of images. In the place of objects created by an artist or craftsman, precision technology gives us products that do not rely on the human eye or hand.<sup>60</sup> But this antithesis in fact has a long history. The desire for faithful reproduction is an old one, and it led to many technological advances that enhanced verisimilitude, even at the expense of the role played by the artist. A lack of trust in the reliability of images that depended on human powers of mimesis drove an anthropological impulse directed at inventing means of generating images that were infallible because they derived precision from technology rather than from the unreliable fount of human talent.

Paradoxically, it was the body that first called forth these technologies, and it did so in the interest of preserving an accurate record of itself. Georges Didi-Huberman devoted an exhibition to wax impressions and casts that reproduced the entire body or its individual parts.<sup>61</sup> Death masks or life masks

are in a sense mechanical technologies for the reproduction of the body. Like footprints or shadows on a wall they recall the presence (and thus the reality) of a body. This self-reproduction of a body was an attempt to transfer its auratic power to a likeness. For centuries, Christians went on pilgrimage to Rome to worship a shroud on which the facial features of Jesus were, according to legend, imprinted, as if by some photographic process.<sup>62</sup> In all of these cases we are dealing here with technical reproduction that is fundamentally different from a human viz. painted interpretation.

Once we abandon our current notion of what technology is, we have to admit that there is a long tradition of technological advances in the making of images. Photography emerged from this tradition, and its technological innovations opened up new territory. Today's new technologies, digital simulation and animation, further expand the frontiers of our ability to visually analyze our world. The questions raised by these observations were formulated by Manovich in his archaeology of the screen.<sup>63</sup> Manovich noted that already in the Renaissance, the mathematical calculation of perspective, itself a form of technology, had transformed the world into a realm of appearance. Alberti was making the same observation when he compared the new perspectival picture to a "window"<sup>64</sup>—a virtual window, as it were. Perspective reproduces the normal gaze that an observer casts upon the world. Since the perspectival method was a medium of the gaze and not a medium of the body, it paved the way for the modern fascination with a kind of disembodied gaze and for the fashion for "ocular centrism" (Fig. 1.5).

Perspective projected on a flat screen or print denied its own surface in order to simulate a visual space, in the process substituting its artificial projection for the viewer's spatial perception. One could already say that it was a non-corporeal medium that was turning the physical/corporeal world into picture. When there is a physical link connecting the image to the medium, as in painting for example, the relationship is one-to-one. Painting, unlike the modern screen, calls for a new panel or carrier medium every time an artist works. And for that reason, the universe of images in, say, the Renaissance,

consisted of an imaginary collection of single pictures. Within this collection, however, were pictures of vastly different types, ranging from naturalistic still lifes to fictions featuring the gods. Both the real and the unreal could be accommodated. It is thus not the pictorial medium's technology, but rather the way it is put to use by a culture that determines its place in history. Beholders exercised not only their perception but also their imagination in their interaction with paintings.

Photography, although it remained confined to a framed visual field, fed on its opposition to the concept of painting. It was not a medium of the gaze, for it replaced the gaze with the camera, but rather a medium of the body, which itself produced its own shadow. This shadow was arrested, held still at the moment of exposure, and as soon as it took shape in the print, the body was lost. Thus, the movement of life was frozen; it became a motionless image in contrast to the performed images of ritual or dance.<sup>65</sup> It was not until the advent of the filmic image that, through the use of montage, it became possible to simulate continuous action in a flow of time. The interplay between filmic images and the “virtual” images lodged in the viewer, the latter nourished by the viewer's memories and dreams, recalls the anthropological ambiguity between internal and external images that has exercised film theorists time and again.

Moving images—the category has expanded now to include video and computer animation—require, it would seem, a discussion of their own. Bellour has used the metaphor of a “double helix” to describe the relation between the two modalities they involve, the photographic modality and the analogy of movement. His question, “What is today happening between the images?” makes the drawbacks of such an approach abundantly clear.<sup>66</sup> Using the term “passage,” to denote the interval between images, for example, turns on a misguided attempt to speak of perception in the language of technology. Another difficulty appears when Deleuze, in his film theory, discusses the “sensomotoric situation” that pertains in dream and memory.<sup>67</sup> Perception inevitably operates with the moving eye, even if we are looking at fixed surfaces such as photographs. The interaction between our

perception and the object perceived is thus a mobile one that brings into play the dynamics of our consciousness and our inner images. Whether pictures are moving or not, we need to animate pictorial technology of any kind with our imagination and our desires.




Fig. 1.5. Screen with several windows. From Lev Manovich, “Eine Archäologie des Computerbildschirms,” *Kunstforum* 132, 1996.

Manovich speaks in the case of film of a “dynamic screen” whose observer must be immobilized. In the movie theater, our eye is indeed linked to a roving camera that transports us into a virtual space.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless, the moving image and the immobile body do interconnect, coming together in a rhythm that is controlled by our perception. It is not enough to speak only of media when we discuss images, and it is equally impossible to detach images from their media. In Bill Viola’s 1992 installation “Slowly Turning Narrative,” two video projectors throw images onto a large screen that rotates slowly around its vertical axis. The mirrored front side shows a seemingly uncensored flow of random pictures. The other side

reveals a face, which, as we know, is the locus of all images ([Fig. 1.6](#)). The rotation of the screen between the chaotic stream of images and the focused face turns the polarity of world and perception—in whose intersection our images are created—into a metaphor. Viola's treatment of space, mirror, and sound calls to mind in this new pictorial technology those ancient rituals for which images were originally invented.<sup>[69](#)</sup>

## Across Pictorial Media

Today, storage media make it possible for us to create electronic archives of images from long ago and far away. And, as is so often the case for new pictorial media, these too are in essence only newly polished mirrors of memory. In them historical media live on, though not in the same way as they might be preserved in museums, churches, or books. In the resulting intersection of contemporary and historical media, images of a kind that are no longer produced today come once again to light. Their nature contrasts with the mass-media images that today flood our awareness, and the contrast evokes in us memories and feelings of nostalgia. This is not a new phenomenon. “Profane images,” to quote Cardinal Gabriele Paleotti's 1582 description of new altarpieces, sometimes provided a stage or framework in which a beloved icon of a previous era could be inserted and displayed once again.<sup>[70](#)</sup> In its day Renaissance art looked like “new media,” and altars made in the Renaissance style, with their undisguised display of artistic virtuosity, did not fit the church's concept of sacred art. They were therefore used as decoration, framing for the old icon, which functioned now as a religious relic. In 1608, Rubens invited just such a dual experience in a large altarpiece that he created for the Chiesa Nuova in Rome. It occupied the place of an old but inconspicuous miracle-working picture. Ruben's *mise-en-scène* culminated in a revolving mechanism which, on special occasions, opened a window onto the old icon set in the center of his painting. We see this phenomenon amplified in the case of Baroque church interiors. For the first time decorative elements dissimulated the real space of the church, concealing its contours under lavish ornamentation, while the power of



the image remained in the original icons, revered from of old. In spite of their new, almost museum-like presentation, icons preserved the ontology of the sacral image in the midst of a new visual and artistic environment.<sup>71</sup>

The interactions of the image with media technology are complex and cannot be reduced to a simple formula. A technological innovation does not necessarily trigger a new mode of perception. Sometimes it was the other way around, and new ways of seeing result in the creation of new pictorial medium. As Peter Galassi has shown in his exhibit “Before Photography,” the photographic gaze was anticipated in painting when, in the later eighteenth century, painters began to portray impromptu moments akin to arbitrary “snapshots.”<sup>72</sup> At the other end, so-called post-photography is today undermining the established meaning of the photographic medium. Instead of producing analogous pictures, post-photography explores the virtual realm, where the so-called real is deconstructed. Intermediality remains in play however, for digital images despite their dissimilar technology do still, inevitably, recall the older medium of photography.



Fig. 1.6. Bill Viola, “Slowly Turning Narrative,” 1992.  
Video/sound installation. Photo: Kira Perov.

Contemporary art is rife with intermedial strategies in which the chosen medium reflects and recalls another. In his films, for example, Jean-Luc Godard made the film medium itself his theme when he introduced painting (*Passion*, 1982) or poetry (*La Nouvelle Vague*, 1990) in order to set apart the “pictorial language” of these media from that of film. Painters like Gerhard Richter have used photographs taken by amateurs as their subjects, simulating the technique of photography even as they convert it into the older medium of the painter. Durand sees in this what he calls a “ready made” painting, since the photographs that Richter uses “free him from the weight of personal experience and involve him in a collective history of contemporary perception.”<sup>73</sup> Intermediality, a regular phenomenon in any media history, calls forth images that we know and remember from one pictorial media and links them with other pictorial media. Sometimes, as McLuhan points out in his essay “The Relation of Environment to Anti-Environment,” it takes a new medium to bring to our awareness qualities which had gone unnoticed in the media of the past.<sup>74</sup> Often, past media could be carried on only by way of quotation. Intermediality is at bottom another facet of the interaction of image with media, a relation that bears on the mystery at the heart of the image; namely that of being vs. appearing. For images behave according to the rules of appearance, but inasmuch as they are embodied in media they exist also in the world of being, of bodies, and therefore occupy a place in social space. The history of pictorial media is nothing other than a history of the symbolic technologies that give witness to images. And it is consequently also a history of those symbolic transactions that we call perception in a personal or collective sense.

## Crosscultural Issues

The question of what an image is remains a rather narrow inquiry so long as it does not explore the notion of images in cultures other than our own. In academic debates the invisible horizon of Western thought and Western experience is rarely crossed, except in the context of ethnographic research. But images unfold their full potential only when seen in



crosscultural perspective, for then contradictions come to light between any generic definition and definitions specific to different cultural traditions. The same applies to pictorial media, which are often culturally specific: the European easel painting, for example, or the Asian picture scroll, which are not found in other cultures ([Fig. 1.7](#)). The dilemma we face is that Western thought, with its tradition of theories in Western languages, often resists opening into other thought patterns and mental dispositions.

The history of so-called Primitivism provides a wealth of material on the modern West's encounter with other visual traditions. When artists in Paris appropriated African masks for their own purposes, they disregarded the former function of the mask and reduced it to empty form. It was readily forgotten that the masks were worn by bodies and had a role in ritual dance.<sup>[75](#)</sup> What had been a culturally rich and dynamic medium used to create living images on the body became a purely aesthetic object. This bare formalism gave rise to a sense of unease, however, for it was not enough to see form alone; viewers missed the experience of "meaning" in the masks. In the next generation, the Surrealists supplied their want, investing the masks with psychoanalytical meaning and thereby once again appropriating them for their own purposes.

Aby Warburg encountered the snake ritual of the Pueblo people in 1895, and the experience remained with him for a lifetime. Throughout his career as an art historian he would remain more attentive to the cultural significance of images than any other scholar in the field. He had, even earlier, begun to question the validity of an "aestheticizing art history," the "formalism" of which did not do justice to the image.<sup>[76](#)</sup> Warburg's interest in the symbol helped him to interpret Native American image practices. In the pottery of the Pueblos he detected "the influence of medieval Spanish techniques," which had been "taught to them in the eighteenth century by the Jesuits." An indigenous tradition however came to light in the ritual of the snake. For Warburg the snake was a familiar symbol, one encountered in many cultures, but he had not yet taken cognizance of the snake dance, a living performance that itself constituted a different kind of image.



Fig. 1.7. Japanese hotel room with picture scroll and TV.  
Photo: H. Belting.

The encounter gave rise to a permanent unrest in Warburg's thinking. His studies of the Italian Renaissance bear eloquent testimony to this, for he suddenly began to investigate what he saw as archetypal patterns underlying the image practice of the Renaissance. The so-called "rebirth" of antiquity took on a crosscultural character, raising the question of whether Classical images changed their meaning after they migrated to the Renaissance. Years later Warburg himself fell under the spell of the images he had studied as a scholar. When he delivered his famous lecture on the snake ritual, he would admonish his audience to leave behind the dark realm of the snake and return to the bright light of the sun (Enlightenment)!

Four hundred years earlier, the Spanish conquistadors had already undergone a different kind of intercultural experience when they discovered Native American religious pictures that

were not only alien to them, but contradicted their very notion of what constituted a religious image. While the Portuguese at the time were labeling African statuary “idols” or “fetishes,” the Spanish in Mexico spoke of “cemiés,” a term that left open whether these were images at all, and not simply objects put to magical use ([Fig. 1.8](#)).<sup>77</sup> Merely describing what they saw gave rise to misunderstanding. Derogatory terms like “idol” stood in the way of genuine attempts at understanding the alien images. Cortez accordingly decided to destroy “idols” and to replace them with Christian images, thereby colonizing not only Mexico but also, he hoped, the collective imagination of its people. An “idol” was only an idol to the Spanish gaze. It was an idol because it threatened a Christian image ([Fig. 1.9](#)).<sup>78</sup> The very existence of such representations brought into question the universal truth of Christian religious claims. And so the Spaniards, having recently reconquered the south of their peninsula from Islam, now directed their missionary zeal at the New World. The history of their colonization can be viewed as tantamount to a “war of images,” to quote the title of a book on the subject by Serge Gruzinski. The author brought to light not only conflicts with the natives but also struggles within the Christian clergy over the question of how to deal with indigenous images. The only way out, some thought, was to regard idols with a measure of humanistic tolerance and thereby win a cultural victory by relegating them to the realm of things “exotic, primitive, and without history.”

In the back and forth of intercultural exchange there were also encounters between traditions with conflicting notions of written vs. pictorial imagery. “In Europe,” Gruzinski explains, “writing, under the impact of the phonetic model, is seen as the reproduction of words, and painting as the reproduction of the visible world. In China, by contrast, where writing is not limited to a representation of the word, painting claims a territory that relates to the visible world only as a relationship of contact and analogy, but not as a relationship of redundancy and reproduction. Central America stakes out a third solution. Just as graphic expression in China goes beyond the model of phonetic writing and cannot be separated from painting, so too the pictographic codices encountered in the New World were

identified by the Spaniards sometimes as painting, sometimes as books. However, the pre-Columbian pictures bore so little resemblance to the mimetic representations of the world with which they were familiar that the Franciscans simply applied the indigenous term *ixiptla* to Christian cult image in order to enforce a symmetry between their own images and those of the natives.<sup>79</sup>



Fig. 1.8. Zemi, Pre-Columbian figure from Haiti. Ethnological Museum, Turin. From Serge Gruzinski, *Images at War: Mexico from Columbus to Blade Runner (1492–2019)*, Duke University Press, 2001.



Fig. 1.9. Virgin of Guadalupe, before 1550. 173.3 x 109.7 cm. Mexico City Cathedral. © Insigne y Nacional Basilica de Santa María de Guadalupe (Mexico City). Photo: Emeterio Guadarrama.

Such examples explain the phenomenon of visual colonization, but they reveal more besides. Any encounter with another culture raises identity issues of the sort that are apt to arouse protective feelings. The conception of what constitutes an “image” is one such issue. It is tempting to simply exclude the images of “the Others” from recognition as alternatives in their own right. Our Western legacy of modernity, for example, with its pivotal notion of “enlightenment,” still create lines of demarcation based Western cultural ideals and conventions that stand in the way of open scholarly debate on crosscultural issues.

## Conclusions

Mental images, as has become evident, cannot be separated from physical images by means of any clear-cut dualistic scheme. Dreams, visions, and visual memories illustrate the close interaction between the internal and the external in the realm of images. The pictorial medium plays a key role in the equation as it prevents us from confusing the image with its material support, be that support an object or an action. But there is still room for ambiguity, for the language we use is itself imprecise. The medium is not “in the middle” between image and spectator. Rather, it is the other way round. Images are exchanged between us and a pictorial medium in the double act of transmission and perception. The medium, the carrier or artificial support, remains “out there,” while the image, a mental construct, is negotiated between us and the medium.

If we take an anthropological approach to the subject, it soon becomes clear that the images of the past are constantly being replaced by new and different images. Today’s image can be but a temporary answer; it will not satisfy the next generation. Thus, every image, once it has fulfilled its current mission, generates a new image. But it is not at all obvious what we mean when we refer to a “new” image, for all past images were once new. Some may seem new because they employ a new medium or respond to a new collective perception. Although a “history of the image” is most readily studied via the history of media and imaging techniques through time, it would be a mistake, from an anthropological point of view, to seek images only within their production history. Images are not confined by their historical, medial, and technical contexts. All images carry a temporal form within themselves, but they are also in the final analysis as “anachronistic,” as outside time we are ourselves, to quote from a book by Didi-Huberman, or even “magical,” as Flusser once remarked. And this despite all our much-vaunted progress through the thickets of image criticism toward enlightenment. Even if one looks for the historicity of images within the collective imagination, the anthropological question still remains. The purpose of the present inquiry is to free the

notion of the image from the confines within which the various academic disciplines have imprisoned it.



## The Locus of Images: The Living Body

### Bodies and Cultures

The human being is the natural *locus of images*, a living organ for images, as it were. Notwithstanding all the devices that we use today to send and store images, it is within the human being, and only within the human being, that images are received and interpreted in a living sense; that is to say, in a sense that is ever changing and difficult to control no matter how forcefully our machines might seek to enforce certain norms. But what exactly is the human being? When this issue is debated we sometimes get the impression that he is either a universal being for whom modern Western man is the tacit model, or that he occurs in a variety of local forms, such as those exhibited by various primitive cultures (in which case it is usually implied that there is an ongoing evolution that will lead eventually to the universal man). Though neither view does justice to the question, the dichotomy does explain why the word “anthropology” is used, at least in some countries, either for philosophical universalism or for the ethnological study of local conditions.<sup>1</sup> Now, it is quite clear that human beings are different from other life forms with respect to their images (the Greek legend that birds pecked at the grapes of the

painter Zeuxis is plainly a fiction). But it is equally beyond dispute that when it comes to their images, human beings are fundamentally different—in their inner selves, as it were—from one culture to the next. (Note that for this reason globalization poses a threat to the diversity of collective images that have come into being). It is through the vast array of images to which humanity accords meaning, that the human being proves himself a cultural being, a being that cannot be described solely in biological terms.

However, to speak of a “locus of images” presupposes that such a locus in fact exists in order to be so identified. The locus in this case is the “body”—a term I use here in full awareness that the concept “body” has become a highly problematic one in modern thinking. If, however, we simply call it a “locus” (for whatever), the sense in which we are using the term here will become clear. The body is a place in the world, a locus in which images are generated and identified (recognized). These are often transitory images—we do not know where they come from, nor do we know where they go when we forget them or whence they return when we remember them again unexpectedly.<sup>2</sup> Unlike the images that await our gaze on monitors, film screens, or museum walls, our own images possess personal meanings for us that compensate for their lack of permanence. While images in the external world are essentially mere pictorial offerings set before us, the images in our corporeal memory are linked to our life experiences in space and time.

We know that our bodies occupy places in the world, that they can leave those places and then return to them once again. But our bodies themselves constitute a place, a locus, where the images we receive leave behind an invisible trace.<sup>3</sup> The perception of these images involves exposure to pictorial media, which not only guide our attention in a technical sense, but also shape the memory that the images assume within us. We see images with our corporeal organs (though it is currently fashionable to speak of the brain’s information processing and not of the body as a whole). Perception is an operation by which we take in visual data and stimuli and analyze it. But the final outcome is not an analysis but a

synthesis, which alone creates the image as Gestalt.<sup>4</sup> It is for this reason that the image can be approached as an anthropological concept, one that must assert itself today against notions of the image as an aesthetic or technical construct. The media do provide a means whereby the image is communicated, and that means is culture, grounded not only in technical know-how but also in consensus and authority. But we deal just as competently with the pictorial techniques of another time or culture. We may not be able to read in those techniques the meanings that were originally inscribed in them, but they preserve their place in the collective memory because we possess the capacity—inborn and then further developed—to step back and observe the interplay of images and media.

Much like our bodies, our personal images are ephemeral and thus different from the images that are objectified in the external world. And yet we store them for a lifetime. The saying that an entire library burns down every time an old man in Africa dies—and one could just as well say an entire archive of images—makes clear that the body also plays a crucial role as the locus of collective traditions, guarding them against the loss of vitality that can infect them, for various reasons, in the world outside the body. Many cultures that were once protected by geographic boundaries are today threatened with the loss of their traditions. It is in fact a fate that even the West is now facing.<sup>5</sup> Under such circumstances, a single death can endanger the collective memory from which a culture draws its life. In many cultures, memory was protected by institutions and individuals cared for it by means of rituals. But we must not forget that it was also transmitted between generations in ways that are spontaneous and difficult to decipher. Although humans are mortal, as parents and teachers they play a role in the transmission of images that transcends the limits of their own lives. As both creators and heirs of images, they are part of dynamic processes by which their images are transformed, lost, recovered, and reinterpreted. The transmission of images and their survival into later periods resemble the two sides of a coin. Transmission is intentional and conscious; it can deliberately

pick up an old, established image and use it as a model for something new (we might think here of the uses that the Renaissance made of images drawn from antiquity). The survival of an image, however, may follow hidden, subconscious pathways and even run against the prevailing tide, refusing to yield ground long after a culture has moved on to different images.<sup>6</sup> These processes touch on questions of cultural memory, the common storehouse in which images lead their own lives, evading neat definitions and a rigid place in an ordered scheme of history.

In our bodies, we bring together the personal (gender, age, biography) with the collective (environment, historical time, education, and upbringing). This duality is expressed in the way we respond to images in the external world: some we accept, others we reject. Some we venerate or love, others we detest or fear.<sup>7</sup> We can observe this happening in today's media world, in which the personal space of the viewer is narrowing. When we take our orientation from images, our individual disposition interacts with the collective disposition that is also a part of our make-up. In the sense that our natural body represents a collective body, it is also a locus of the images from which cultures arise. Today, however, the individual is no longer as deeply embedded within a culture that provides him with a firm foundation and secure borders that define his personal space. As the boundaries of once isolated, sheltered cultures dissolve, the individual members of such cultures, who live in natural bodies, assume a new importance, the kind that emigrants possessed in other times. Their images migrate with them to other places or travel with them into a new time.<sup>8</sup> We need therefore a new concept of culture broad enough to cover this widespread diffusion of fragments of traditions that are borne along by individual bodies and their history. Even in our highly technological world civilization, in which everything seems to conspire against it, culture remains alive, surviving in a ferment that is able to engage with new circumstances.

It is clear that, like our life itself, our *Weltanschauung*, being produced and reproduced in our personal image archive, is not rigid and does not operate according to fixed laws. In an

anthropological study it is nonetheless important to bear in mind the relationship between the symbolic images of the collective and personal images. While ethnologists once took an interest in the images of others, they now turn their attention to their own culture and inquire into “the conditions of circulation between the individual imagination (for example, the dream), the collective imagination (for example, myth) and fiction (literary or artistic, visually constituted or otherwise).”<sup>9</sup> In this context, the body, as the anthropologist Marc Augé explains, forms a critical element, for in dream or ritual it is governed or even possessed by images that “inhabit it ... leave it and come back to it,” images that behave as though they were being generated by a kind of internal *Doppelgänger*.<sup>10</sup> This notion has led to the familiar view of the body as a duality, both the site or locus of images of unknown provenance and the seat of a *Doppelgänger* who inhabits it as Self or spirit.

Anthropology is familiar with “the confrontation of different pictorial worlds that accompanies the clash of peoples, conquests, and colonization, but also the resistance that stirs in the world of imagination of the defeated against the images of the victors.” For example, the Jesuits set out to colonize the imaginary world of the natives even “in the realm of visions,” that is to say, not only by placing pictures before their eyes, but also by attempting actually to imprint the pictures bodily, so that they would take possession of their viewers’ imagination and dreams. What emerged in the process, however, was a peculiar, hybrid pictorial culture, for the imported images did not remain what they had been, but were “adapted, recreated, and transformed.”<sup>11</sup> Which means that the imported images adjusted to the gaze that fell upon them, just as the gaze had already changed under their impact. And so in this case, as in many similar cases, one can speak of a two-fold locus of images. Public images, in this example religion-based images, are explained less by the origin of their motifs than by the culture of the locale in which we find them, for it is this that grounds them. It is in this place that they exert their effect, because it is local people who behold them and

whose internal images and dreams they simultaneously provide with a public locus.

## Places and Spaces

Images and geographic places are connected in ways that have yet to find their interpreter. Just as we may speak of the body as a locus of images, it is possible also to speak of a place as the locus of an image; that is, of an image that we can recognize and remember. In many cultures, people visit pictures of gods in places where they, the gods, are believed to reside. Countless images of the Madonna possess not only a local meaning, but also a local identity that asserts itself against the background of the general notion of a Madonna.<sup>12</sup> The aura of old images is not merely a secretly sacralized object-concept, but—and to an even higher degree—a sublime place-concept. In the modern age, the museum has become a refuge for pictures that have lost their locus in the world and exchanged it for a locus in the world of art. But this secondary link to a place is now also dissolving, giving up its physicality as images enters the realm of high-speed, ephemeral pictorial media.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, the notion of “place” itself has become questionable. Places of the old type have ceased to be permanent and have lost their fixed boundaries. We are replacing them with images of places that we receive on our screens. Many places exist for us merely as images, in more or less the way we remember the places of the past. People have always remembered places as images, but that kind of image presupposed that one actually had been to the place. By contrast, today we know many places only in pictures, in which they have taken on another kind of presence for us. This has shifted the relationship between picture and place. Instead of visiting pictures at their given geographical places, we prefer now to visit places in pictures. This is also true of contemporary photography. Hubertus von Amelnunxen entitled an exhibit by French photographers “Les lieux du Non-lieu.” Here, photographic images became “places of the place-less.” When places in the world get lost they withdraw into pictures,



which provide them once more with an alternative status as a place.<sup>14</sup>

In the old understanding, a place established meaning via its residents. Its identity derived life from the history that had taken place there. Places possessed a self-contained system of signs, actions, and images to which only locals had the key. Outsiders were just that, outsiders. Places were thus virtually synonymous with cultures. The fieldwork of ethnologists concerned a place that set itself apart from other places by its system of signs, through external boundaries and internal traditions. This is how Marc Augé describes “place” in his essay “Places and Non-Places,” in which he argues that even ethnologists must today bid farewell to this notion of place. In advanced modernity, which he calls *surmodernité*, spaces of transit have replaced the old geography of fixed places. Spheres of communication are substituting for the geographic spaces of old. For Augé, the traffic through these spheres is a global network.<sup>15</sup>

The self-contained places of old have become fragmented or undermined in such a way that they cease to be distinguishable from other places, except perhaps as a metaphor. If they survive, they may do so only in images that the real places no longer match. Something similar is happening to local cultures, which one can no longer encounter in their traditional places. Places, however, do not vanish without a trace; they leave behind a multi-layered palimpsest where the old and the new have taken root and become deposited. In the old understanding, places were “places of memory” (*lieux de mémoire*), as Pierre Nora has called them.<sup>16</sup> Today they are more likely to be *places in memory*. Pictures, too, are losing the place in which we once had reason to look for them, the places where they lived by their presence. They now often reach us as their own representations, stored in machines and shorn of their original physical mediality. We retrieve them from machines to recall them and stage them in new media. Like the places and, above all, the objects of the world, they borrow new modes of representation. Technical reproducibility, which Walter Benjamin once distinguished from museum presence, was



merely the first phase in this process. Technological images have shifted the relationship between artifact and imagination in favor of imagination, creating fluid transitions for the free play of the mental images of their beholders, at least in terms of their perception. And perception has changed as well, both in general terms and in the specific sense of the way in which images are experienced.

The global media have brought about a transformation of this kind in the notion of place. As J. Meyrowitz has described it, the notion of place is becoming disconnected from its old meaning of a physical location. Information and experiences are transported from one place to every other place, until all places become more or less equivalent and the Here and Now disappears. We live “in an information system rather than in specific places.”<sup>17</sup> One cannot, however, quite agree with Meyrowitz that the place we see on the TV “is no longer a place at all.” Viewers have enough experience of place to transfer it to the images of places they are shown. It matters to them, for example, that a reporter is on site when he reports an event. But it is true that the experiences we have of places slowly fuse with the knowledge we have of them from pictures. Instead of our physically entering places, it is the places that come to us—in images. The pictorial presence of absent places is an old anthropological experience, but today the relationship between imaginary and real places is becoming rearranged. The more they turn into imaginary entities, the more places as images occupy our own bodies.

Still, the Once and the Now must not be conceived as absolute opposites, either in the case of pictures or in the case of places: were it otherwise, the anthropological approach, too, would be meaningless. The situation is more complicated than that, even considered from the perspective of our day-to-day experience. If we have lived in or visited a real place, we look upon it with different eyes (one might say with “inner eyes”) when we remember it at another point in time. It even happens that we sometimes search in a particular place to find that place as it exists in our memory, as we once knew it.

Future generations or outsiders will look upon that same place with different eyes. It does not even take a physical

change in its appearance to change a place for us when we see it again after a lengthy absence. In the interim it has turned for us into an image against which we measure its current appearance. The shift between place and image, between perception and memory, is part of every genuine experience of place.

For a long time, ethnology was at pains to provide the foreign artifacts encountered in other cultures (images of gods and ancestors, for example) with terms accessible to a Western understanding. This hermeneutic effort was significantly different from the way in which one might interact with images and works of art in one's own culture. But even in the latter case, the situation has changed, and changed in similar ways for places and pictures. The more the world is "globalized" (to use the trendy word), the more anthropologists return from their travels and turn with fresh eyes to their own culture, which now suddenly seems foreign and in need of explication.<sup>18</sup> In our lives, places of shared history play "the same role as quotes in written texts." But quotes still require a reader or listener who understands and remembers them. For Marc Augé, it is only the individual who retains the ability to recall the old world of places in the new world of vast open spaces. As the world breaks up into images, only the individual can piece them together. He may be an inhabitant of the "global village," but he is yet possessed of memories of the place from which he came, memories of traditions that he is able to "translate." Without the individual these memories would be consigned to oblivion.<sup>19</sup>

Augé developed his ideas in his poetical essay *In the Metro*. Travelers on the Paris Metro "suddenly ... discover that their inner geology and the subterranean geography of the capital city intersect at certain points," discoveries that trigger "tiny and intimate tremors in the sedimentary layers of their memory." Augé merely has to think about or encounter the names of specific Metro stations "to page through my memories as if they were a photo album." The Metro forms a transportation network that is shared by many passengers, who each have their own lives and do not know one another, and thus it invites a modern revision of the concept of culture. In

the Metro we experience changing and repeating images of places, continually interrupted by posters that address the beholder who is in the midst of a crowd and yet is alone. Though fastened rigidly to the wall, these ads move with the rhythm of the train and arouse in each of us different feelings or memories.<sup>[20](#)</sup>

Michel Foucault summarized his research into places and spaces in a short essay titled “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias.”<sup>[21](#)</sup> In looking at the history of spaces, he perceived changes in the meaning that fixed places possessed in relation to open spaces, with fixed places at different times either occupying or shutting out open spaces. Our terminology quickly fails when it comes to making a clean separation between “places” and “spaces.” Thus we speak of public and private spaces, in spite of our experience that both are tied to places (e.g., one’s own home). Moreover, spaces are inherently heterogeneous and discontinuous in their organization. Foucault speaks in this regard of “heterotopias”; i.e., places that are antithetical to or radically different from the places where we live. They include sacred as well as forbidden places, and places from which segments of society are excluded, such as prisons, and old age homes. The cemetery belongs to this category in a very special way. The shifting of cemeteries to the outskirts of cities led in the modern era to the experience of a second and different kind of city, which Italo Calvino described in his novel *Invisible Cities* as a kind of second city, a counterpart to the city of the living.<sup>[22](#)</sup> The ancient world’s conception of “extramural space” (that is, the area outside the walls), set up an antithesis between city and countryside, civilization and nature, that lives on in the notion of the garden. It was an antithesis that captured the imagination of the bucolic poets who sang the wonders of Arcadia, a place of freedom and return to nature, turning it into a poetic fiction.<sup>[23](#)</sup> Today, the virtual reality of images comprises such a heterotopian realm: a space, created by technology, that is different from and outside our world. In all cases, the imaginary place or space is set against a familiar place by exclusion. The image of one place (e.g., the city) is countered by an antithetical image of other places, which by

its contrast re-establishes the reality of the former with all the more authority.

This cultural geography is mirrored in art when art deals with places and spaces. One need only recall the nineteenth-century landscape paintings that presented such potent counter-images to urbanization and industrialization. It was because of the force of this contradiction that John Ruskin saw the landscape genre as the most urgent mission of “modern painters.”<sup>24</sup> Today, as Susan Sontag has so vividly described, tourists capture in pictures the memory of Arcadias where they do not live and to which they might never be able to return.<sup>25</sup> For Sontag photography is as an “elegiac art” that preserves places and cultures in pictures before they disappear from the world. Ethnographic photography is a familiar example of this.<sup>26</sup> There is a nearly inseparable web of interconnections between places and images of places which we seek with our eyes and to which our bodies have no access. Viewed in this context television is merely a continuation of the interplay between place and image.

When we suddenly rediscover our own culture in images preserved in museums and archives, we are participating in a way of seeing that Augé has described as the “ethnology of one’s own environment.” Familiar images strike us as foreign and in need of explanation. We look at them in the same way as we once viewed the images of other cultures. Europe’s image tradition is at such a juncture: it is on the point of losing the confident gaze that once characterized its bourgeois culture, a gaze built on the firm foundations of church and court. This, our own tradition, now stands increasingly in need of interpretation; we raise questions that demand anthropological answers. Anthropology thus takes up the legacy of the kind of art history that was born in the nineteenth century out of a sense of loss, of a rupture with spiritual and artistic tradition.<sup>27</sup>

## Images and Memories

Our bodies possess the natural capacity to transform into images the places and things that the passing of time takes from them; these images the body stores in memory and can recover through remembrance. We thus use images to defend ourselves against the flight of time and the loss of space that we suffer in our bodies. In the form of images, lost places occupy what the ancient philosophers called our “corporeal memory,” a place in a figurative sense.<sup>28</sup> Here they acquire a presence different in kind from their former presence in the world: in our memory places have a presence that emancipates them from our experience in reality. They represent the world by *embodying* it as images in our memory. The exchange of experience for memory is an exchange between world and image. But the memory images that we thus acquire affect our every new perception of the world. They operate, intentionally or unintentionally, like a filter, censoring perception. We relate paintings and photographs as objects, documents, and icons to our own image archive. Memory applies to these media its law of time, replacing what has been with images of what has been. Its historical authority grants to our personal recollections participation in a community of the living and the dead. On the other hand, there is the danger that the reification of images by memory might render the images lifeless, locked forever into a state of changelessness. That is why we already find in Plato a controversy over whether pictures are at all able to establish a viable memory outside of our own bodies. His criticism, however, overlooks the part of the animating gaze through which we transform pictures in the external world into images.

Our memory itself is the body’s own neuronal system of fictive places of recollection. It consists of a web of *places* where we search out those images that constitute our own memories. The physical experience of places that our body has had in the world is mirrored in the construction of places our brain has stored. The notion that memory has a mental topography is the basis of the old “technique” of mnemonics (a method of training the memory).<sup>29</sup> It was based on the theory that memory is laid out like a topography in the brain, with memory images (*imagines*) linked to memory places

(*loci*) that operate like relays or stations. This body-inherent technique employed the help of language, which was thought to possess a similarly structured topology. Language memory, however, like mnemonics, is an artificial medium that interacts with the natural medium of our spontaneous memory. A similar relation exists between the memory of a technological apparatus and that of our own bodies. Technologies transfer images to other places, while our corporeal memory is a born locus of images where images are both received and generated.

The collective memory of any culture from whose tradition we retrieve our images is contained within a technological body consisting of the data stored in its data bases and digital memory banks. But this technological stockpile is dead unless it is kept alive by the collective imagination. In addition, cultures renew themselves through forgetting as much as through memory—both are transformative. There was a time when cultures drew life from a “retrospective continuity,” which granted to the past a visible place in the present. Today, by contrast, we have lost our living connection to the past, so that we experience, as Pierre Nora put it, “the end of the equating of history and memory.”<sup>30</sup> The disappearance of any official and collective memory, Nora argues, is being compensated for and at the same time accelerated by the blind accumulation of materials in the technological memories and archives of the media.

The museum is one of the heterotopias that modernity has brought forth. Heterotopias, much like cemeteries, denote, as Foucault has pointed out, an “absolute break with traditional time.”<sup>31</sup> They belong to a different time and create a place outside of the kind of time in which life processes are ongoing. By opting out of current time, such places can transform time into an image and recall it in an image. In museums, too, the exchange of place and image of which I have been speaking takes place. It is not only a place for art, but also a place for objects that have fallen out of use and for those images that represent another time and thus become symbols of memory. They not only reproduce places that existed in another time, but they represent the past by turning it into its own image.



The museum makes us exchange the living world for a place that we conceive of as another kind of place. It is here that we look at images that were painted for another time and can survive only in the museum.

The cultures of the past are, it would seem, migrating into books and museums, where they are archived but no longer live. They survive in documentary images (much like old places that are recalled only in photographs), but these images would themselves constitute a new death were they not once more brought to life in the museum audience. In this sense the living Self, the old locus of images, has become more important than the archives of photographs, films, and museums in which images are stored. Places carry within themselves all the stories that happened in them: only stories make them into places worth remembering. We, too, carry stories (the content of our life's story) within us, stories that make us into what we are today. Places that are recalled and human beings who recall them are mutually interdependent. The loss of the culture as a place in which they once lived turns the people themselves into places with collective images. In times of radical change the spread of individual organisms or plants into new environments is one of the stratagems nature employs to promote the survival of species. Cultures are subject to a similar law during times of historical dislocation. The cosmopolitan nomad who is no longer at home in any particular geographic place nonetheless carries within himself images for which he, in his life, once more provides a locus. This use of memory is imperiled, however, when images must share their place in our imagination with a sense of reality that is in fact a fiction. It is the individual and collective images in the imagination that constitute the "Self." And when the imagination is infected with fiction, the Self that can still remember also becomes fictive.<sup>32</sup>

Today, the idea of an imaginary place—where one no longer lives—seems so much a part of contemporary experience that one easily forgets the long history of such places. In old Chinese literature, the rice paddy was a symbol of social order, to be sure, but the literati went in search of uninhabited nature in the hope of finding themselves. They



contemplated nature from a distance, as “landscape”; that is, as an image. The man who could transform nature into an image was not at its mercy, unlike the peasant who worked in it. The poet loved the same nature that the peasant feared. Nature was where the literati sought refuge when their freedom in society was threatened. In the process, they invented places, took possession of them through their gaze, and immortalized them in their poetry. Thus were created places of the imagination with which an entire culture identified. Through their cultural names alone, mountains and forest ravines expanded the territory of memory beyond the settled world. They were places to which one could journey, but not places where one could live.

The difference between landscape and the rural countryside where people did live reveals how a place—by which we mean the idea of what a place is—is culturally determined. In this sense of the word, a “place” is itself an image that a culture superimposes onto a real geographical site. The transformation of a landscape that resembled a thousand others into a place that was unique, was in China accomplished by the unusual practice of inscribing a site with texts praising its appearance and explaining its importance.<sup>33</sup> On the spot, a visitor would read a poetic description that transformed the real site into a place within the imagination of the poet who had discovered it long ago ([Fig. 2.1](#)). Poetry could no longer be separated from reality, and so the site itself was turned into an image. Images do not exist in nature, they exist only in the mind’s eye and in memory.

Those who could not journey to a poet’s sites read about them in travel descriptions or examined them in paintings, which had been inspired by descriptions and, in their turn, described places ([Fig. 2.9](#)). Their gaze focused on a scroll in a picture nook at home, they would travel far. While Europeans boasted about their travel, Chinese travelers took the reader to a place whose appearance they wished to recreate. Thus an entire culture lived in dreamed-of places, the names of which triggered a veritable flood of images in the reader. “The Red Cliff” or “The Pavilion of the Orchids” were places of remembrance in a double sense. On site, the beholder recalled

the travelers who had seen it in the way that it still appeared to him. At home, he recollected having been in this place or having read about it. Time shrouded the place and distanced it from the beholder. The Chinese experienced natural sites not in their own time but in the time of the ancient poets. This experience of nature had its melancholy aspect, for it reminded the beholder of his own mortality. As one moves from place to place on a journey, one continuously loses places, and then in the end, at death, all places are lost. In Chinese culture, therefore and not only in Chinese culture—places were painful images of time's duration, the enormous expanse in the face of which one's own life shatters.<sup>34</sup>

Places are not only where people live, they can also be places of imagination and escape, places of *u-topia*, a word that is inherently contradictory. In Greco-Roman tradition such places were called “Arcadias,” in Biblical tradition, “Paradise.” They arise from the meeting of a *real place* with its counter-image, an *imaginary place* where everything is entirely different or where everything was once good. This brings us to the anthropological definition of a “place,” which is bound up both with the desire for belonging and with the desire for escape. The discovery of time led to the realization that one could lose a place forever, even if it continued to exist. The perspective of today is different. We no longer mourn ideal places, but we are losing the real places that create identity. The imaginary and the real are trading places. In non-places we dream of real places, just as our ancestors dreamed the reverse. We dream the dreams of a person who has gone away. In this reversal, every fixed place is related to an open space, and—conversely—open space is related to a place where one actually can arrive as a traveler. In an anthropological sense, then, a “place” is different from either a spot in geography or a position in social history.



Fig. 2.1. Woodcut of man writing on a cliff face and young boy holding a palette, from the *Sancai Tuhui*, volume 94, [page 41](#), 1610, China. Collection of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, RMc.80.s1.

## Dreams and Visions

Nowhere are we more justified in speaking of ourselves as “the locus of images” than when it comes to dreams. Dreams are among the images that our bodies produce without our will and without our awareness, during sleep. The images of dream work are mysterious, and they have for that reason always aroused curiosity as to their meaning. Freud spoke of dream material and dream thoughts, but he conceded that both are in fact expressed in “visual images.”<sup>35</sup> There is a fluid connection between places and images in dreams: dreamers venture into places where they experience the images of dreams, and at the same time they create these places as images that have no counterpart in the real world. This corresponds, as we have seen, to the topology of the art of memory. Freud reported that he once, by happenstance, discovered a “site” (*Lokalität*) in Padua that he “had often seen in dreams,” but conceded that this in no way clarifies the

“provenance of this dream element.” The dream, Freud, maintained, “has at its disposal recollections that are inaccessible to the waking person.”<sup>36</sup> This points to the hidden structure of the visual memory that our body possesses. In the dream we leave the body we know, and yet we dream only with or in this body. The body is the source of our images.

But how do dream images come about? Are they nothing but our own images, or are they not also traces of those collective images that dominate a particular culture and include, of course, visual experience? The dream knows (and in fact *is*) only one medium of representation, which Freud called the “dream work.” From an ethnological perspective, Augé explains, the dream usually appears as a “journey” but that the journey exists only in the dreamer’s later recollection of what he saw in the dream. The dreamer is “the author of his dreams,” even though the dream may expose to him “an image he might reject in his waking state. The dream thus presents a problematic relationship between me and my Self,” as though we were dealing with a multiple Self.<sup>37</sup> Augé compares the dream to a person who is possessed by spirits and ancestors, in that the body seems to be speaking with the voice of another. For those who are present and observing the trance, the body is then “merely a medium.” Forces or powers, whether they appear merely in a dream or take possession of a body, raise a question about their identity. There is however a subtle distinction. Whereas the dreamer confronts “the enigma of his own image,” which he is later able to remember, the person who is possessed is not aware of what is happening but reveals to others someone or something that has taken possession of his body at that moment. In either case, however, the “symbolic activity” that takes place in the dream and in the state of possession destroys the simple dualism of reality and imagination. It reveals that there exists a range of experience that lies between the two and that the body may be the in a multiple sense “occupied”: in dreams, an occupation through images; in possession, through verbal acts.<sup>38</sup> The body in these circumstances is both *locus* and *medium*, regardless of the origin of the images that the body is performing. The “performance” happens without the body’s control, and yet it

is subject to memories and visual experiences, which behave in the process like free agents, independent of the body.

Supernatural “visions” are in many ways similar to dreams. They are in fact often received in dreams. In Christian culture they fit into the broader historical context of shamanism and possession, for they usually entail the appearance of a supernatural agent.<sup>39</sup> The vision is comparable to the dream not only in that it presents us with a journey (either a journey into another world or a visit from another world), but also as a visual manifestation whose origin and meaning require interpretation. Unlike the dream, the vision, when it takes the form of an ecstatic out-of-body experience, may present the recipient with a “revelation,” giving him access to things that he could not experience within the world and on his own strength, things that are possible only through the intervention of a higher power. For that very reason, visionary experience may be suspect, prompting the question of whether the experience was genuine or fake; that is, whether it was an otherworldly intervention whose author could be identified or mere hallucination. Regardless of the provenance and authority of the vision images, however, the body is still their locus. The distinction between images external to and images inherent in the body calls to mind portrayals of visions in official ecclesiastic art and the question of how much such images may have influenced the way visionaries experienced and remembered their visions. If the visions of female mystics in the Middle Ages were validated on the grounds that they bore a remarkable resemblance to the pictures in churches, the visions were simultaneously vulnerable to the charge that ecclesiastical art—altar pieces and devotional images—had provided models that had merely been reenacted in the visions.<sup>40</sup> Images may therefore change venue in either direction: an internal image may be transferred to a statue or a painting, and such external, public images may migrate to the internal, private image realm of an individual. The same image that appears to us as a mere artifact in a church can mutate into a supernatural “manifestation” that brings about a subjective experience.

In his analysis of the colonial veneration of holy pictures that the ecclesiastical orders in Mexico introduced as a rival to indigenous images, Serge Gruzinski compares the role of official pictures to the role of the miracle image and the dream image.<sup>41</sup> The visionary experience was perceived as providing supernatural sanction for a material picture: “The kinship of the vision to the image is very close in the process.” The dreams of the indigenous people reflected back the structure of ecclesiastical pictures. In the latter, so it was claimed, the invisible that was locked up in the visions became visible. Official images thus provided a synthesis of the dream experience and the vision, which were simulated and simultaneously controlled by the official images, which transcended corporeal matter. One can speak of an isometry between private imagination and the normative power of official pictures that embodied the collective imagination of the people.

But this isometry was constantly imperiled and remained always a contested zone. Whenever it came under threat in the public sphere from false and dangerous images, its defenders protected it by banning and destroying those images. At the same time, there was dissention over the privilege to define “correct” pictures, for a vision, as the possession of a private individual, endangered the Church’s authority in matters visual. Baroque painting responded to the problem by declaring itself the official mirror of private visions. Through theatrical and hallucinatory staging, it created the impression in the faithful that they were receiving personal visions as they stood in front of these works.<sup>42</sup> Despite the power struggles between official images and the individual imagination, which were encapsulated in the dualistic schema of the physical vs. the mental or the collective vs. the personal, institutions regularly lost control over images. As a locus of images, the body proved difficult to control, not only in dreams and visions, but also in its encounter with official images.

Descartes devoted much thought to the imagination, which he saw as connecting him to the body and its mediality, while cognition, by contrast, seemed to detach him from his body. As a young man he was curious to discover the provenance



and meaning of images, whose locus was the body. On a night in 1619, he had three dreams that he hoped would reveal his future path in the “marvelous sciences.”<sup>43</sup> Later, the biographer Baillet found Descartes’ record of the dreams in a notebook under the heading *Olympica*. During the third dream, Descartes asked himself, still in his sleep, “whether this was a dream or a vision.” He settled on its being a dream, though upgraded it by supposing that the imagination could convey its own kind of insight in a dream, just as it did in the hands of poets. Thus the “spirit of truth” had now transmitted to him an important message through the medium of the imagination, the kind of message that had once been conveyed by visions of a religious nature. In an anthology of poetic works that was shown to him in the third dream, he perceived “a series of small copper engravings with portraits,” which, like everything else in this dream, he wished to interpret. But he “was no longer in need of an explanation, for an Italian painter had visited him the following day and provided one.” We are not told what these pictures looked like or what they meant. But they were such that a person acquainted with the visual arts, a painter, recognized them and was able to divine their significance. The dream thus established a correspondence between personal imagination and memory that Descartes could not make sense of in his waking state. It seemed that within this correspondence, however it had come about, the dualism that separated collective truth from subjective phantasms was abolished. The images within the dream had crossed a threshold where the imagination of the dreamer revealed itself as a source of insight all its own.

Today we prefer to speak of what is imaginary as a counter-figure (*Gegenfigur*) to the real, though one that is not entirely subjective. This is a “comparatively recent term, whose importance grew in tandem with skepticism” over whether imagination and fantasy were in fact activities of a subject.<sup>44</sup> Imagination continued to be treated as a capacity of the subject, while the imaginary was related to consciousness and thus also to society with its shared images of the world, in which a collective history of mythic material lives on. Thus the imaginary is distinct from the products in which it finds



expression, for the imaginary is a culture's common stock of images from which images of fiction can be recalled and with which they can then be staged by the imagination of an individual. It is in this sense that W. Iser counts the fictive and the imaginary "among the anthropological dispositions," though they solidify into a recognizable entity only in their interrelationship.

## Dreams and Fictions in Film

There is good reason to describe the movie theater as a *public locus of images*. People flock to it for one reason alone: to see the images that are projected onto the screen within the temporal unit of the film. And yet there is no place in the world where the viewer experiences himself more deeply as the true locus of images. His own images may flow over into the images of the film, or they may remain in memory as his own. The film exists as a medium only for the split-second that it projects its image. It amounts to a radical temporalization of the image and thus calls forth a different kind of perception in the viewer. We identify with an imaginary situation as though we ourselves had stumbled into the movie picture. Our mental images cannot be clearly distinguished from those that reach us through the technology that produces the fictional images of the film. Even the projection of the image on-screen by the projector in which the cinematographic illusion is created, blurs the boundary between medium and perception. The film medium does not consist of matter, the film on the reel; in order to become a medium, the film requires technological animation. In the viewer it creates the impression that the fleeting images flowing before his eyes are nothing other than his own images, like the ones he experiences in imagination and in dreams.

Through his reading of film theorist Christian Metz, Marc Augé subjected the film to an anthropological interpretation that addressed the interplay of imagination (whether private or collective) and fiction. "As creative works, films are not pure fictions: they have, one might say, a claim to the everyday, to existence; they suggest a space, a history, a language, a way of

looking at the world,” in which the American film, for example, differs from its European counterpart. In a given country, the imaginary has a collective character that unites the movie audience and plays an important role in the production of illusion in the name of reality. In the individual viewer, on the other hand, it is his identification with the eye of the camera that stimulates the imagination, an effect that is heightened by the contrast between the moving eye and the restricted movement of his body in the seat. This creates a “heightened intensity of perception that borders on hallucination and dream.” The paradox of the visit to the movie theater lies in the fact that “the subject believes she has hallucinated what she has really seen.” Thus the cinematic experience, even as it suggests a real experience, resembles more closely the state of dreaming, of exposure to images that one cannot control even though they seem to be of one’s own making.<sup>45</sup>

Literary fiction generates images different from those of the film. First of all, they are produced by someone else. The reader’s personal phantasms clash with the fictions, and then the reader confidently proceeds to intermingle the two, contaminating the one with the other. In earlier times, cult images and works of art were “kept at varying distances—depending on the period and the individuals involved—from the axis of the collective imagination and from the axis of fiction.” As a result, it was possible to forget their creator, the artist, and thus to suppress the knowledge that they were fictions. For example, the Mexican cult icon of the Virgin of Guadalupe (Fig. 1.10) would eventually become a manifestation of the Virgin herself. The relationship of the viewer to this icon then became so immediate and personal that the faithful literally incorporated it, took it in to themselves. Moreover, the reaction to the image became a bond between all those who identified with the image. In short order, several layers of official exegesis were imposed on it. The personal fantasies of the viewers, all of which converged in this one image, adjusted to conform to this common experience and to the shared rhetoric of the exigencies; and the more the personal fantasies conformed, thus granting a

foundation to collective and symbolic experiences, the more smoothly this process ran its course.<sup>46</sup>

Cinematographic fiction is similar and yet different. It is similar in that sometimes even an obvious fiction can serve society's prevailing myths so well that, as in the case of the Guadalupe icon, it becomes difficult to distinguish fiction from reality. This is what happens with a cult film. But film is different in that an imaginary relationship is established between a director and a viewer when their personal imaginary worlds come into contact and then overlap in the viewer's autosuggestion. M. Augé speaks of a "coincidence of images," produced by the fact that the viewer shares his own images with someone else and resocializes them without stepping out of himself ([Fig. 2.2](#)). This experience rests on an understanding of fiction that recognizes it as such, "a way of looking that does not confuse the real with reality."<sup>47</sup> Moreover, in the darkened theater, the collective view of the film is transformed into the personal experience of each spectator. He is part of a community and yet alone with and in himself. There is a sense in which the bourgeois culture of live theater lives on in the movie theater, but film, through techniques such as the close-up, obliterates the shared space in which the audience makes its presence felt and destroys any analogous relation with the real places of the theater (i.e., with the stage or with the audience hall) through the fiction of a place (or a lack of place) in which the viewer is thrown back upon himself and his images. In a public space he experiences a kind of hallucination or dream in which his usual experience of time and space is abolished, and in spite of the public setting, he alone becomes the locus of images.

Movie theaters were built to serve a new kind of illusion. In a well-known series that the Japanese artist Hiroshi Sugimoto has been producing for over thirty years, empty movie theaters in the United States have become a metaphor. They remind us of the ephemeral nature of the images to which we expose ourselves in this cage of perception and presentation.<sup>48</sup> Sugimoto draws our gaze toward the gleaming white but empty screen, on which an entire film was shown—while Sugimoto kept his exposure open—without leaving any

trace in his photograph, other than that of mere light ([Fig. 2.3](#)). Traces of the cinematic images are found, however, on the walls and furniture of the room in which they were screened. Instead of whisking us away to the fictive places of the film, these images leave behind ghostly reflections of the light that they cast in the room during the film, reflections that the movie audience did not notice for the simple reason that it had forgotten the place in which it was. Sugimoto inverts the cinematic situation in such a way that it can be photographed and all movement freezes into a static image of remembrance. Because cinematic time collapses in upon itself, the empty screen symbolizes in equal measure the sum of all possible cinematic images and their emptiness and interchangeability, for it erases the films that Sugimoto had in front of his camera, as he sat in the stoic ritual of his filming sessions. The Everything can no longer be distinguished from the Nothing. The cinematic sequence of place fades away in the real place where the films are shown. That space with the epiphanic window on the world, where in reality only *images* of the world appear, evokes the *camera obscura* that we ourselves are when, within our body, we stare at images we ourselves project onto the world. The movie theater is empty; the images have invaded the viewer, whose images Sugimoto cannot make visible.



Fig. 2.2. Alain Resnais, still from the film “Hiroshima Mon Amour,” 1959. Used by permission of Argos Films.

The light for Sugimoto’s pictures is light left behind by an invisible film that was shown in the visible space. Time and space have traded places. Cinematic time is obliterated by the photograph, which can capture only a single place and then transform it into a lasting image. The ontology of photography, of which André Bazin once spoke, vanishes, for we can see the room that Sugimoto shows only as an image and only in Sugimoto’s picture. The arrested time that has settled upon the interior spaces erases the linear time of the film and transforms it into the memory time of the photograph. We simply cannot see that the projection time of an entire film is enclosed in Sugimoto’s exposure time. And then there is the variation between the spaces, the rooms themselves, in which Sugimoto has photographed. It stands in stark contrast to the white screen, everywhere the same, on which the pictures have chased one another in the flow of the film. The movie theaters that Sugimoto shows us were modeled after European theater spaces in which spectacles of an entirely different kind were staged. Keeping in mind that this backward look at the history of the theater is also a part of Sugimoto’s photograph, we can

see him crossing media boundaries to comment on the entire history of the visual spectacle. Under his gaze, the story of modern technological progress shrinks to a history of illusions.



Fig. 2.3. Hiroshi Sugimoto, “Regency, San Francisco,” from the series “Interior Theaters,” 1992. Courtesy of the artist.

These photographs, showing an empty locus of images make us almost painfully aware of how little a real movie theater is touched and changed by all the images for which it is built. There is not even a stage that must be reconfigured for the next play. Once everyone has taken their seat, the audience plunges into a stream of images only to awaken two hours later as if from a dream, and then to leave this place where there is nothing more for them. This theater of illusion derives its life from the movie audience, from the individuals who see the same movie and yet experience it in different ways. For although the experience of the movie is a collective one, the individual quietly transforms cinematic images into his own. The result is an interaction between body and medium, imagination and fiction, that defies the dualistic model that

would impose a rigid divide between mental images and media pictures.

Jean-Luc Godard provided stunning proof of this phenomenon when he created an eight-hour film entitled “Histoire(s) du Cinéma.”<sup>49</sup> The story of the film is made up of all the film histories we have seen in our lifetime. They have become part of the images that come back with our recollections, and yet they constantly break away from them. We are no longer able to say what film they belong to, and yet we recognize them in Godard’s *ars combinatoria*, his free play with the material of memory. Fictional images mix with documentary material from old newsreels in such a way that fiction and history blend in memory. We find in the fund of our memory images that bear in them the traces of history, even though they were created for the fiction of a movie. We no longer know whether we are remembering our own images or physical images that have taken up residence in our memory. Using old film material, which he comments on in his role as the narrator sitting at his typewriter, Godard creates an *imaginary museum* of film in Malraux’s sense. But he creates as well a “palimpsest of cinematic images” that is “comparable to the palimpsest in our image memory in the way in which material is both deposited and reused.”

In his commentary on Godard’s film, Augé speaks of the “screen of memory.”<sup>50</sup> Memory “mixes stories: those we have experienced, and those we tell to one another,” and the latter include films; for example, the black-and-white films that some of us still remember. “What characterizes a generation better than its shared recollection of a few images?” But then there are also “our personal life stories, in which life and the movies become confused.” The collective imaginary, which, Augé argues, we cannot easily separate from the personal imaginary, has become saturated with the visual material we have experienced in fiction, which includes films. Godard reminds us that we also associate images with past times in our lives. However, he not only mixes films with photographs that document history (Don’t we experience history, even the history of our own times, primarily in images?), but inserts paintings from various centuries just as liberally as he does



cinematic quotes. He thereby claims the contents of museums for the storehouse of his own memory.

## Virtual Spaces and New Dreams

The film has been a classic medium for a long time now, and it is one whose history we look back on with a newly awakened and somewhat melancholy curiosity. TV, video, and images of the virtual world, submedia within the film, have made it into a medium of memory. They alter the balance between imagination and fiction in the age-old play of images. Augé believes that the fictionalization of the world has unleashed a “War of Dreams.”<sup>51</sup> Dreams and myths are threatened by what he calls “total fiction,” a phenomenon that usurps our private images and undermines our collective myths.<sup>52</sup> Can we in our age of techno-fiction and cyber-utopia still think of ourselves as the locus of images? Are we as confident as we once were that the images we live with are our own? Or has the fictionalization of the world progressed so far that it threatens to overpower our own images?

Not only is the realm of images expanding today vis-à-vis the realm of life, but images are also occupying a space of a fundamentally different kind, a “heterotopia” in Foucault’s sense. Like zealots of the technological, these “new” images claim no longer to refer to the real world; they promise instead to liberate us from it. But in order to accomplish such a radical end, they would have to give us access to a realm beyond the image as we know it, for only then would our conception of the real shatter. And this they do not do. They merely expand the universe of images which is indeed, in keeping with its destiny, expanding beyond the boundaries of our own corporeal experience. It is true that the representation of a world of objects and bodies is today losing ground, faster than ever before, to a world of images, but simple mimesis was never the be-all and end-all of picture-making. The collective term “virtual reality” (VR), conceals the fact that we are still dealing with images, albeit interactive images that boast the authority of the latest technology. Whether then we celebrate or condemn these images, it is unjustified to speak of them as

“virtual images,” for virtual images would no longer be images produced by a medium, but rather our own images, which are impossible to grasp through technological means. We *can*, however, speak of the images of a virtual world, if by that we mean a world that exists only in images.

Do such images still relate to a beholder, in whom they find a living locus? If we answer this question in the negative we are taking a stance that has a long history. Time and again, viewers have lost their identity, or feared losing it, when they were forced to adopt new forms of perception. Confronted with images of a kind that they had never seen before, they felt that they were turning into beings of a different kind, and proclaimed—either joyfully or regretfully—that humanity was at an end. We are likewise thrown into confusion when it comes to virtual reality, for it seems to confound our notions of what is imaginary and what is fictive. The new technologies, however, are only able to create a common fiction, while the imaginary lies in the image-world of the beholder, where what is fictive is either recognized as such or not. The fictive cannot occupy the place of the imaginary, for underlying the production of the imaginary there is a social process. Augé, who put forth this claim, was forced to concede that “an image can’t be anything but an image. Whatever its power, it is we who have endowed it with this power.”<sup>53</sup> But this collective “we” by no means suggests that the “I” has disappeared completely. Far from it. For it is the “I,” the individual, who manipulates the collective imaginary with his personal imagination. A kind of resonance exists, therefore, between the individual and the electronic image, for both manipulate existing pictorial material and do so with a degree of freedom. This enriches the store of the raw materials from which we produce our interior images, a store that contains always a personal element.

Much the same is true in the intercultural realm. It is by no means certain that the export of Western visual material will in the long term have a leveling effect on the collective imagination. More likely, local traditions will seize increasing control of media and foment a countermovement directed against globalization. To be sure, American soap operas are

being broadcast in the slums of the Third World, and modern telemedia do deliver the propaganda world of capitalist producers into homes around the world. But access to the internet and other forms of technological communication are already working against the standardization of images at the global level by bringing the imaginary in its culturally-specific guise into play.

Video technology is available to private users worldwide. In the Third World it has already produced new hybrid images in the wedding and funerary realms, as Pinney has recently described in the case of India.<sup>54</sup> The video camera, like the photographic camera, brings the observer himself into the picture. But unlike the latter, it invites users to communicate with others or to watch themselves. This practice is already being exploited in films, as when couples declare their feelings for one another or observe one another on live video. This new medium of presence is thus no longer limited to serving as a medium for the memory, nor is it subject to the time lapse that up to now separated any image from the beholder. When a video serves not only as a recording medium but as a means of self-presentation, it becomes possible for the presence in front of the image to interfere with the presence in the image. Existing video can be stored and reworked, while photography, which records a time irretrievably lost, does not lend itself to comparable manipulation. We can employ and manipulate the video like a prosthesis of our visual memory. The interaction between passive perception and active construction therefore predestines it to serve as a medium of the imagination.

Contemporary art has for some time now been comfortable in the realm of technology, using it to create what look like mental images and images of memory and to use those images in the way a writer would use quotations. One well-known example comes from the American painter David Reed, who figures in Arthur Danto's book *After the End of Art* (Fig. 2.4).<sup>55</sup> Reed was experimenting with digital photos in San Francisco when he discovered that the location of his gallery was only a few blocks from the house in which Alfred Hitchcock had filmed his 1958 "Vertigo."<sup>56</sup> He then designed

“an installation that was a remake of Judy’s bedroom in the Hotel Empire.” In it he combined painting, film, and video clips to create a hybrid medium so seamless that it unleashes reveries and memories that seem to be our own. A painting by Reed hangs over Judy’s bed, while a video next to the bed plays the scene from the old movie. Reed tells us in the catalogue that “I inserted my painting into a still from the film” in order to blur time. In a later video clip, film, video, and painting create an amalgam that can no longer be unraveled, and onto which the beholder projects his own images while under the illusion that he is distilling them from the work itself. In the end Reed decided to exhibit his paintings only in such “fictive bedrooms” in order to encourage the beholder to forget the gallery. They remain of course fictive bedrooms, but they now recall the everyday world rather than gallery art. The viewer’s experience is no longer tied to what he understands as a work of art. Instead his personal imagination is empowered in a private locus that Reed has created by means of the artistic fiction.



Fig. 2.4. David Reed, “Judy as Madeleine,” still from the film “Vertigo” (Universal Pictures, 1958), 1992, C-print. Courtesy of the artist and Max Protetch Gallery.

The future of the *locus of images* that I have identified as our living body, will, however, not be decided in the realm of fine art. A much more critical venue is virtual reality, which so vastly increases our space, taking in the expanses of the Internet and plumbing cyberspace. As Wertheim has shown, opinions diverge over whether our imagination is swallowed up by VR spaces or whether it acquires a new freedom through them.<sup>57</sup> The “Net” opens up realms of fantasy and an unbounded freedom of communication, in which users can feel newborn. They put on “digital masks” or “ersatz faces” behind which they pretend to change their identity. Cyberspace provides a site where participants play a Self different from the one they must play in the real world.<sup>58</sup>

As early as 1984, William Gibson introduced the term “cyberspace” in his novel *Neuromancer*. At one point in the narrative, the main protagonist was “jacked into a custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that was the matrix.”<sup>59</sup> The crucial words here are “disembodied consciousness.” This experience is at bottom but a new take on the old phenomenon of out-of-body “ecstasy,” a state in which one’s own body creates the sensation that one has left it. Reports of “journeys” into cyberspace also describe the sensation that one is plunging with a new Self into a world where the possibilities for metamorphosis are unlimited, while the body remains behind in a torpid, everyday world. With the body eliminated as the locus of identity, one’s current identity becomes, in the age of the internet, a mere option.<sup>60</sup> But again, this is not so new as it seems at first sight. It is a common experience that images disconnect the gaze from the body and guide consciousness to an imaginary place where the body cannot follow. Imagination is a corporeal activity even when it means, in a manner of speaking, leaving the body. As a result, the new technologies transform the individual body even more thoroughly into a locus of images, for the body now lives only in images and it is only through images that it communicates with this world or with other worlds.

But why are we talking about visual images? Aren’t we just as likely, if not more so, to communicate with others on

the internet by means of texts or even voice? That is true, but images are an issue all the same. The participants in Internet dialogue erect in their minds imaginary images of one another. Acquaintances forged in chat rooms have already led to dramas where cyber friends meet in person (or perhaps one should say, meet in body) and realize that they have formed erroneous images of one another (or perhaps one should say, merely media images). It is well known that the less our mental images are constrained by physical or visible images, the more actively they unfold: this may even be a universal law governing the interaction of external and internal images. But the trend toward the visible image is now also growing on the internet. There are already famous legal cases concerning private individuals who subject themselves to 24-hour video surveillance and then post the images on the Internet. Newly developed technologies promise a future in which people will “be able to send real-time video messages” electronically from house to house. For many years users of the Web liked to visit the cybercity Alpha World, where they felt animated as “avatars.”<sup>61</sup>

The difference between the imaginary world of old media and that of the new is that in the latter we are apt to discover that we are not alone. We encounter fellow travelers in imagination. Like us, they are not where they are (at home alone in front of their computers), but rather together in a shared Nowhere whose communality creates an illusion of reality that is the more potent the less it can be experienced in daily life. Communication as a communal act is more important than its contents, for it creates the sense that one is acquiring a social existence that is no longer tied to physical places. But this existence is an imaginary one, for it is possible only in fiction. In painting and even in film, the beholder is alone with his imagination. In the interactive media, by contrast, he engages with others, who can either stimulate or paralyze his imagination. Interactivity is a new form of seduction, enticing us to renewed faith in images.

Today’s technofiction is increasingly laden with religious overtones, which bear unmistakable witness to the role that technofiction is playing in the private imagination of our time.

For these overtones are a response to his experience of spiritual loss in the face of the collective imaginary and its commercialization. Old ideas of the immortal and disembodied “soul” resurface today in the form of a “virtual *Doppelgänger*” who lives in cyberspace. When we hear cyberutopia’s promise of immortality on the Web, we think of Oscar Wilde’s *Picture of Dorian Gray*. Talk of a “digital eternity” that can be programmed into the Web reminds us of ancient cults of the dead with their practice of exchanging body and image. From an anthropological perspective, then, embodiment in an image is a topos: it testifies to an age-old urge to transcend, by means of the image, the boundaries of space and time that confine the human body. It would appear then that images remain tied to the body, even in our present-day virtual world. Which means that there is good reason to go on speaking of that body as a living *locus of images*.



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## The Coat of Arms and the Portrait: Two Media of the Body

The history of the modern portrait has generally been written as the history of a picture in which the beholder reads a resemblance to a living model. But resemblance is a nebulous concept and one that has found new meaning since the invention of photography. If one means by “resemblance,” a resemblance to a body, the question arises as to which notion of the body is meant. In the early period of the portrait, that notion could not yet have been a modern one, since a general concept of the body did not develop until the Enlightenment.<sup>1</sup> A similar problem arises if one speaks of the early portrait as presenting a resemblance to an individual, for that concept likewise could not have the meaning that it bears today—if indeed there was any such concept at all. Finally, the study of the portrait has suffered from the fact that the portrait panel was not taken seriously as a carrier medium; instead, portraits in any context whatsoever (from the mural to book illumination) were lumped together. We can, however, speak of an autonomous portrait only when the portrait comprises the whole of a composition and appears on a distinct—in this case, portable—medium that shapes its content and form. That medium in turn is shaped by social conventions from which

one can draw inferences about the meaning of the portrait. It is, then, only by understanding the relationship between image and medium—as a double statement—that we may begin to understand this central invention of European pictorial culture.

If we speak of the panel as the pictorial medium of the portrait, we must however recognize that it was not the earliest such medium. There was another whose history reaches much further into the past; namely, the coat of arms. We could almost speak of it as a precursor to the panel portrait, provided we bear in mind that the coat of arms was not a body *image*, but a body *sign*, an heraldic abstraction. It identified not an individual but the bearer of a familial or territorial genealogy; that is to say, it defined the body of a social estate. This makes clear a distinction between the two that may in itself have provided the impetus for the development of the portrait: for we see that the latter functions as both a counterpart of the coat of arms and as its contradiction. Let us not forget that the same painters—the *schilderer*, or shield painters, as they were called—worked in both media, as different as they may have been. When the portrait panel was introduced in courtly society, it was felt that entire series of portraits had to be commissioned so as to reproduce the genealogical chain that the coat of arms encoded.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, let us consider how these pictorial forms relate to two concepts that are a focus throughout this book: the body and the medium. Portrait panels ([Fig. 3.1](#)) as well as coats of arms ([Fig. 3.2](#)) can be described as “media of the body” in the sense that they take the place of the body, whose presence they extend both in time and space. To be sure, they conveyed different conceptions of the body, for the genealogical and the individual body can not be reduced to a common denominator. That is also why the two media operate in such distinct ways, the one via heraldic sign and the other via physiognomic duplication. But to call them “media” of the body also means that in representing the body they demanded an appropriate sign of recognition from the beholder, either a gesture of loyalty for the coat of arms or, in the case of the bourgeois portrait, of pious intercession for and in the name of the depicted individual. That is, they demanded a response. When

we admire the work of an artist in a museum, however, we are oblivious to the need for any such response, just as we shift our attention away from the person portrayed.

This brings us to the medium, and the situation that we encounter here will drive home the complexity of that concept. If one uses material and technique as criteria, the coat of arms and the portrait appear to be the same. Both are painted wooden panels. As representations, however, they are profoundly different, and the distinction consists in more than the difference between image and sign. In fact, it becomes fully apparent only when we consider the very different symbolic uses of the medium in the two cases. For it is in their uses that the individual characters of the escutcheon panel and the portrait panel lie and not in their technical similarities or in their analogous histories. It is only in the way they approach the task of representation that the dynamics of the respective media unfold. Yet the comparison between the two is hermeneutically meaningful only if contemporaries drew the same comparison. That is what I intend to demonstrate in the following pages. In the process it will become apparent just how intensely the portrait panel and the escutcheon panel were locked in a competition whose intermedial meaning had to be obvious to all.

The thirteenth-century donor figures in Naumburg will serve to introduce the theme of coats of arms and portraits.<sup>3</sup> One of the donors, Ditmarus the “Comes Occisus,” carries a shield—still used as armament in this period—in front of him in such a way as to protect and cover his body. Painted on the shield is a second, medial face, Ditmarus’s coat of arms, which enables us to read the owner’s name and status. When engaged in an action, the owner would use it as a “second body,” the term Walter Seitter used in his seminal essay.<sup>4</sup> It thus stands between the body of the owner of the coat of arms and the body of the beholder (who in a battle would be the enemy), playing much the same role as a computer “interface” in today’s technological environment. The body’s real face is concealed behind the official face of the escutcheon. The latter informs us that every representation has its aggressive side,

which emerges in warfare of course, but also in the legal claim asserted here by the coat of arms. Though the Naumburg figures are much earlier than real portraits, they point to the complex relationship between body, image, and medium that was one driving force behind the development of the portrait. This relationship touches on a fundamental question of historical anthropology.




Fig. 3.1. (left) Rogier van der Weyden (ca. 1399–1464), portrait of Francesco d’Este (born ca. 1430, died after 1475), ca. 1460. Oil on wood, overall 31.8 x 22.2 cm.; painted surface, each side 29.8 x 20.3 cm. The Friedsam Collection, bequest of Michael Friedsam, 1931. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Photo: Image copyright © The Metropolitan Museum of Art/Art Resource, NY.



Fig. 3.2. (right) Verso of the portrait of Francesco d'Este ([Fig. 3.1](#)). Coat of arms and crest of the Este family, ca. 1460. The Friedsam Collection, bequest of Michael Friedsam, 1931. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Photo: Image copyright © The Metropolitan Museum of Art/Art Resource, NY.

Scholarship has barely begun to probe the history of the shield of arms. Its earliest use dates to the thirteenth century, when a change in military technology prompted the introduction of helmets with a solid facemask. As these completely obscured the identity of the warrior, they of course lent new significance to the identifying shield. Further changes in military technology caused the shield to disappear from warfare in the early fourteenth century, but it subsequently became all the more important in courtly tournaments, where knights fought with closed visors. Both victor and vanquished were identified not by their bodily face but by their medial face, the colors of the armorial bearings on their shields. In the process they also brought their genealogy into play, which they carried with them into the contest, both in their bodies and in their coats of arms.<sup>5</sup> Shields of arms also figured whenever the owner of the coat of arms was absent or when he

demanded homage as a feudal lord. In the former case the shield was displayed as a placeholder for the absent person, in the latter as the legal signifier of the lord who was present. What was once a weapon had become either a pure emblem of suzerainty that took a person's place, or a signifier that linked his body with his status and domain of authority.

Only a vanishingly small number of shields of arms have survived, for later, in the age of art collecting, they were not considered works of art. As a result there is an imbalance in the number of escutcheon panels vs. figural panel images that have come down to us, and this has distorted our perception of the historical relationship between the two in their intermedial competition. Sometimes, shields of arms or écus were preserved only because they were painted over at a later date. The heraldic panels that were created in Lille around 1529 for Jehan Barrat and his wife are a revealing example. As the couple were commoners, the shields were likely epitaphs or death shields which, in a secondary function of the original shield of arms, were displayed in churches. A generation later, after 1563, they were painted over with two portraits; these portraits, however, were not contemporary, but copies of portraits dating back to the beginnings of the bourgeois portrait. The originals, painted in 1425 by Robert Campin, depicted Barthélemy Alatrueye and his wife. Alatrueye was among those officials of the Burgundian chancery in Lille who sat for paintings, by Campin and Jan van Eyck, that count as the earliest independent panel portraits of persons outside the high nobility. As such, they may be indicative of the subjects' social ambitions. Before her death in 1452, Alatrueye's wife, Marie de Pacy, donated to the Carmelite church in Brussels a tablet inscribed: "Idem a painted panel with the portrait of the aforesaid testatrix," which provides us with a very rare statement about the function of an early portrait. The presence of the coat of arms on the portrait panels, which were once shields of arms, was revealed only by X-ray images.<sup>6</sup>

In most instances, heraldic panels were preserved because they were physically connected to works of another genre that replaced them over the course of time. This was the case, for example, when armorial bearings were attached to the wings



or the backside of portrait panels. But one must not forget that portrait panels have come down to us not on account of the individuals portrayed, but for the sake of the artists who painted them. This shift in focus seems to have begun rather early. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why Margaret of Austria, the Regent of the Netherlands, added van Eyck's portrait of the Arnolfini to her art collection.<sup>7</sup> Finally, we find escutcheon panels on the covers that were used to protect portraits during transport. Very few have survived, and those that have are no longer exhibited along with the portrait they originally covered. This is true, for example of the escutcheon cover for Dürer's portrait of Hieronymus Holzschuher, which bears the *Allianzwappen* of two families that were united in marriage, thereby expanding the genealogical scope of the physiognomic portrait.<sup>8</sup>

It is important to introduce a distinction here—one that is usually overlooked in heraldry—between the *coat of arms* itself and the *shield of arms* that is its carrier medium. An analogous distinction applies to the *portrait* and the *portrait panel* as separate objects.<sup>9</sup> In the case of coats of arms, the so-called *écus* or shields of arms were the prerogative of feudal lords or persons of rank, while coats of arms as such were very early adopted by the burgher class. The image (escutcheon) carrier not only reproduced a body (in the case of the coat of arms a social body, however), but itself possessed a physical body as an object: a functional body for the ritual of representation. The medium of an independent carrier is essential in establishing this distinction. Let us compare in this context the escutcheon and the portrait panel, both of which, incidentally, were described with the same historical term (*Schild* or *tableau*).<sup>10</sup> The escutcheons of the Order of the Golden Fleece were on ceremonial occasions treated in much the same way as likenesses of princes; that is, as another kind of face looking out at the beholder. They even sported the necklace of the Order in much the same location as the one worn by Philipp the Good of Burgundy in his portrait by Rogier van der Weyden.<sup>11</sup> What was the left side in the coat of arms the beholder saw in front of him on his right, which is



also true of the face, which is always conceived from the point of view of the body and not from that of the viewer. The coat of arms also turns a kind of face toward us—not an individual face, but a dynastic and genealogical one.<sup>12</sup> But even the likenesses were often understood genealogically, and not individually: for example, according to the chronicler Georges Chastellain, Philipp the Good had as his physiognomy “le visage des ses pères” (the face of his fathers).<sup>13</sup>

Both the coat of arms and the portrait carry within them body references, whose meanings are as different (even as they reference each other) as the appearance of the two media. As the emblem of a family and a lordship tied into the high nobility, the coat of arms was inheritable and thus proof of a genealogy that was borne by the body. By contrast, the portrait signified only one person within the genealogical line of the coat of arms: a living bearer of the name in his mortal body. But this body carried the social rank that it derived from its genealogical heritage visibly, in its physiognomy, just as it had both an individual and a family name. One could almost speak of “two bodies,” the collective body of the family line and the natural body of the living person. Still, the emblem and the likeness are part, each in its own way, of the visual praxis of a legitimate succession by which the living bearer assumes his place in an ancestral line. The emblem refers to a trans-corporeal right of inheritance, while the likeness refers to the living body which was, as such, endowed with a different kind of evidence. In their divergent concepts of the body, the escutcheon and the portrait panel thus referenced each other contrapuntally as they both attested to one and the same person. But under the combined impact of a rising burgher class, of humanism, and of a new concept of the person, the differences between the two became heightened to such a degree that they gradually became mutually exclusive means of representation.

We have a vivid account of the use of the escutcheon in a text that reports the annual session of the Burgundian knightly Order of the Golden Fleece. The session took place in 1445 in St. Bavo in Ghent. Olivier de la Marche, who took part in the meeting, described splendidly painted *tableaux* with the “coats

of arms, the names, and the devices” of the knights of the Order, which were displayed on this occasion in the choir of the church. The knights assembled in front of their escutcheons. The places of those who had died remained empty, and their escutcheons had been placed “in front of a black cloth.” The escutcheons of those who had been deceased for a longer time were outside of the choir, at a location where “everyone could see them clearly and identify them (*voir et connaître*).” At the place of the King of Aragon there rose a baldachin “as though he were present in person.”<sup>14</sup> The ritual that was performed on this occasion presupposed the two-fold presence of the living bodies and the escutcheons, the latter representing the bodies of the dead and the absent. Here the coats of arms of the knights of the Order, unlike the armorial bearings of families, stood in the horizontal relationship of an association of persons. Each escutcheon belonged to a different family and was correspondingly different. But all conformed to a standardized format and featured the necklace of the Order. The escutcheon thus testified to membership in the Order and the coat of arms designated an individual member within that collective.

A coat of arms also extended the presence of its owner, taking him into spheres that his body could not reach. There, too, he could exercise his privileges through the “display and imposition” of his heraldic emblem. It was also possible to bestow one’s arms on others who would then bear them in one’s stead. Heraldry “thus produced *de jure* persons” in the sense that it “invested physical persons with secondary bodies.”<sup>15</sup> Coats of arms had “to be borne by someone or attached to something in order to manifest presence.” They attested not only to a privilege, but also to the legitimate person to whom it belonged. We can assume something similar, *mutatis mutandis*, for the portrait. Today we are too quick to separate the emblem or the image from its carrier medium, without considering that it was only the use of a shield or a portrait panel that established the legitimate character, and with it the meaning of the emblem or the likeness. The notion of “representation,” best known to us from the dynastic cult of the body double, had more to do with

the *right of portrayal* than the *act of portrayal*, which latter we isolate when we focus our modern gaze on the issue of physical resemblance.”<sup>16</sup>

The portrait derived its legitimacy from the function of the portrait panel as an object gifted or exchanged by the nobility, or as a link in a genealogical chain that attested to a dynastic “Self” in the context of court ceremony. Among the burgher class, on the other hand, the portrait was only appropriate to designate donors in a religious context or for use in the memorialization of ancestors that was a part of funerary liturgics.<sup>17</sup> The pictures that burgher families owned were, for the most part, devotional images and ancestral portraits, both of which were defined by their functions. Moreover, they complemented each other in their conceptions of the body: both the *apparitional body* of the saints and the *remembrance body* of the ancestors depended quite manifestly on the image in order to become present as body.<sup>18</sup> The burgher detached the portrait panel from the genealogical chain within which it made its claim to legitimacy in the courtly realm. By contrast, the genealogical chain of the court is ratified by Lucas Cranach the Elder’s triptych of the Electors of Saxony (Fig. 3.3).<sup>19</sup> This was a painting of the three officeholders that brought the usual portrait series depicting the course of dynastic succession in the office into an updated form. The two deceased Electors recall their deeds in long inscriptions (“Lovely peace prevailed in the land... .”) or invoke the legitimacy of their succession (“... after the death of my dear brother, the entire governance passed to me... .”). By contrast the third Elector, John Frederick the Magnanimous, who succeeded his father and uncle in 1532, introduced himself solely with the escutcheon of the Electorate, whose living carrier he was. In the physiognomic image, his body is in a dialogue with the heraldic corporeal sign of the coat of arms. Shortly after assuming office, John Frederick had commissioned sixty diptychs with the likenesses of his two predecessors, a response to the emperor’s refusal to perform his investiture. A short time later he gave expression to his dynastic legitimacy in triptychs like this one, which is today in Hamburg.

The dialogue-like relationship between the likeness and the coat of arms of a great feudal lord was staged *in corpore*, one might say, when the body of the lord walked behind heralds or pages who carried his coat of arms. Such a pairing of a body and a portrait would have been tautological. In the case of the coat of arms, however, alterity vis-à-vis the body was further heightened when a composite heraldic field was divided up into the coats of arms of the individual fiefs that represented, territory by territory, the suzerainty embodied in the person of the overlord. The many heraldic emblems would then refer to a single body. That is the meaning behind the design of the tomb of Philippe Pot, the “Great Seneschal of Burgundy,” which reproduces his own funerary procession at the Abbey Church of Citeaux (prior to 1493). Eight “mourners” in monastic robes balance on their shoulders a stone slab bearing Philippe’s body. On the outward-facing sides of their bodies they carry, on a strap around their shoulders, an escutcheon with one of the eight *quartiers* of his *blason*.<sup>20</sup>



Fig. 3.3. Lucas Cranach the Elder (1472–1553), “The Electors of Saxony,” 1532. Left to right: Frederick III the Wise (1463–1525), John the Steadfast (1468–1532), and John Frederick I the Magnanimous (1503–1554). Oil on wood, 67.5 x 67 cm. Hamburger Kunsthalle, Hamburg. Photo: Elk Walford, Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/Art Resource, NY.

The coat of arms and the likeness share a body reference, but at the same time coexist in a state of symbolic and aesthetic

opposition. The face that appears in a portrait is part of the natural body by which it is borne and which it represents. Unlike the heraldic “face” of the coat of arms, it is represented by means of corporeal mimesis. Through mimesis the portrait, by means of its outward gaze, closes the distance between itself and the living face. In time the act of speaking, too, would be symbolized by allegorical means.<sup>21</sup> The face is a reminder not only of a legitimate status, but also of a lifetime. However, the *genealogical gaze* to which the face invites us is of a different order of meaning than the *theological gaze* of the *imago Dei*. In the body analogy of a noble family, physiognomy displays evidence of social distinction, while the burghers in their portraits put forward a claim of a different nature. The bourgeois portraits of the early realists in fifteenth-century Flemish painting freed the body from the old social hierarchy and made it instead the medium of a person embedded in a bourgeois social system.

This new conception of the likeness is evident, for example, in the portrait of a goldsmith from Brugges, the work of Jan van Eyck (signed 1432).<sup>22</sup> The body analogy of the panel is evidenced by the fact that the face looks directly at us, a gaze that would have been impossible for earlier portraits with their conventional profile faces. The goldsmith turns toward us in a challenging way that, paradoxically, only the heraldic coat of arms had previously achieved by means of its frontality. The coat of arms made a face-to-face address to the beholder who was supposed to ratify the legitimacy of its claim to privilege with an answering gaze of loyalty. The portrait, too, wished to be not only looked at, but also to be acknowledged; the viewer was to remember and to intercede for the soul of the person depicted *in absentia*. The inscription on the frame of the painting dates the beginning of the work to the birth of the goldsmith, thereby proclaiming itself a second body that assumes the place of the real one. But in stark contrast to heraldry, the new frontality of the portrait abolishes all trace of a two-dimensional surface. The frontal face that seeks our gaze (as would a living body in an encounter with a beholder) is almost like a mask, a painted representation that has separated itself from the body. Behind the portrait is a



mortal face with which we are to communicate through the medium, through the painted face. The portrait is not only a document, but a medium of the body in the sense that it summons the beholder to engage it. As a medium it attained for the mortal body a paradoxical immortality, which until then only the heraldic emblem had claimed for itself.

It is only in its contradiction to the *escutcheon* that the *portrait panel* establishes its true character. As a composition of signs, the coat of arms affirms the actual surface quality of the medium, not only in the literal sense but also symbolically, for a coat of arms is an abstraction of a body. The portrait panel, on the other hand, as soon as it abandoned the profile view of a rigid heraldic figure, introduced the metaphor of a window in order to pierce the surface of the medium and allow our gaze inside the frame. The turn toward frontality directed the portrait on a path *away* from that of the coat of arms; it had now to articulate a real *body conception*, which invariably also altered the *conception of the image*. The more body one depicted, the more of the world one had to simulate and marshal against the fact of the surface, and it was this means, by transcending the reality of a surface that this body came into the world that we are looking at here on this first screen of the modern age. Projection is a way of transferring the world into a medium. A face, however, is more than a *flat plane*—and not only because it belongs to the three-dimensional *surface* of the body. Through its activity of the gaze it displays a dualism of interior and exterior, a dualism one can describe as painted anthropology.<sup>23</sup>

The inner life, expressed in the gaze, was given a corporeal dimension in the metaphor of the eye as the “window of the soul.” Once a radical physiognomic likeness became the goal, persons could no longer be depicted as links in a genealogical image-sequence. The pictorial task now at hand was to describe a particular individual body, and that task led, logically and consistently, to the task of describing a subject. *Subject description* and *body description* are by no means synonymous, but they join here now into a tense union, a two-pronged challenge to future portraitists. When the natural body becomes the agent and placeholder of the subject, the social

body with its static claim is suddenly up for grabs. It is in fact only the recognition of the subject that opens up, in the long term, the possibility of changing roles; indeed, it creates the possibility of distinguishing roles in the first place. A role can be played only if one has identified an independent carrier who can play it. Just as there is *no subject description* without a particular subject, there is *no role description* without a specific role player, for both abstractions can be depicted only if there is a body to *embody* them.<sup>24</sup>

However, if one reflects on the genesis of the body concept in the Early Modern Period, it is clear that the changes in the referential contexts of the body that now became possible bore the potential for conflict. At the beginning stood the inequality of bodies, which prevailed as long as they were conceived of as *social* (rather than *physical*) entities. Nobility of birth conferred a genealogically distinguished body. This body, capable of marrying and inheriting, was affirmed by the symbolic practice of wedding pictures (*Brautbildnisse*), which were also used to perform long-distance weddings. The invention of the bourgeois likeness constituted a genuine provocation against this noble body which had so long held a monopoly on portrayal. That is no doubt why, in the region of Flanders, burgher portraits were limited to use in the church's funerary liturgy, where they could most easily be tolerated. Van Eyck's so-called "Timotheus" may have been, in fact, a genuine death likeness ([Fig. 3.4](#)). The symbol of the tomb inscription, LEAL SOUVENIR, like the weathered crack in the painted tombstone, point to transience and death, which in turn give new meaning to the likeness as a memory-medium. Albeit in this limited context, the mortal body now entered the arena of portrayal and took up a position alongside the immortal heraldic body.

Preliminary attempts to openly represent the subject led to the use of various analogies, among which the analogy of *body* and *image body* (= panel) was paramount. The mirror metaphor, too, contained an obvious body reference. If a painting was understood as a mirror, it could depict only the natural body, which a mirror captures ephemerally. This established a definitive contrast to the static heraldic medium



of the escutcheon. Jan van Eyck's self-portrait contains a programmatic statement in this regard, for it represents a mirror view in which the medium alters itself conceptually in favor of a fleeting "here and now."<sup>25</sup> Unlike a monument or a tomb, with their indifference to time, a mirror captures only transitory images. There was, for example, a contemporary fashion of depicting skulls as seen in a mirror, as a way of denouncing the *trompe l'oeil* of the mirror gaze as it related to corporeal truth. Jan van Eyck captured his own body in the picture with a photographic precision and, in an inscription on the frame, also records the precise time when this inquisitorial body analysis took place. The portrait endows his appearance at that very moment with a paradoxical durability, which previously would have made sense only in a genealogical context, where it was not the person who was to endure but the legitimacy of a line of descent. A real mirror, which one uses only for a brief moment, stands in a relationship of intrinsic contradiction to the mirror of memory, which beholders are supposed to use to recall someone who has departed—a contradiction that gives us an inkling of the controversies surrounding the understanding of the early portrait. Such a likeness supported the idea—already voiced by Plato—that one can only remember a body that one has seen with one's own body. Body and image stand in a relationship of analogy from which one can read changes in *body concept*, just as, conversely, changes in body concept bring in their wake changes in *image concept*.

Heraldic panels, which we today regard as a sideline in the history of the image, established the legitimacy of the portrait panel as a pictorial medium for representation. Rogier's likeness of Francesco d'Este asserted the equivalence of image and emblem as two complementary views of a person of social rank ([Fig. 3.1](#)).<sup>26</sup> Only to the modern gaze does the coat of arms mean merely the backside of the portrait. Likeness and heraldic emblem, which give expression to two different concepts of the body, share the same medial body (the panel). On either side of the coat of arms we read the name "Francisque" and the personal motto "me tout," which in the family genealogy always identifies an individual name, much

as do the *Allianzwappen* of the two families that were linked through the marriage of Francesco d'Este ([Fig. 3.2](#)). Genealogical signs (coats of arms) and personal signs (mottoes) together formed the “heraldic face.”<sup>27</sup> But today we accord immediate corporality only to the portrait, which we like to call an “autonomous portrait.” We forget that behind the portrait there stood as well, though invisibly, a person whom that panel served to represent and whose legitimate status in legal affairs the panel authenticated. In the religious realm, a portrait exhorted family and friends to take an active role by praying in front of it instead of merely recalling the features of the face, but it was also the medium of a symbolic communion with God. One could call it a kind of user-surface through which one established medial contact with an absent person.

The intermedial relationship of portrait and coat of arms, which plays a fundamental role in the early history of representation, is demonstrated by a votive image, created at a turning point in this history, that offers a glimpse into what led up to that juncture. This image was neither an autonomous portrait nor an escutcheon. Rather, the so-called Wilton Diptych, commissioned at the end of the fourteenth century by Richard II of England, reveals, when fully opened, the king as pious donor in the act of praying before the Virgin's heavenly court.<sup>28</sup> If one closes the winged altarpiece, however, two heraldic panels come into view, one of which reproduces the escutcheon, like a picture within a picture, along with the helm and the headgear of the blazon's owner. The other panel shows, in the *Figure parlante* of a white stag, the emblem of Richard, which alludes to his name. This allegorical device, precious exemplars of which the king distributed among his followers, was the most modern heraldry of its day. Alongside the stereotypical escutcheon with its transpersonal meaning, the stag forms a personal countervoice similar to that of the autonomous portrait, which was also coming into being at about this same time. A generation later at the court of the Este in Ferrara, under humanistic influence, the portrait medallion came into use, the back of which bore the device of the portrayed individual.<sup>29</sup>




Fig. 3.4. Jan van Eyck (ca. 1390–1441), portrait of a man (“Léal Souvenir”), 1432. Oil on oak, 33.3 x 18.9 cm. Bought 1857. National Gallery, London. Photo © National Gallery, London/Art Resource, NY.

A physical demonstration of the relationship between heraldic emblems and the body was enacted whenever the members of the Gruuthuse family showed themselves in the windows of the prayer loge where they attended Mass in the church of Saint Mary in Brugges ([Fig. 3.5](#)).<sup>30</sup> They were introduced as living images of their coats of arms, which were displayed on the parapets below the windows. The understory of the family chapel gave access to the burial place of the Gruuthuses, while on the upper level one could see the living bearers of the name in the windows during the liturgy. A window was a ritual frame for the public presentation of a person ([Fig. 3.6](#)). The real body and the painted or sculpted body in the guise of a heraldic emblem and likeness were tied into a web of references that guided the historical experience of the image.



Fig. 3.5. Prayer loge of the Familie Gruuthuse (exterior),  
Liebfrauenkirch, Bruges, fifteenth century. Photo: Jan Termont  
—photographic service, City of Bruges.



Fig. 3.6. Prayer loge of the Familie Gruuthuse (interior).  
Photo: Jan Termont—photographic service, City of Bruges.

The interaction of coat of arms and likeness in a symbolic as well as social-aesthetic sense was taken to an unusual level of complexity by Petrus Christus in his portrait of Edward Grymstone, Henry VI's ambassador. The painter used a fictive interior, introduced into the portrait genre now for the first time, to display two small escutcheons, one in the light and another in shadow. The back of the panel also displayed a coat of arms. But the heraldic syntax here takes hold of the subject of the painting, as well, who not only owns the insignia, but wears garments in colors that have heraldic significance. Here, the natural and the heraldic body form a contradictory emblem that resists deconstruction.<sup>31</sup>

Heraldry plays an even more important role in the Beaune altarpiece that the Burgundian Chancellor Nicolas Rolin, in a somewhat immodest bid for attention, commissioned from Rogier van der Weyden. An ongoing power struggle between Rolin and his rival Philippe de Croy, who hailed from the high nobility, involved, among other issues, a conflict over the feudal use of images and emblems. The outer wings of the altarpiece depict the donor couple in a manner similar to their prototypes on the Ghent altar, but they are now accompanied by their coat of arms, the inclusion of which may have pushed the envelope of courtly convention ([Fig. 3.7](#)). The anachronistic knightly helmet refers to the only rank that the bourgeois parvenu ever attained at the court. The seraphic angel, who carries the helmet in his hands like a religious offering, seems to declare that the presence of the portrait here has a sober, religious significance, bespeaking the donor's piety. The colors, however, tell a different story, loud and clear. The heraldic gold and black that spread over the entire picture field are the colors that dominate Rolin's escutcheon. He could hardly have made *de facto* use of his escutcheon in this context, but through the medium of paint he is able to make the same point figuratively. The difficult synthesis of heraldry and portrait painting reaches a problematic climax here. And we sense that, in bourgeois use, the portrait and the coat of arms long continued in need of religious justifications that ensured no trespass was intended on the feudal prerogative of the nobility to pictorial representation. We have



only faint echoes of this war of images that was fought with the escutcheon and the portrait panel, and we are only slowly learning to read the meaning of those echoes once again.<sup>[32](#)</sup>

We must not overlook the fact that the painters of portraits were also responsible for creating escutcheons. In fact, they had three escutcheons of their own, recognizable from their rounded lower parts as emblematic of the painters' guild. On the portrait of himself and his wife that the Master of Frankfurt painted in 1496, the ox of St. Luke holds a coat of arms with three golden *écus*, which indicates the artist's membership in the guild. On his St. Luke panel in Antwerp, Frans Floris de Vriendt, in a stroke of humor, gave the bull a headband with the painters' coat of arms. It was in the same spirit that Jan van Eyck shows his own likeness mirrored in the escutcheon of Saint George on the panel of the canon Georg van der Paele. Van Eyck's tomb in St. Donatian in Bruges shows an inlaid copper shield with three small escutcheons, and the accompanying epitaph describes the painter as the "alder constlichste meester van schilderij" (the most artful master of painting). The choice of words is revealing. The portrait panel and the escutcheon are two distinct media that were created in the same workshop, but in actual use they complemented and then competed against each other.<sup>[33](#)</sup>



Fig. 3.7 Rogier van der Weyden (ca. 1399–1464), altarpiece of The Last Judgment, detail of Nicolas Rolin. Hospices de Beaune, Beaune.

Subject description, in both the semiotic and the iconic sense, is grounded in the reciprocal relationship between body and image. Humanism was instrumental in this process, advancing principles inimical to heraldic thinking and taking a stand against the rigid hierarchical structure of the social body. In addition, the humanists' reflections on individual death, the meaning of which no genealogical privilege could mitigate, placed life within new horizons where it acquired a deeper



meaning through the exploration of fate and man's ability to overcome fate through his personal ethos. The process of wresting the concept of the "subject" from what Arlette Jouana called the *ordre social* of medieval feudal society was a long one, and it has left its mark in the history of the pictorial media. The notion of a "likeness" in the modern sense is not yet relevant in the period we are considering, for it bypasses the question, likeness to what? Likeness to a body is not sufficient, as the body on its own is linked to social categories. The social facet of the body makes it necessary to speak of it as a generic entity to which the description of a particular person is affixed. Humanism, for its part, used body-description to create a description of an individual, a notion that was antithetical to past ideas of personhood.

In the Chatsworth Collection there is a portrait of a young man by Boltraffio with, on its back, a skull in the place of a coat of arms, and an inscription stating that this is the true heraldic emblem of Hieronymus Casius: *Insigne sum Ieronimi Casii* ([Fig. 3.8](#)). Death is the fate that endows the individual life with dignity and meaning.<sup>34</sup> To be sure, it is the heraldic emblem of Everyman, and in the face of it class privilege, status, and worldly possessions are as nothing. Still, death is also seen as the boundary and goal of an individual life that strives for autonomy in its conduct and its assertion of itself, in its character and its ethos. It is no accident that the skull as a pictorial motif appears simultaneously with the modern portrait. They are true counterparts, one of the other. In some cases the skull even takes the place of the portrait in a radical profession of mortality. The living face, which represents a person, is never so fully an expression of one individual life as when it is set against the anonymous face of death.

All the same, life was and would long continue to be a matter of playing a role. From the slide cover of a lost portrait panel, which today is in the Uffizi, a living mask, a mask the color of flesh, looks out at us with empty eye sockets. A Latin inscription relates the mask to the portrait it once covered and to the person represented in the portrait ([Fig. 3.9](#)): *Sua cuique persona* (To each his mask). The inscription plays with the double meaning of the word *persona*, which can mean either a

“mask” or the “role” that the individual assumes in society, like an actor on the stage. Cicero already used the word to mean both “mask” and “face.” Erasmus of Rotterdam, in *The Praise of Folly*, described life as “a play in which each person uses his mask and plays his role.” Machiavelli, too, developed a theory on the subject of role-playing, which Castiglione termed the “art of the self.” In her interpretation of the Florentine slide cover, Hannah Baader points out that this panel, for the first time, raises the question of personal identity.<sup>35</sup> The actor behind the mask is analogous to the highly uncertain self in the role-play of society. It was not until the modern discovery of the Self that it became possible to identify its old and new roles. Gottfried Boehm has collected the rhetorical references that are relevant to the development of the art of portraiture in Italy. In affect and temperament, the *uomo singolare* conceives of himself as an individual who forms his character through the interplay of various roles that only an individual can reconcile and unite.<sup>36</sup>



Fig. 3.8. (left) Giovanni Antonio Boltraffio (1467–1516), memento mori of a skull in a niche (verso). © Devonshire Collection, Chatsworth. Reproduced by permission of Chatsworth Settlement Trustees. Fig. 3.9. (right) Anonymous (attributed to Ridolfo Ghirlandaio), portrait cover depicting a mask between griffins, sixteenth century. Oil on wood, 65 x 48 cm. Uffizi, Florence. Photo: Scala/Ministero per i Beni e le Attività culturali/Art Resource, NY.

During the High Renaissance, some private portraits bear the emblematic inscription V.V., which has been read to mean *vivens vivo*, or, “[painted] during a lifetime for the living

[beholder]”). Therein lies an allusion to the relationship between body and portrait.<sup>37</sup> The portrait is painted during the lifetime of the body. Since the body is mortal, it survives only for those whose living gaze falls upon its image. This thought was already expressed in Leon Battista Alberti’s tractate on painting: “Through painting, the faces of the dead go on living for a very long time.”<sup>38</sup> Painting thus provides a memory picture that defies death. But the argument goes further. It is nourished by the analogy between the *body* and the *medium of the body*. This analogy exists only because a portrait depicts someone who once lived in a body, in the way in which he is now perceived in the image. That is one reason why the “living expression” that one expects to see in the dead painting is so important. The body as a living medium is replaced by an artful and artificial body (the portrait panel) in which a subject is remembered who is worthy of remembrance (if only for emotional reasons). In the process, life and death are captured simultaneously in the gaze of the beholder.

The humanist portrait, an invention of the Northern Renaissance, belongs in a separate category, if only because the members of this new elite of the learned possessed a degree of self-awareness that called out for its own form of expression. The humanist “Self” belonged neither to a courtly nor a bourgeois lineage (the normal territory of remembrance); rather they sought a public reputation that would, in their writings, outlast their corporeal existence. They profited from the new medium of printing to engage in propaganda for their work: not the political propaganda of social groups, but rather the promotion of a person, a concept that they brought to life for their contemporaries as well. It drew on the antithesis between the “Self” as immortalized in their work, and their body, which would in the end die and decay as was the common lot of humankind. The difference they celebrated was no longer the old one between collective and personal identity, but rather a new difference in which the “mind” (*mens*) asserted itself against the body. The afterlife they sought was not the afterlife of the Christian soul in the Hereafter, but rather the afterlife of the mind in the world, and most especially the literary legacy of the individual.

Dürer and Cranach disseminated their likenesses of humanists and Reformation theologians in a print medium that resembled the print medium of their books. In 1507, the poet Konrad Celtis commissioned Hans Burgkmair to create a memorial image, in the form of a woodcut, that would contrast his corporeal death with the life of his books: in the picture, the armorial bearings with his personal device shatter at the end of his life and are replaced by his books, the “heraldic emblems” of a new age.<sup>39</sup> Erasmus of Rotterdam was already disseminating his likeness and personal device in a medal created for him by Quentin Massys, when Dürer, in 1526 (a year that saw many important portraits from his hand), created the famous copper engraving of him. It depicts the relationship between image and text as a conflict between the body and the work of the humanist.<sup>40</sup> Erasmus is portrayed in the act of writing, his gaze directed not at the beholder but rather resting on the text by which he communicates with his readers. A framed inscription, which shares the picture-ground with Erasmus, has the appearance of a picture within a picture—though in fact it contains no picture at all, but rather a text that speaks of the “true” Erasmus, and also, incidentally, of Dürer, for he has signed his work in this very space. Word and picture side-by-side invite us compare the medium of the writer with that of the artist, both of whom here use print media. The comparison is quite obvious but if we give it serious thought, it leads to a profound conclusion, for it explains Dürer’s concept of likeness. When a likeness is reproduced and conveyed in printed copies (just like the word of the writer) it becomes abstracted. Like a written text reproduced by a printing press, a print likeness that issues from the matrix of a print block is no longer a unique expression of a unique body: it has undergone duplication. *Publication* alters a portrait, which previously, as the unique object of the painted panel, carried within itself an analogy with the equally unique body it depicted. What is created in the print, moreover, is a hybrid of the private and the public. We see a private image that simultaneously portrays a new kind of public person.

Dürer took the two inscriptions from Erasmus’s medallion and modified them. The Greek text refers to the difference

between Erasmus's work and image, the Latin text to the difference between his body and his image. In both cases what is at issue is the unportrayable "Self," which, as a subject, expresses itself in one instance in the written word, and in the other not in the image, initially, but first of all in the body. We read that "the image (*imago*) was drawn from the living likeness (*effigies*)" of Erasmus. This likeness, however, can only be the body per se. Previously, the word *effigies* had referred usually to a double or a counter-image that was fashioned *of the body*. Now, however, the same word declares that it is the body that is the double (but only the mortal and visible double) of the Self. This leads to a shift in the constellation of image, medium, and body. Mediality now expands to include the body, thereby stripping it of the monopoly it once exercised over social identity. Social identity no longer belongs to the body, but to the Self.

The inscription, like its model on the medallion, plays with a two-fold concept of the image. In this case, *effigies* refers to the body as the living "image" of Erasmus, which experiences in the artist's *copy* a *medial* afterlife. Luther, like his contemporaries, understood *effigies* to mean portrait.<sup>41</sup> But in the third likeness that Cranach made of him ([Fig. 3.10](#)), the inscription speaks of the body as the "mortal effigy" (*effigies moritura*), as shown in "the work (*opus*) of Lukas" Cranach, while only Luther himself (*ipse*) could express "the eternal (image) of his spirit."<sup>42</sup> A little later, the humanist separation of body and *Self*, not to be confused with the Christian separation of body and *soul*, is applied to the Prince Elector Frederick the Wise, where it is especially surprising given Frederick's venerable dynastic genealogy. Cranach's woodcut shows the prince "as he was in life." Death "left behind only such memory images (*simulacra*)" as Cranach was disseminating, but could "cannot destroy the fame of his virtue."<sup>43</sup> An inscription on the copper engraving with Melanchthon's portrait notes that not even Dürer's "practiced (*docta*) hand could draw the spirit" that the Reformer possessed.<sup>44</sup> But Dürer's limitation is in fact the body's as well, for a portrait can only reveal what the body reveals.

Along with the concept of the image, ambivalence also takes hold of the concept of the body, which until now had been the subject of the portrait. In the process, the meaning of “likeness” was revised. “Likeness” now comes to mean not the making manifest of the “body,” which was the goal of artists’ efforts at mimesis, but rather the making manifest of the “Self.” As the very term “individual” implies, the individual is “indivisible,” but this *indivisibility* is put in doubt by a *division* between “Self” and “body.” If what the artist aims at is the “individual,” then this goal must be achieved by a new means. The mere corporeal view must give way to a rhetoric of the “Self.” The old connections between the media of representation, which I call *media of the body*, were shifted in the sixteenth century. Until then, the coat of arms furnished an *emblematic reference* to the body; that is, its message (the information it conveyed) was not limited to physical likeness (which the *iconic reference* of the portrait conveyed). But even the most exacting likeness of a body is not a representation of a subject. The representation gap that heraldic arms once closed opens once again when the goal becomes representing the Self. The allegorical speech of the *motto* now does the work of the heraldic emblem: it enables the portrait to speak.





Fig. 3.10. Lucas Cranach the Elder (1472–1553), Martin Luther in doctor's cap. Engraving. Graphische Sammlung Albertina, Vienna. Photo: Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY.

The unity of a subject was thus at first established only by giving it double exposure, as it were, in two media, in the picture and in the writing. This of course also demanded a dual gaze from the beholder: the gaze at the picture, and the gaze at the person's words, which were translated into writing, just as the body was translated into an image. In this process, the coat of arms, too, was drawn into the intermedial power struggles. The more the portrait depicted the singularity of a person, in his body, the more the coats of arms called to mind the genealogical chain that extended into the past and the future, beyond the life of the individual. The alliances of families that linked themselves through marriage, as well as the privileges that accrued through descent and hereditary title, were demonstrated via the escutcheon, while the paramount function of the individual likeness became the staging of the "Self." It is also evident that the various media of the body—the coat of arms, the likeness, and the heraldic device—



continually formed new groupings and even changed their meanings whenever they interacted.

A look back at the early history of the modern portrait reveals once again that images of the body and images of the person always manifest themselves in ways that are tied to their times and that give deliberate expression to specific intentions. The enthusiasm over the timeless “modernity” of the Flemish portrait that once pervaded the scholarly literature came from a failure to understand this principle. There is no concept of the body that is not the product of a specific time and society. An anthropological investigation must take especially careful note of changes in ways of viewing the body and the person, for it is here that perennial questions about what a human being is—in a social, biological, and psychological sense—are posed.

The dissonance between the portrait and heraldry reflected more than the fundamental difference between an image and a sign. Rather, that dissonance consists of two faces confronting one another: the natural face and the heraldic face. They had pulled so far apart in their concept of the person that a reconciliation was urgently called for—and in the end, it was a new face translated into the visual rhetoric of Renaissance imagery, that emerged victorious. In this process, the carrier medium played a decisive role in defining the human being both as a legal and a social entity. And it was the body itself that emerged as a carrier medium, while the face became the heraldic device of the Self.

Legitimated either by its function in a religious context or by its role in preserving the legacy and memories of a family, the portrait genre began to take upon itself the task of portraying a subject, thus embarking on a massive and never-ending adventure. The escutcheon and portrait panel had already differed as media because they conveyed different concepts of the body. The genealogical body of the nobility and the body of the bourgeois individual stood in a state of medial competition, which a further evolution of their differences enhanced. In the Christian sense and then in the Humanistic sense, the portrait attracted anthropological interpretations that removed the person from the collective

norms of the social hierarchy. The discovery of the “Self” as an unportrayable entity within the portrayable field of the body changed the medium of the portrait in its humanistic usage. With the advent of the printed book with its public character, pictorial art also learned new techniques of graphic reproduction and texts became integral elements of the image. Both the artist and the model were thus “given a voice.” They tell of the ways in which media play a role in the portrait, and they speak also of the limits of the image that became palpable when it was not just the body but the subject that wanted representation.

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## Image and Death: Embodiment in Early Cultures

## With an Epilogue on Photography

To speak of the image and death is to evoke two themes that are today surrounded by uncertainty.<sup>1</sup> The old, symbolic power of images seems to have faded, and death has become so abstract that the question of its meaning scarcely arises. We no longer have images of death that compel our questions—and, more than that, we are even getting used to the death of images, the field in which we once exercised our fascination with the symbolic. In the process, the analogy between image and death, which seems as old as image-making itself, is falling into oblivion. If, however, we follow images far back into their history, they will themselves lead us to the great absence that is death. We are still aware today of the way in which the image conveys a contradiction between presence and absence, and that contradiction has its roots in the human experience of death.

The embodiment of the dead who have lost their body raises the question of what role exactly it is that death has played in the decision to erect images of man's own invention. Today this appears a very remote question, for images nowadays are more likely to invite the living to an escape from the body than to attempt to represent the body of the dead. We are today more concerned with the images' loss of meaning than with the role that death has played in their invention.<sup>2</sup> And yet we cannot understand the one without the other. The anthropology of the image must, therefore, probe the origins of the image and of its connection to death in order to advance our understanding of the ways in which we interact symbolically with the image.<sup>3</sup> But whenever a philosophy of the image has been advanced, the origins of the image have been quickly passed over. When Plato questioned the meaning of images, for example, he was thinking of the advanced art of illusion of his day, which aimed at a mimesis that he thought deceptive and therefore abhorred.

The Greeks of Plato's day hardly remembered that images had once served as vessels of embodiment, replacing the lost

bodies of the dead. The notion would have been quite foreign to him that an image might be called to life through an act of animation, that it need not remain always a lifeless artifact. We too are apt to disparage animation as the relic of a “primitive” worldview that saw a magical identity connecting the image and what it depicted, an identity that obscured any genuine understanding of the image as such. Moreover, historical movements that were dedicated to enlightenment in general and to the enlightened use of images in particular, often took exception to images in a cult of the dead, seeing them as incompatible with a rationalistic conception of the world. Physical pictures of the dead were rejected in favor of mental images of them, on grounds that only the latter could be *living* images.<sup>4</sup>

Maurice Blanchot once posed the metaphysical question, what is it that we learn about death when we look at it.<sup>5</sup> Paradoxically, we come to see something that is not there at all. Similarly, an image finds its true meaning in the fact that what it represents is absent and therefore can be present only as image. It manifests something that is not *in* the image but can only *appear* in the image. An image of the departed was therefore not an eccentricity, but rather an early and rather literal statement of what an image essentially is ([Fig. 4.1](#)). The dead have always been absent in person, and their unbearable absence—that is, their death—was made good by the presence of images. It is for this reason that we fix the dead in a chosen location (the grave) and give them an *immortal body* in the image; that is, a *symbolic body* in which they are resocialized while their *mortal body* dissolves into nothing. The image that represents the dead thus acquires a counter-meaning to that other image, the corpse.<sup>6</sup>

At the moment of death, the corpse indeed becomes an image, a rigid image that merely resembles the living body. That is why Blanchot can say that, being no longer a body, “the corpse is its own image.” No body can resemble himself. Only in the image or as a corpse is this possible. The living, those who are the observers, reacted to this perplexing discovery time and again with the supposition that along with life, the soul, too, left the body. But is a body from which life

has departed still a body? Answering in the affirmative would mean reducing the body to dead matter, the opposite of life. The body belongs to life, just as the image that takes its place belongs to death, regardless of whether that image anticipates the inevitable death or merely represents it after the fact.<sup>7</sup>

What is alarming about death is the fact that a speaking, breathing body is transformed into a mute image before our eyes, in an instant. And it is a fleeting image at that, for in no time at all it begins to disintegrate. There was nothing people could do but stand helpless before the realization that life, when it dies, is transformed into its own image. They had lost the deceased, who had been part of the community, to a mere image. And so quite sensibly they made an effort to defend themselves against their loss. They created a different image, one that enabled them to make death, the incomprehensible, into something that they could understand on their terms. This new image would be an image of their own creation that they themselves would marshal against the image of death, the corpse. Through this act of making an image, they would cease to be passive before the experience of death. The enigma that already surrounded the corpse would be shared now by the image: the paradoxical *absence* that speaks so loudly in the *presence* of the corpse would be heard now also in the *presence* of the image. It is with this paradox that the mystery of Being vs. Appearing begins, a mystery that has never ceased to exercise the mind of man.<sup>8</sup>



Fig. 4.1. Andrews Air Force Base, United States: An unidentified member of the Jean Dalizu family, clutching a photo of Jean Dalizu, wipes her eye on 13 August, 1998, prior to the start of a memorial ceremony for 10 US victims of the terrorist bombings at the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Dalizu was one of 12 US citizens killed in the bombing attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. © 1998 Getty Images. Photo: Stephen Jaffe/AFP/Getty Images.

A fascination with this paradox may have begun as soon as man realized that by creating a man-made image in response to the mystery of death, he was in fact creating a new mystery. The making of the image was an active response to a disturbance in the community, more important in fact than the actual possession of the image, for this act of making reestablished the natural order: the dead were given back a status that they needed in order to maintain their presence in the social group. On the other hand, when the body became an image, it underwent what Louis Marin has called an “ontological transfer.”<sup>9</sup> The image was given power to act in the name and place of the body. This is just the kind of transfer of power that normally takes place between bodies, and it effectively endowed the image with a new kind of authority.



The image was no longer merely compensation for a loss but had, in the very act of representing a body, acquired “Being” in the name of that body. Its presence, precisely because it was delegated to the image, surpassed that of an ordinary body—quite apart from the fact this new image-body, as part of a cult of the dead, had now acquired a sacred character. Through images and their use, the social realm was now expanded to include the realm of the dead. And as the social realm acquired this new dimension, the realm of the living became less precarious.

We possess few images older than the skulls from Jericho ([Fig. 4.2](#)). Though actual skulls, they are images to the extent that they were covered with a layer of plaster and painted. But images of what? A skull is an *image of death* by its very nature. And even if it is painted, that does not make it an *image of life*. A more accurate way of posing the question therefore would be: an image *for* what? The answer arises from the demand made by the cult of the dead; namely, the demand for a medium to reestablish the presence of the dead. A new face possesses the social signs of a living body, yet it belongs to a stranger, because it attests to the incomprehensible transformation that is death. Through the transformation of the skull into a specific person, however, the deceased returns to a community that is able to interact with him in a “symbolic exchange” of signs.<sup>[10](#)</sup> In Polynesia, too, there was an ancestor cult that involved the veneration of statues surmounted by real skulls: the places in society that the dead had left empty were repopulated in the course of cult rituals celebrated in the midst of a living community. In so-called “primitive” cultures death is not the fate of an individual but of the community, which must protect itself from dissolution.<sup>[11](#)</sup> In the Neolithic “skull cult,” the living secured a means of interacting with their ancestors, of preserving their presence. The transformation of the corpse into an *effigies*, as the Romans later called the double or likeness,<sup>[12](#)</sup> was still in that context a measure taken in the interests of preservation, as was the mummy.<sup>[13](#)</sup>

The image has a variety of roots, including depictions of animals on the walls of Stone Age caves and female fertility

idols, but what concerns us here is not its overall genealogy, but only the emergence of the image as a reflection on the experience of death.<sup>14</sup> Humans responded to death by erecting stones and memorials devoid of image. These were generally followed—although we cannot trace a neat evolutionary path—by funerary images. Just as there is a nearly inexhaustible richness of ideas about the nature of death, so too is the variety of images of death virtually infinite: mummies, stelae, and anthropomorphic funerary urns; one thinks also of the dolls that were used in death rituals when a community wished to rid itself of the contagion of contact with its dead.<sup>15</sup> Both the presence and absence of the dead, howsoever close or contradictory the relationship between the two might be, were symbolized by images that were intended either for collective memory or for the brief ritual of exorcism. Used in this sense images are carriers or vessels, even if what they convey is merely a conception of the dead, a conception that they render visible in a representation.




Fig. 4.2. Skull from Jericho, ca. 7,000 BCE. Archaeological Museum, Damascus.

## Image Bodies and Image Magic in the Cult of the Dead

We enter now on an area in which the anthropological material immediately presents us with uncertainties as to what, if any, general concepts can be appropriately applied to its interpretation. In fact the material itself is contradictory and obscure, the more so the further back we trace it. It is dangerous to look for archetypes, even though we know that images of death are foundational for most cultures; for when we attempt to search for a unified meaning, we only find *local truths* of the sort that already drew a smile from Herodotus. (He tells an anecdote about the Persian king Darius, who could no more persuade the Greeks to eat their ancestors, which is what a tribe of Indians did, than he could persuade the latter to burn them, as was the Greek custom.)<sup>16</sup> Moreover, when we encounter images in the cult of the dead in one culture, they often defy comparison with those of any other culture. And yet, they raise the common questions: why do they exist in the first place, what function it is that they were created to fulfill?

In the 1920s, the topic of the image and death possessed an importance, among artists and ethnologists, that it has subsequently lost. Carl Einstein, a champion of the Paris avant garde, presented his “methodical aphorisms” in the series *Documents*, edited by Georges Bataille. “The image,” he tells us, “is a consolidation and a defense against death. Our existence is unalterably an experience of space. It is in this sense that art serves the dead: by restoring a space for their representation.” If their images were seen as living, it was because of the “fear of death” and out of a wish to secure the “continuation of the family,” which would include always a place for the “spirits of the dead.” The images of the ancestors, “a kind of petrified memory,” deprived death of its power to destroy duration. “In this sense one can speak of a religious naturalism,” in which the dead “prove superior to the living.”<sup>17</sup>

In the cult of the dead, images were at first accessories to performances—masks, makeup, costumes, and disguises. Only later did they separate from the body and replicate the latter as a doll or a fetish. In the first instance they were borne directly on the body of the person; in the second, they received an independent existence so as to invoke a *body comparison* and

to assume the place of the body. The goal of the substitution was either to transform a body into an image or to duplicate a body. The *image body* did not need to demonstrate its fundamental resemblance to a body because it was created solely for the sake of this analogy and thus could not resemble anything other than a body—not a particular body, but *the body* as such.

And yet the analogy was fatally flawed, for the image remained mute. The silence of the image—a shortcoming that we today overcome through the use of moving images and sound—did not disturb the onlooker, however, until the image lost its connection to death cult.<sup>18</sup> So long as it remained a part of ritual practice, it was animated by performers who gave it voice. It might even be said that through this animation the ultimate purpose of the image was achieved, namely the embodiment of life. Take away the cult, the magic if you will, and the image is reduced to a medium of remembrance. But even remembrance, when it takes place in a living body, is a kind of embodiment. The image now transfers its embodiment, via representation, to the beholder's imagination. Personal remembrance replaces the collective imagery of the cult. When this point is reached, the embodiment of a person in an artifact becomes suspect. It is viewed as "image magic," as an atavistic misuse of images. In modern times, "image magic" has been relegated in the dark realm of demonology, to such practices as abusing a double (a doll or the like) in order to inflict harm on a living person. Tales of corpses raised from the dead to a hideous, uncontrollable shadow existence belong in the same category. Once disconnected from the cult of the dead and its ritual control, the image moved into a murky realm in which it contaminated life with its touch of death. Today, when we have nothing remotely like a cult of the dead, we are apt to mistake the meaning of the human production of images. For example, Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz, in their book *Die Legende vom Künstler*, traced the "likeness as magic" back to a "confusion" for which they held the "primitive races (*Naturvölker*)" responsible.<sup>19</sup> As they saw it, the confusion was created when humans asserted the magical "identity of the

image and the depicted” without according the image a status of its own.

The notion of a “magical worldview” is, however, a modern one, and it does not take account of the power of symbolization of the ritual act.<sup>20</sup> The medium symbolically closes what Kris and Kurz term the “gap” between image and person. The existence of this gap was the motivation for the making of physical images invested with an old tradition of symbolization. Kris and Kurz introduced the concept of “image magic” with the intent of situating the artist within a genealogy that traced his descent from the magician.<sup>21</sup> When image magic dropped away, they maintained, the role of the artist could begin in earnest. In the likeness he created a new bond between image and person. Likeness, so the argument went, was required of art once images were no longer animated by magic. What Kris and Kurz have described as the emergence of the concept of art could also be understood, however, as a structural change that began when the image was detached from the cult of the dead. In cult usage “likeness” meant ontological identity, a meaning that went missing when what was once a cult object became an object to be admired for the skill with which it was made, in other words as a work of art.

## Skulls, Puppets, and Masks

Images belonging to the cult of the dead have survived from the pre-ceramic Neolithic B period,<sup>22</sup> which is dated to around 7,000 BCE. This was the time of the so-called “Neolithic Revolution” that saw the establishment of the first permanent settlements. The finds come from graves excavated at sites in what are today Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The dead were not buried in segregated graveyards, but in the soil of the settlement, sometimes even inside houses. After the process of decomposition was complete, the skulls were removed and put on display. This “skull cult” is the earliest instance of a ritual engagement with the dead that is known to us.<sup>23</sup> In the ancient settlement of Jericho in the Jordan valley, archeologists excavated the fascinating series of skulls described above that

gaze back at us for the first time with human faces ([Fig. 4.2](#)). By means of a finely modeled overlay of chalk or clay, the bones were given back the face that they had lost in death. Pigments were used as well, including an abundance of red (possibly an allusion to blood), which gave to this artificial flesh the appearance of life. The eyes are prominent, made of white chalk or an inlay of shell and mother-of-pearl. The result is a symbolic body that bears the social signs of the living body and contains the dead body like a vessel or second skin.<sup>[24](#)</sup>

The questions begin when we try to discern the context in which this skull cult might once have operated. The skulls were found in groups, and women and children were included among them. They were displayed on clay pedestals, in what appears to have been a ritually significant order, as though representing a ceremonial family unit. The excavators were disinclined to compare these skulls with the skull statues that were used in a New Hebrides ancestor cult.<sup>[25](#)</sup> In the meantime, however, archeologists have unearthed skull statues of precisely that type at Tell Ramad in Syria ([Fig. 4.3](#)). They consist of diminutive bodies that look like stands for the great skulls that rest upon them.<sup>[26](#)</sup> Although presence is not always tied to visibility, in this instance visibility was clearly important as the statues were displayed in the house. One might imagine a situation very similar to what we know from death customs reported in southeast Africa. There the corpse of a tribal elder remained in an ossuary until decomposition was complete. Then “the elders of the clan removed the skull and carried it into the compound. Here it was cleaned, painted with red paint, and, after being cordially entertained with grain and beer, it joined the skulls of other relatives in a special location. Henceforth, the deceased would participate in all of life’s events, albeit silently.”<sup>[27](#)</sup>






Fig. 4.3. Skull statue from Tell Ramad, ca. 7,000 BCE.  
Archaeological Museum, Damascus.

These Neolithic figures reflect a body experience that could only stem from a cult of the dead. The flesh that had been cleansed from the bones was replaced with an image with which the bones were now newly outfitted. Carrying this thought a bit further, we might say that the bodies of the dead were restored to the appearance that they had when they were still alive. However, we have no modern terminology for this use of images. The sense we have of a presence is the result of an exchange of facial signs, our face addressing that of the image, whose life is most powerfully felt in its gazing eyes. [28](#) The eyes, then, are to be understood as symbol and not simply as an aspect of the reembodiment of the figure. The symbolic body is more than a proof of lineage; it is in itself an object to which the community owes a kind of debt that it discharges by means of a specific ritual.





Fig. 4.4. Head of a Neolithic statue from Jericho, seventh millennium BCE. The Israel Museum, Jerusalem.

In the same cultural contexts as the skull statues, there is a second type of image composed, somewhat surprisingly, entirely of artificial materials. These are nearly life-sized “statues”—though one might better compare them to dolls—which simulate a complete body and look out at us from a face that seems possessed of hypnotic power. In a technique of manufacture that is still not fully understood, these figures were modeled over a core of reeds and grasses tied together with string. There are unexpected analogies to the plastered skulls discussed earlier: a painted overlay of chalk or clay and eyeballs modeled of chalk or shells. The same artisans must have been responsible for both sets of objects.<sup>29</sup> An especially impressive torso, with enormous eyes, has found its way into the museum in Damascus from the excavations at Ain Ghazal.<sup>30</sup> Similar in style is the flat, mask-like head decorated

with painted stripes that comes from the British excavation at Jericho ([Fig. 4.4](#)).<sup>31</sup>

These remarkable figures repeat—as in a mirror image—the dualism of core and shell that was such a fundamental feature of the plastered skulls. In contrast to the small idols that are found in the same contexts, they are not modeled of one solid material, but rather imitate the structure of the body with its internal skeleton covered by a layer of skin. Despite their similarities to the skull statues, however, the life-sized human dolls could not have been used for the internment itself; more likely they played a temporary role in cult ritual and then were stored in so-called “depots.” It is conceivable that they stood in for the deceased in a preliminary internment ceremony. In some cultures, images of the dead take part in performances during funerary rites, interacting with living mourners, the image serving as a kind of body-on-loan that the deceased can inhabit while they make the transition from the world of the living to the realm of the dead. It is likely because their function is temporary that such figures are made of perishable materials.

The oldest known facial masks comprise a third group of images found in these same Neolithic assemblages.<sup>32</sup> The masks have openings for eyes and mouths, which suggests that they were designed for living users, but are made of stone and so would better fit a corpse. It is possible that they were used during the process of decomposition, while the skeleton was not yet ready to play its role as the final “image” of the deceased. The mask was an epochal invention and one that gives the paradox of the image—its making visible an absence—its most definitive expression ([Fig. 4.5](#)). It could conceal the anonymous visage of death behind an alternative face that belonged to a person with a name and history—in other words, place the image like a barrier before the dissolution of identity. But it could also be worn by dancers, who would animate the mask, thus bringing the dead back to life. Mimes played the role of the dead before they began to enact the roles of the living on the stage. Thus, with its single surface, the mask accomplishes both concealment and exposure. Like the image, it draws its vitality from an absence, which it replaces with a

substitute presence. The Neolithic skull statues also wear masks in the sense that they recreate the lost face on the body itself. The image, by placing the final seal on the real body, becomes the medium of its new presence, a presence that time and mortality cannot touch.

Centuries later in Egypt the mummy became the symbolic body of the dead. In the early dynasties of the Old Kingdom, however, up to the middle of the third millennium BCE, several funerary practices and preservation methods were in simultaneous use, among them the facial mask ([Fig. 4.6](#)). The earliest convention was a linen casing, which was either painted or three-dimensionally modeled over the body; later a plaster mask of the entire body was superimposed on the linen casing. On an example from the Giza necropolis the eyes of the molded face are open, suggesting a rudimentary effort at individualization.<sup>33</sup> A third form of covering was a prefabricated pasteboard mask that had been cast from a model. Only at this third stage does the “envelope detach from the body,” giving rise to a proper mask that “becomes a separate element of the cult of the dead.” As such it is able to symbolize the entire body of the dead, and yet it is also an “image” in the autonomous sense that we most often intend when we speak of the image today.




Fig. 4.5. Neolithic stone mask from Hurvat Duma in the Hebron Hills, seventh millennium BCE. The Israel Museum, Jerusalem.

### The Search for a Locus

The whereabouts of the dead is a quite common and natural subject for speculation, for in addition to their bodies they would also seem to have lost their place in our world. Blanchot could say, in modern terms, “It is a misnomer to speak of the ‘presence’ of a corpse.” In most cultures, the search for the dead is in fact a search for the place in which they are now to be found. The Hereafter was originally conceived of as a place to which the dead journeyed, leaving their bodies behind in a “resting place” in the Here-and-Now. The latter, which can only be a symbolic place, is the grave, which we today locate in a cemetery. As we have seen, it was customary in the Neolithic period to keep one’s dead close to hearth and home, even burying them underneath the family dwelling. But even the separate necropolis, from which the cemetery evolved, was legally and ritually part of the territory of the community, a sort of second settlement established for the accommodation of the dead. Whether buried in the house of the living or removed to a necropolis, the dead remained always under the protection of the community, and at the same time offered their protection to that community.<sup>34</sup>






Fig. 4.6. “Reserve head” of an official, Old Kingdom (2630–2524 BCE), Egypt, Giza, Tomb G 4940 B. Limestone, height: 27.4 cm. Harvard University—Boston Museum of Fine Arts Expedition 21.329. Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Photo © 2011 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

Such customs were unknown to nomadic hunters and gatherers, who understood death as an act of violence. The dead, whom they regarded as having been killed (though perhaps by some unknown force) were to be feared; they were capable of evil acts, and the living had to use magic to protect themselves. Perhaps it was this environment that gave rise to the custom of exposing the dead or of conducting them ceremoniously into the wilderness in order to make their passage easier and to free the living of their presence. Such customs make it clear that the Hereafter was conceived of as the natural world outside the protected boundaries of the settlement. It was a “beyond” (like our heaven), where the living could not dwell and where any notion of place dissolved, which meant that the place of the dead could not be determined either.<sup>35</sup>

By contrast, settled societies felt the need to secure their continuity through the symbolic settlement of their dead. Their understanding of the natural world was quite different, based on their experience of agriculture. The cycle of the seasons that nourished them became an allegory for the cycle of their lives and deaths, so that the community felt itself part of an order that included the ancestors. In settlements, alongside their tilled fields, generations lived side-by-side. Keeping the graves of the dead within sight was compatible with their notions of society. But the tomb is only an *image of a place*; a dead person cannot really occupy it. It is not a place where we experience the presence of the dead but rather a place that we have created for them. The Iliad proclaims, almost beseechingly (17.434), that “a pillar abideth firm that standeth on the tomb of a dead man or woman.” The pillar endows the place with a permanence and uniqueness that it does not inherently possess; it, like any funerary monument, is part of a strategy to compensate for the absence of a real place in which

the dead “are.” Still today the dead need a “final resting place.” This language is a survival of the old belief that without a place of “rest,” the dead would wander aimlessly or return as ghosts (*revenants* in French) to menace the living. Nothing demonstrates this better than the Greek practice of conducting a symbolic burial at a cenotaph when a corpse could not be recovered.<sup>36</sup>

This need also explains ancient Greek tomb inscriptions, which so emphatically invoke the reality of the place, warning passers-by against desecrating, damaging, or expropriating the tomb. Since the dead cannot defend their place, the living must ensure that it is not violated. The tomb establishes a barrier that separates life from death and protects the living and the dead from one another. But it is also the place where life and death meet. To that end the grave employs inscriptions that speak to the visitor, and images that look out at him. It is a “place of remembrance,” as echoed in the Greek word for the grave, *mnema*. This meaning was already apparent when the first stele carved with an image of the deceased took the place of aniconic stone grave markers that were believed to possess magical properties. Through the image, the dead called upon the living to give them a place *in their memory*, and with that the meaning of “place” became even less concrete.<sup>37</sup>

The grave, however, is not only a place of rest, but a place of activity as well: a place at which *the hour of death* is, via the burial, pictorially reenacted. This takes place some time after death has occurred—in some cultures months or even years—and it effects an exchange between the *catastrophe* of death and death as a phenomenon under social control, whereby a community restores order through ritual (Fig. 4.7). In the ceremony the dead find their place within the social framework. In archaic societies, this replaying of death is a classic rite of initiation, a “rite of passage,” similar to the ceremonial reenactment of birth that takes place when a new member is received into a male society. In both cases, a *social event* substitutes for the *biological event*. Christian baptism, which insists upon the death of the “old man” who must be “reborn,” carries an echo of these rites of initiation.<sup>38</sup>

Burial unites the bereaved with the dead under the imprimatur of custom. In the *Iliad*, the spirit of Patroclus visits his friend Achilles in a dream, beseeching him to bury his body lest the souls of the departed prevent him from entering the gates of Hades (23.73). In the *Odyssey* it is the soul of Odysseus's companion Elpenor that appears before him at the entrance to Hades and asks him for a burial mound: "Do not go and leave me behind unwept, unburied" (11.83). Cremation, an offering of wine, and a funerary feast, accompanied by loud lamentation and tears, help the dead to attain a ritually correct death such as will restore their identity and serve as their passport to Hades. The ancient burnt or blood offering is still required to seal the "symbolic exchange" that unites the living with the dead as members of the same social unit.<sup>39</sup>



Fig. 4.7. Funeral scene on a Greek vase, ca. 460 BCE. National Archaeological Museum, Athens. Photo © Hellenic Ministry of Culture/Archaeological Receipts Fund.



Images of the dead that played active roles in burial rites must be distinguished from images that merely served to evoke quiet remembrance at the grave, just as they symbolized the grave itself that was left behind after the funerary rites. Such images preserved the dead for the future of one's own community and could thus even act as support for the legal claims of the decedent's survivors. It is no coincidence that tombs with names and images were in many cultures the privilege of the powerful, whose descendants thereby secured for themselves rights that were imperiled by the death. At first grave images were thus, logically and consistently, *public images*. But over time they became increasingly privatized, and as they did so grief moved to the fore, grief as a personal more than a social matter. Both grief and remembrance, however, acknowledge death as an irreversible fact, and this also altered the images on the tomb: they depict the dead only as they were in life and thus as they live on in memory.<sup>40</sup>

Graves tells less about a group's notions of death than about its social structure, though of course the former are also social in origin. Again and again we encounter the *right to the tomb*, as a special privilege to which only some are entitled. There are even instances of what might be termed a *right to death*, when for example it is only an expensive death that is regarded as "official." In fact it is quite clear that death, which is by its nature anti-social, has been recast in the form of a social artifact. Much the same is true of grave images that endow the dead once more with an identity within the social order. If one is looking for death, one is more likely to find it among the living, who are so eager to exercise control over it. Writers who wanted to enlighten their society about death, for example, often attempted to deal with it in such a way as to render it reasonable and to regularize usages connected with it. The relevant chapter in Plato's *Laws*, for example, sets down practical principles for minimizing funeral expenses.<sup>41</sup>

We encounter similar ideas in China at around this same time. While Plato was preaching economy to the Greeks, the Chinese were beginning to break away from an almost ruinous cult of the dead in an effort to stabilize their economy (which in Egypt had been invigorated by the death cult). Confucius

“sacrificed to the ancestors as though they were present,” but no longer accorded the dead a life with which they could become active. In fact, he recommended that one “keep the ghosts at a distance,” as “the book of rites” recommends (*Annalects*, 6.22). The only objects placed into the grave should be non-functional or merely symbolic—accordingly, he called them “spirit tools.” Human sacrifice as an offering to the dead struck Confucius as barbarous. He considered even the use of anthropomorphic figures as grave goods dangerous, because they might induce traditionalists to take up human sacrifice once again. The very word used to designate such figures (*yong*) could facilitate confusion with a living victim, Confucius thought.<sup>42</sup> In China, the images placed in the tomb included figures of servants, musicians, and soldiers, all of whom would be useful in reestablishing the earthly social order in the realm of the dead. Allusions in the texts suggest that in a certain sense they took the place of human sacrificial victims, whom they replaced with a simulated body. Like the above-mentioned “spirit tools,” they appear as symbolic bodies, and as such they prove themselves once again to be images in the most basic sense of the term.

Small female idols are attested in many Neolithic cultures. On the Greek Cyclades, where they are quite numerous, the figures were fashioned not from clay but, quite exceptionally, of marble. In appearance, however, they conform the general pattern with its strong emphasis on sexual characteristics, and they are therefore commonly interpreted as having a connection to fertility magic. As such they would have played a central role in the cult of life forces and, in a cult of the dead, might have had reference to the analogous notion of a new “life” in death.<sup>43</sup> Some examples attain life size, but only the smaller figurines made it into graves. Their rather rigid typology suggests a canon of allowable forms such as one might expect in the case of cult objects. In fact, many of these figurines were found in what do appear to be cult contexts. Among the grave goods included in these finds are objects showing signs of wear such as would have resulted from their use in life.<sup>44</sup>

The Cycladic idols suggest votives presented to gods at their sacrificial sites, or amulets that visitors to the cult site might have taken home with them. Votives would either reproduce a well-known image of the god that was at the center of the cult or embody the devotés themselves, who consecrated themselves to the god at the site and signaled their allegiance by making the god a gift of their likeness. In either case, the form of the votive could not be freely chosen, because what mattered was that both parties, god and worshipper, would recognize the devotional image that was being given a concrete form. With the arrival of gods on the scene, we are now entering the realm of religion, which had already impacted the original cult of the dead by the time that these early objects were manufactured.<sup>45</sup> The use of the same images in cult contexts and in tombs points to a desire to provide the deceased with a pledge that would guarantee them the protection of a divinity. What had been created during a person's lifetime as a votive object could become an amulet in the grave. It was precisely by means of such symbols that a cult could establish a connection between life and death and thus make plain that its reach did not end at the grave. But the significance of these images goes further. The dead, by taking these images with them into the grave, were represented there not only by their mortal bodies, but also by a figurative symbol of their belief in an afterlife. This brings to light a new motive for the image. What had been an offering in life would become in death a grave good with symbolic significance.

Similar funerary objects are attested in Egypt from the predynastic period, among them female clay statues that invite comparison with the Neolithic figures, but also unusual forms—embryonic figures in boats, for example, or in the bellies of sacred animals, which were regarded as symbols of resurrection.<sup>46</sup> We are here still within the realm of the amulet and the Cycladic idol, but the boundaries are murky in this little-understood world of early religion, and it is difficult to discern where cults of the ancestors leave off and cults of the gods begin. There are as yet no texts to chart our way from one to the other. We have only the images to guide us.

## Egypt: The Mouth-Opening Ritual

By the time of the Old Kingdom, the Egyptian cult of the dead had produced death images that, though they are quite unique to Egypt, nonetheless have broad implications for our theme. The background to these developments lies in the emergence of the monumental necropolis, a city of the dead in which the tombs of court members are arranged around the pyramid of the king. The tombs, complete with their inscriptions and images, made possible for the deceased the unbroken continuation of an orderly social existence, personified as the principle of *Maat*. In inscriptions, they called upon the living to protect their graves and to supply them with sacrificial offerings, visible expressions of society's collective memory of the departed. The dead, who had "left behind their city," now lived in a city of the dead in which they owned a "house" where they lived in images that took the notion of embodiment to unimagined extremes.<sup>47</sup>

The mummy, for its part, was an image into which the corpse was transformed. By seeing to it that his mortal remains would be preserved (the chemical process dates to the Fourth Dynasty<sup>48</sup>), the Egyptian assured himself of the continued use of his body as a vessel. But who exactly was the deceased? It would seem that he lived on as a kind of "spirit," nourished by sacrifices and embodying itself in images in the tomb. The *Ka* was a personal "life force" that was born along with the body but survived it in death. It was only in the Middle Kingdom, however, when the Hereafter ceased to be the exclusive prerogative of the king, that the *Ka* was joined by the *Ba*, the soul-bird, which flew off to another world, from which it could return to the tomb.<sup>49</sup>

The mummy and its workings were hidden from view in a sealed burial chamber situated at the end of a subterranean shaft, a chamber that was accessible only to the spirit of the dead. Here the spirit would embody itself in the mummy, a body that was now, thanks to its chemical preparation, indestructible. The spirit could enter into dialogue with this body through its facial mask and through the "speaking" images on the mummy wrappings. The mummy's concealment

was not only de facto, hidden away from visitors to the tomb, but also conceptual. A second embodiment of the *Ka* was therefore needed to receive the sacrificial gifts of the living. It was provided by a statue located in an above-ground chamber (the *serdab*) behind a false door, in front of which sacrificial goods were deposited. On the outside of the statue chamber, the dead addressed the living through pictorial narratives and inscriptions. But behind the door, where the eyes of the living could not penetrate, the dead were embodied in statues and endowed with names and titles, as though with personal identity cards. The false door, which symbolized the threshold between life and death, interrupted the sightline. Only in rare cases did the dead appear in front of the door, in the form of a second statue, a double to the statue on the inside, which served to indicate its presence behind the false door.<sup>50</sup>

The very layout of Old Kingdom private tombs explains the emergence of the funerary statues. In the above-ground sacrificial area, the *Ka* of the dead could not be present unless it was able to embody itself there (as well as below ground, in the mummy), hence the statues. Embodiment was so essential that it was multiplied, as though to ensure that it would never be threatened. Some statue chambers have been found to contain thirty statues, all evidently representing the same person, though they showed great variations in format, type (standing or seated), material (wood or stone), and even in the degree of physiognomic verisimilitude. As early as the Fourth Dynasty, Egyptian funerary statues attained a lifelike quality that was not only unparalleled in other cultures, but either not achieved—or perhaps no longer desired—even in Egypt in later times. The urge to embody the dead issued in these body representations of extraordinarily high quality, but it must be remembered that the aim was functionality, the embodiment of the dead, and not a desire to impress the beholder. The life-sized bust of the vizier Ankh-haf (ca. 2580 BCE) in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston is a masterpiece of this kind and, interestingly, its limestone surface was covered with a red-ochre wash, similar to the surface treatment of the skull statues.<sup>51</sup>



Fig. 4.8. Plaster mask of Nimaatre, Old Kingdom, Dynasty 6 (2350–2194 BCE), Egypt, Giza, Western Cemetery, Tomb G 2092+2093: pit (shaft) G 2092 a A, chamber. Gypsum plaster, 22.2 x 17 x 20 cm. Harvard University—Boston Museum of Fine Arts Expedition 37.644. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Photo © 2011 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

A similar lifelike quality characterizes the stone “reserve heads” that were briefly in use during that same Fourth Dynasty period ([Fig. 4.8](#)): they could only have had a symbolic function, multiplying the stock of embodiments available to the deceased in the image repertoire of his tomb.<sup>52</sup> This drive toward heightened verisimilitude waned when the notion of an afterlife resembling the temporal life of the living gave way to a new conception of the dead as souls dwelling in timelessness, who therefore no longer needed the accoutrements of an earthly life. An afterlife in the tomb was replaced by the idea of the Hereafter, and the notional change became manifest in a new death image.

The Egyptian conception of the image is most clearly demonstrated by a rite of animation known as the “mouth-opening ritual.” By New Kingdom times, the ceremony required that no less than seventy-five different actions and incantations be performed on the mummy, so that, as one incantation put it, “the soul will remember what it has



forgotten” ([Fig. 4.9](#)). The custom had its origins in the Old Kingdom as a “statue ritual” that was conducted upon the completion of the statue but before it was set in place. It was through this animation ritual that the statue officially became a medium. What made a statue into an image, then, was not the manufacture of the physical statue, but rather a magical act that qualified it for embodiment. Only later was this ritual transferred from the statue to the mummy in order to secure there the interaction of the soul with the Hereafter.<sup>53</sup> This chronology is important, because it attests once again to the analogy between the sculpture and the mummy.




Fig. 4.9. Page from the “Book of the Dead of Hunefer,” depicting rites before a tomb, 19th Dynasty (ca. 1300 BCE), Thebes. Papyrus, 45.7 x 83.4 cm. British Museum, London. Photo: © The Trustees of The British Museum/Art Resource, NY.

Two and a half centuries later mummies were still in use in Egypt, but the “mummy portrait” had lost its native Egyptian roots. The phrase itself is in fact already misleading, for the portraits now in use were not portraits *of* the mummy, but portraits *on* the mummy: Greco-Roman portrait panels tied onto the mummy in the position previously occupied by the face mask ([Fig. 4.10](#)).<sup>54</sup> The mask, however, had been intended for the body of the dead, while the painted portrait lived from the *absence* of the body, so that it might take its place. With the sole exception of these Egyptian mummy portraits, the fragile panel portraits of the ancient world, which were not suited to the damp of the grave (not an issue in the dry air of Egypt) had previously served in the dwellings of the living. Memorial images, created independent of the body, they attest to a different conception of the image in Greek culture. And thus the distinction between the painted panel and the mummy goes beyond their technical differences. It is rooted in the discrepancy between two fundamentally divergent conceptions of the death image.

## The Speaking Images of the Ancient Near East

Though the ritual of opening the mouth experienced its greatest elaboration in Egypt, it was known throughout the ancient Near East. At bottom it was a more sophisticated version of a much older brand of image magic, formalized now, limited to specific images, and administered by priest-kings. Already in the third millennium BCE, the ritual was part of urban Sumerian culture, the imaginary of which bristled with gods and rulers. It was the kind of environment against which Judaism revolted by renouncing the “graven image,” and it reflected the social order prevalent in Mesopotamia, where priests and rulers were locked in rivalry. The images of the dead that will concern us in Mesopotamia are therefore images of the *official* dead, deified kings for the most part, for the ancestor cult yielded ground as soon as the leaders of a community or polity were deified.<sup>55</sup>

The dead kings of Ur and Babylon received sacrifices not in their tombs but in front of statues of the kings that were set

up in the temples of the gods. This would seem to point to a cult of the dead that centered on images and was conducted by the community. Such an analysis, however, would simplify a situation rife with contradictions. Statues of gods no doubt pre-dated statues of kings, and the earliest images of the latter were more than likely executed in the same medium as was used for statues of gods as a means of expressing the deification of the dead ruler. The king's statue, however, was usually consecrated to a divinity whose aura was attached to it, while the donor of the statue simultaneously acknowledged the supreme power of the gods. Such compensatory formulas point to a society in which various parties compromised their own interests out of deference to other powers. My concern, however, is not to lay bare social structures, but to observe the interrelation of image and death, which is a dynamic more powerful than society's attempts to channel it.




Fig. 4.10. Portrait panel for the mummy of a young boy, from Hawara, Egypt, Roman Period, 100–120 ce. Height: 133 cm. British Museum, London. Photo: © The Trustees of The British Museum/Art Resource, NY.

Some kings secured the privilege of an image already during their lifetime by donating a votive of themselves in the temple of a divinity. As a result, there is sometimes no clear demarcation between a statue of a living ruler and that of a royal ancestor. The former could, upon the king's death, turn into the latter. The statue would remain unchanged externally, of course, but interaction with the image would change as it entered the cult of the dead and became an object of sacrificial rites, embodying a person beyond the boundary of life and death. In its solid body, the statue was unequivocally *not* a fleeting ghost of the dead. Only when its magical life began did it qualify as a medium of the dead. Until then, monumentalized in indestructible stone, it insists on the paradox of an eternal body that is, simultaneously, a body in legal terms, under the auspices of the law. Power structures come into play: power over the living, and power in the name of the dead.

The Sumerian language possessed a separate word for "image" (*Alam*), evidence that the Sumerians were no longer content with the notion of a mere puppet or "double," but were already thinking in terms of a medium in which a person re-embodied himself. However, they transferred to the image not only the rights of a person, but also the duties that, as a living person, he was unable to fulfill. For example, Gudea ordered his image to speak to the divinity in his name. This command is contained in a text inscribed across the seated diorite statue of Gudea ([Fig. 4.11](#)). That same text tells us that the statue was intended for the main temple of the god Ningirsu in Girsu, where for all eternity it was to receive sacrificial gifts of food and drink *for Gudea*. The dialogue that the living conduct with the image is mirrored by the dialogue that the image conducts with the divinity, which makes the image, in the truest sense, a medium between two worlds.<sup>[56](#)</sup>

As we are beginning to see, images in ancient Mesopotamia did, quite literally, begin to speak. In the inscriptions that cover their surfaces, dialogues are carried on, commands are issued, and names and events are ritually recalled. To be sure, images always did speak, just as they were always spoken to by the beholder, but here they do so



more explicitly, employing the new medium of written language, which they use to explain themselves, to provide a kind of instruction manual for interacting with them. Within this union of image and writing, however, the two media retained each its own special capacities. The image, the older of the two, still possessed magical powers, but these now needed to be defined anew. And it was precisely this definition that fell to the mouth-opening and eye-opening ritual, which depended for its efficacy on painstaking adherence to instructions handed down from time immemorial. Institutionalization furnished an old practice with a new and up-to-date significance.<sup>57</sup>



Fig. 4.11. Gudea, king of Lagash, sitting on a throne, ca. 2120 BCE. Diorite, 46 x 33 x 22.5 cm. Musée du Louvre, Paris. Photo: Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY.

The texts that speak of this reflect the hopes and fantasies that have always marked man's attempts to master the meanings of images, attempts that quickly become embroiled in a confusion that is all too predictable. Sumerian and old Babylonian texts confirm that questions about the ontological nature of the image were unanswerable. In ancient Babylon, it was believed that only the mouth-opening ritual could liberate images from the muteness inherent in their dead matter. The ritual called upon an archetype "born in heaven" to take possession of the visible, man-made image. The image—which might better be called an artifact—awaited this embodiment like a vessel awaiting its contents. "Without the ritual," declares an ancient source, "the image cannot smell the odor of the sacrifice." One ruler of Larsa in southern Mesopotamia, beseeched the votive image he had commissioned with these words: "Do become a living being once you have entered the temple."<sup>58</sup> We are not dealing here with a sophisticated form of animism; rather, the words express the expectation that the image should reach beyond the boundaries of human life. This can by no means be reduced to asserting a magical identity with the depicted person; rather, it opened the world of the body, as a medium for transcendence.

The image practice of the ancient Near East is further exemplified in the death cult of the Hittites, whose great kings were also posthumously deified. The Hittites, too, erected statues of their dead kings on which their deeds were recorded. Living rulers were celebrated in relief sculptures and stelae, but the funerary cult gave rise to an unusual image practice, which evolved from the custom of cremating the dead and then honoring them with extensive sacrificial rites.<sup>59</sup> In the funerary cult, the king, after death, remained present in an image that provided him with a symbolic body. The statue (*Ana Alam*) was evidently clad in gold. "On the seventh day it is placed on a cart and, escorted by wailing women, taken to a tent, where it is seated on a golden chair" and receives sacrifices. "The cup bearer offers drink to the male image." On the twelfth day, the funeral procession leaves the "house" of the grave to partake of a sacrificial meal in a separate tent. This ritual provided the dead with a double or a replacement



body after the original body was cremated. However, the deceased used this body only for the duration of the ceremony. In a dialogue the absence of the deceased is mentioned. He has joined the gods: “The priest then calls the dead by name: Where has he gone? And the gods, among whom he dwells, respond: This is where he has gone. He has gone to the house of cedar.”<sup>60</sup>

### “Double” and Image in the Greek Funerary Cult

In our context, the Greeks seems to be in many ways unique among ancient cultures. Greek culture does not, however, offer as clear a picture as the civilizations of Egypt and the Near East, which is all the more regrettable as Classical Greece has bequeathed to us image concepts that we still use as though they were universally valid. A fundamental difference is that its images, together with writing, emerged rather late, long after a sophisticated society had rationalized the meaning of funerary images. By contrast, the preceding “dark age,” from which only the Homeric epics have survived, remains a field of speculation. The evidence comes from linguists who have uncovered clues suggesting that noniconic symbols were used in the early funerary cult. These two faces of Greek culture, the Homeric and the Classical, complicate any simple synthesis, and yet we must look at them before we can understand Plato’s critique of images.

The burials of Homeric heroes shed light on how the Greeks dealt with the bodies of the dead. Cremation destroyed the corruptible corpse, substituting for it an image in memory in which the body remained forever as beautiful as it had appeared during the splendid laying out (*prothesis*) ([Fig. 4.7](#)). The dead must depart so that they may remain alive in social memory. They depart as bodiless psyche, but in fact do not quit the community of the living until their “white bones” have been buried and a stone marker (*stele*) erected on the grave mound (*tymbos*). If the purification of the dead is delayed, the gods must preserve the corpse of the hero intact and sound (*empedos*) until the deceased is rendered invulnerable through an act of ritual transformation (Iliad 16.700 and 19.37). This

liberation of the community from the dead may reflect a memory of nomadic practices, though the stone markers that were a part of the process introduce a reference to place that would be internalized in epic poetry. The “beautiful death,” as J. P. Vernant termed it, which concealed the true face of death, would remain a characteristic of the Greek funerary cult.<sup>61</sup>

Mourning was what made remembrance possible. It was a last goodbye, the finalizing of an absence, and so it is not surprising that scenes of lamentation at the bier or graveside are the most frequent images in early Greek funerary art. Not only is mourning an image of death, it also points plaintively at the empty place of the dead, the object of lamentation. It is rare for the dead to be indicated by the soul-bird, a pictorial symbol that Greeks adapted from the Egyptian *Ba* bird.<sup>62</sup> The small psyche, too, which sometimes sits on the grave as an *eidolon* or flies away from it, does not mitigate the absence of the dead from the body that is left behind. As the opposite of a body, the psyche can only inhabit a world in which the body has no place.

In Greek funerary culture, sculpted *kouroi* were erected on graves and set up in the temples of the gods: they idealized the depicted and endowed them with an earthly immortality within the public sphere of the city. These heroicized bodies were intended to make visible a social ideal, a standard of excellence that extended beyond the individual life: the dead was an exemplar (an *agathos aner*) of this ideal and as such to be kept alive in social memory. Thus the image seen at the grave clads the dead in the beauty of life which he has lost, but which he will retain forever in memory. In the process, as Vernant puts it, “grief (*pothos*) is transformed into fame (*kleos*).” That the hero’s death was celebrated as a public death and immortalized in a public monument, is demonstrated in the story of Cleobis and Biton, the two young sons of a priestess of Hera who died an honorable death (Herodotus 1.31). By contrast, in the fifth century BCE we begin to see, on private stelae, scenes painted in the rich colors of life in which the dead bid farewell to the living. They can only be understood as a metaphor. When the living and the dead—no longer distinguishable in appearance—share a grave image,

the dead have once and for all lost their claim to an image of their own, one that could embody their changed status.<sup>63</sup> It is in fact questionable whether images ever fulfilled this function in Greek culture.

It is again *only* from texts that we can learn something about the earliest Greek images or monuments relating to the dead. The texts tell of monuments that embodied the dead in a replacement body. Since materiality was more important in ritual practice than iconicity, non-iconic stone monuments could fulfill the same role. Here we encounter, in Homeric and pre-Homeric times, the image as symbolic body, though it is doubtful that we should speak of images at all. Vernant opted to speak of a “double,” which he distinguished from an “image” in the proper sense. It was not until classical times, he wrote, that the Greeks went beyond embodying the absent dead in pure symbols “to create the image in the true sense, the image as a mimetic work of art.” The invention of *mimesis*, “a theory sketched out by Xenophon, and elaborated in a fully systematic way by Plato, marks the juncture in Greek culture when the evolution from the making present of the invisible to the imitation of appearance” is complete. It was for this reason that Vernant titled his study “From the Double to the Image.”<sup>64</sup>

But Vernant embraced too narrow a concept of the image when he adopted its Platonic definition. If one takes an anthropological perspective, two different species of image come into view, and of the two the “double” was incomparably more important in funerary cult than the mimetic image, which was merely a *medium of remembrance*. As Egyptian culture (among others) attests, the double, a *medium of embodiment*, can be called an archetype of the image: as a double of the body it could be possessed by an invisible life force. Since it acts as a placeholder for the body, it could also be *aniconic*, though such a term itself reveals its roots in the image concept we call Platonic.

Vernant himself shows us a way to solve the problem, through a review of the semantic history of the word *eidolon*. While the *eidolon* was sometimes merely a dead object that needed to be filled with life, at other times it was

the opposite: the soul as merely a life breath that needed a body if it was to enter into life. The *eidolon* of Leonidas was a replacement body for his missing corpse, which the Spartans used to bury their dead king (Herodotus 6.58). The *eidolon* of Acteon, on the other hand, was a restless soul, which the living could put to rest only by locking it up in an image (Pausanias 4.38). *Eidolon* thus referred not only to a soul in search of a body, but also to a body waiting for a soul. That is why it could become the target of the charge that it was merely a sham body. By contrast, the word *kolossos* referred only to the mere artifact: “The *kolossos* is not an image; it is a ‘double,’ just as the dead man is the double of his living self.”<sup>65</sup> “Without resembling anyone, the counterpart (*l'équivalent*) exists to embody someone and take his place in the game of social exchange.”<sup>66</sup>

But the very notion of a *recall* into life presupposes the notion of a life substance that has departed from the corpse, of a “soul,” for if there were no soul to embody, embodiment would not make sense. In the Homeric epics, the word *eidolon* generally refers only to a soul that remained behind, a sort of likeness, after abandoning the body. It breaks away from the body to continue a shadow life of its own in Hades. Homer seems to have no grasp of the body and the soul as two living entities; he knows only the soul of the dead.<sup>67</sup> The shadow image suggests a kind of mere memory of an absent body, leaving open the question of how closely it might resemble the living. The shadow soul of Patroclus, for example, resembled the man himself when it appeared to Achilles in a dream, “with his same form / And with his beautiful eyes and his voice / And wearing the same clothes” (Iliad 23.66). Odysseus, however, encountered a phantom when the soul of his dead mother “fluttered out of my hands like a shadow or a dream” (Odyssey 11.207).

The myth of Orpheus with its tale of a journey to Hades, dramatizes this notion of death, but it is not attested until the late fifth century BCE. Around that time, Euripides alludes to it in “Alcestis” (357), as does the original of the well-known Orpheus relief, which celebrates the mythical conquest of death (Fig. 4.12). It is only the Roman poets Virgil (*Georgics*

IV.481) and Ovid (*Metamorphoses* X.47) who give the story a negative outcome: Orpheus loses his wife Eurydice a second time when he violates the prohibition against casting his corporeal gaze upon her non-corporeal shadow. In his *Symposium*, Plato used a different version of the myth: Orpheus merely retrieved a phantom (*phasma*) of his wife from the underworld (*Symp.* 179d). On the relief, the spouses touch each other with their hands, and Orpheus unveils Eurydice's face in the gesture of a wedding ceremony. But Hermes, who guides souls to the realm of Hades, stands behind them ready to pull Eurydice away by her arm. Thus the reunion of the couple already foreshadows their parting, a theme that was repeated on many grave stelae of the period. Only the lyre at Orpheus's side points to the mythical poet's courage in opening the gates of death with his singing. Whatever the meaning of the relief, it takes its place alongside other Greek representations of graveside lamentation, scenes in which the only remaining hope for the return of the dead was utopian, dependant on the deeds of a mythical hero.<sup>68</sup>

Since social identity was lost along with the body in death, the soul that remained behind was a disembodied *doppelgänger*. Plato turned this definition on its head when he declared that only the soul—in the ontological sense—is real and demoted the body, because of its mortality, to the status of a mere shadow (*Laws* XII). Corpses were shadows, illusions of truth, and so he called them *eidola*, the same word that Homer used for his shadow soul. For Plato it was the corpse that was empty, just as the “inanimate” (*apsychoi*) statues of the gods were empty (*ibid.* 11.931). He depreciated the visual, counting it as part of the illusion that ruled the world of the senses. There was an abyss between sensory perception and the realization of truth, and no artifact or ritual could bridge that abyss.



Fig. 4.12. Relief sculpture featuring Orpheus, Eurydice, and Hermes; Roman copy after a Greek original of ca. 420 BCE. Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples. Photo: Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY.

We now begin to understand the critical turning point in Greek thinking vis-à-vis the image. A distance was created between the beholder and every *physical image*, a distance underpinned by *metaphysical reservations* as to the truth of sensory manifestations. Truth was cognitive in nature. The senses were not to be trusted. Although images were now measured by their mimetic accuracy, they had become incapable of acting as bodies of exchange. All that the image still provided was the experience of absence, an experience previously restricted to the encounter with the dead body. The



image no longer filled a gap, but became a metaphor for death itself. It could not transform death or embody the life of a person, for it was itself like death. The horror this induces echoes in a famous passage in Aeschylus's "Agamemnon," where the playwright describes the absence of beautiful Helen, whom Paris has abducted to Troy. Her husband Menelaus is so distraught with longing for her that Argos seems ruled by a phantom. He hates the lovely statues (*kolossoi*) from whose empty eyes Aphrodite has vanished, and he is tormented by his futile dream fantasies.<sup>69</sup> The empty eye sockets prove that life no longer dwells in the image. Real life, we are compelled to interject, never existed in the image unless it was transferred to it. Attempts to see it there were based on a misunderstanding of the past. Disappointment over the ontological shortcomings of the image ushered in a new era. Since the image is dead, it can no longer embody life in the funerary cult.

In Attic theater, the public was amused by statues that suddenly walked about on stage or began to speak. Everyone knew that images were incapable of such nonsense, and they laughed at what amounted to a caricature of embodiment. An ironic report in Plato's *Meno* has it that Daidalos, a sculptor from the mythical past, was said to have once animated statues via magic, so that they had to be tied up lest they run away. Aristotle ridiculed another story, that Daidalos poured quicksilver into a statue of Aphrodite to animate it, but he nonetheless cited it in his tractate on the soul in order to counter Democritus's thinking.<sup>70</sup> This was not, Aristotle insisted, how one should imagine the workings of the soul within the body, for the workings of the soul bore no resemblance to any corporeal function (*De Anima* I.3, 406b). The separation of body and soul was now so complete that the idea of an embodiment of the soul in a sculpture had become meaningless.

## Plato's Critique of the Image

Plato's theories about the illusory nature of the image, which found resonance in his day, attest to a profound change in the experience of the image, one that was long in coming to Greek

culture and one that was reflected also in the funerary cult. Images at the grave had turned into metaphors that served merely to evoke memories of the dead in the living. But there must have been something in the history of the Greek image that gave rise to the notion that a reaction against the image was a move in the direction of enlightenment. To accuse images of emptiness made sense only if they had previously been thought capable of life: a view that would later be called magical and imputed to “primitive” societies.

In our context, Plato’s critique of the image was, however, also triggered by the desire to defend living memory against artificial forms of memory, such as writing and painting. Only living beings can remember. Left to their own devices, artifacts merely duplicate death. Plato’s critique of writing in the *Phaedrus* was intended to save living speech from lifeless written words. And the written word is analogous to painting in that it merely imitates life: it imitates the speech of living beings, just as a painting imitates their bodies (*Phaedrus* 275). Both a written text and a painting are without real life: ask them a question and they remain mute.<sup>71</sup> To render his argument plausible, Plato spoke only of images of living bodies and passes over images of the dead in silence. Likewise, he refers only to the simulated bodies in painted images and excludes three-dimensional works, such as statues. In “shadow painting” he criticized a pictorial style of his time in order to compare it to the medium of writing, of which he was especially suspicious. It was for this reason that he composed his works as fictitious dialogues: they imitate conversations, but they were never actual conversations. In Plato’s mind, the technical medium of writing threatened the uniqueness of life, which is why he recognized only the living body as a legitimate medium. Only the living body could engage in true speech (*logos*), of which written speech was incapable, for it could only produce a “shadow image” (*eidolon*).<sup>72</sup>

A similar distinction between life and artifact, between a living being and its likeness, is drawn in the *Cratylus*, where Plato suddenly reveals his knowledge of the “double.” But, as we might expect, he speaks of the “double” of a living

person.<sup>73</sup> In the funerary cult, by contrast, the “double” would be that of a missing body, and this difference is crucial. A living image of the living Cratylus, according to Plato, would be no different from the man himself. In order to be Cratylus, an image it would have to resemble him not only “in outward form and color,” but also in his “motion and soul and mind.” The embodiment of Cratylus cannot be repeated a second time, because only Cratylus has the body in which Cratylus’s soul can express itself. In the *Sophist* Plato takes a firm stand against any attempt to blur the difference between what is image and what is reality. That, he claimed, was what the Sophists were doing with their “deceptive art” of argumentation (*Sophist* 239–40). They mixed reality with appearance and, with the intent of diverting their audience from true understanding, led them into thickets of argument that bore no more resemblance to reality than shadows or mirror images. It was thus the deceit inherent in images of the unreal, of illusion, that sparked Plato’s polemic against the Sophists.

Images of the dead came into play in an unexpected way when Socrates, shortly before his own death, was conversing with the young Theaetetus on the topic of remembering. In this case, Plato’s work is itself an exercise in memory, for the written record of the conversation would be read only after the death of Socrates. Plato begins by describing remembering as “internal imitation.” Theaetetus, it would seem, provides a good opening for this theme as he resembles Socrates so closely that when the latter looks at him he is startled “to see his own countenance” (Theaetetus 144d). Were Theaetetus to survive as a living image of Socrates, he would, however, be only an image of remembrance. His resemblance to Socrates depended upon the existence of people who remembered the real Socrates. If the image of the latter had imprinted itself on the soft wax of their souls (Theaetetus 194c), they were also able to recognize Socrates in an exact likeness of him. Theaetetus would embody a living memory of Socrates whenever the others saw him. And of course, he himself, as a student of Socrates, also carried that same memory of his teacher. Theaetetus, however, was a mortal being whose

memory would be extinguished upon his own death. In the conversation that frames the dialogue, two friends talk about the fact that Theaetetus in fact does not have much longer to live as he is ill with dysentery. Thus this living memory that he is, proves merely a “postponement of death.”<sup>74</sup> Grave images of stone also lose their meaning once every personal recollection of the depicted person has been obliterated by death. Against this kind of death Plato is able, of course, to advance his theory of an eternal soul. It was in the interests of keeping that soul outside the cycle of mortality that Plato refused to contaminate it with the corporeal substance of the body. For even if the soul were able to do its remembering only within a living body, it was nevertheless an entity of a very different nature.<sup>75</sup>

Plato here represents a culture that forbade the dead any presence other than that of remembrance. The degree of resemblance displayed by grave images and portraits had little influence on memory, for the latter could be triggered even by a mere object that a person had possessed (*Phaidon* 74a). Plato thus distinguished not only between the image and life, but also between mental and physical images. His theory of perception can be summed up in the statement that memory is the only way to respond to the physical likeness of a person.<sup>76</sup>

Plato’s doctrine of the image evolved within a historical culture in which questions about the relation of image and death were no longer in the foreground. The primeval meaning of the image was lost to him, as it was also to all of his philosophical successors. His devaluation of the likeness, which he classified among dead “appearances,” had its antithesis, at the other end of the scale, in the elevation of living archetypes (ideas) that existed outside the created world and alone possessed absolute “being.” While the corrupt likeness merely copied what was already only appearance in the sensory world, the archetypes became abstracted into immaterial and uncreated *models* after which images were fashioned. To put it another way: in Plato’s worldview, there were on the one hand *images*, which (as copies of the empirical world) could only capture the appearance of an appearance; and on the other *ideas* that, unlike images, had

nothing behind them that they could form an image of. Once the world of the body and the world of ideas were set apart, there was no more reason to seek the re-embodiment of the soul, and re-embodiment had been the sole motivation for the creation of the “double” in funerary cult. Embodiment belonged to a *plastic conception of the world*, which preceded the *theoretical conception of the world*. In Indonesian cultures, figures called *Tautau*, which lie next to the corpse during interminable funerary rituals, carry the notion of a “visible soul.”<sup>77</sup> Even a dead body could in this way be fashioned into a new *image* that was suitable as a vessel of embodiment. Of course, an image of this kind does not rely on physiognomic resemblance for its efficacy, but must be created according to strictly prescribed rules.

### Adam’s Model and the Jewish Prohibition against Images

Humanity’s creation myths also provide unique insights into the history of the image. Quite common in this material is the “extremely ancient notion that the world or the first human was *formed* or *fashioned* by a divine being,” which Ernst Tootsch has called the “techno-morphic interpretation of the world.” Such myths describe the creative process as if it were the work of a sculptor using readily shaped material, such as clay or mud. This cosmogony rests on an analogy with the “artistic-artisanal sphere of life,” which was ruled by the intention of the creator of a work.<sup>78</sup> The Bible follows such a conception when it tells us (Genesis 2.7) that God first “formed” (*epласen* in the Greek Septuagint version) Adam, the first man, “from the dust of the ground” and then breathed life into him.

We can relate such descriptions to the animation rituals that were, as we have seen, performed on figurative sculpture in Egypt. Judaism saw in such human practices an intrusion into the sphere of the Creator-God and strictly prohibited image-making in the second commandment of the Mosaic Decalogue.<sup>79</sup> No one should force God to animate human artifacts, and without animation they were nothing more than

dead matter. In other cultures, by contrast, the human sculptor could see himself as the faithful student of the divine sculptor of human beings. The animation could then be safely left to a divinity who possessed power over life and death. In the funerary image, the creation analogy had the meaning of a second creation or a re-embodiment. If the soul had left its old body, the sculptor created a new body that the soul was to take possession of.

In some religions, it was the purported “uncleanness” of embodiment that led to a prohibition against images. The origins of this attitude would be difficult to explain without some sense of the suspicion that attached to images. When the Jews refused to look at their God in an image, it was because they did not wish to make a body for a god who had no body. They also avoided giving him a proper name or addressing him in a loud voice. As early as the second millennium, the Egyptian god Amun (Amon) was known in the Holy Land and worshipped as a hidden god, “whose nature was not known and of whom there are no images of artists”—thus declares a seal inscription of the period.<sup>80</sup> Behind the prohibition against image and proper name lies the notion of a universal god who, unlike the multitude of gods worshipped by neighboring tribes, could not be captured in images. His singularity demanded the renunciation of every image, for all images resemble each other in that they resemble bodies. As a result, the Jewish prohibition was also directed against embodiment in funerary images, which were said to be forgeries of the body that God had given to the human being.

Plato was familiar with the “techno-morphic” model; indeed, in the *Timaeus* (74 C) he describes the creator of the world as a “modeler” engaged in a highly complex animation process that enabled the linking of an immortal soul with the body that had been designed for it. But Plato revised the concept 180-degrees by positing a *blueprint for a work* that was distinct from the *work itself*, a duality based on the schema of an original and a copy. The sculptor transfers to matter an invisible “idea” that preceded the work in the mind of its creator. This view reduces every corporeal image to the embodiment of a pre-existing model image, a notion that



completely reverses the traditional conception of the image, turning it henceforth into a mere mental reality. To be sure, Plato did not conceive his “idea” in reference to art, but it would have a long afterlife in future revaluations of images as art.<sup>[81](#)</sup>

### ***Pompes Funèbres* in Ancient Rome**

In early funerary practice, images of the dead took the place of absent bodies in order that communication might resume despite the interruption of death. As the re-embodiment of the dead amidst the living, they presented a kind of reassuring symbolic certainty in that most uncertain of realms. To assert their place within the community, however, such images needed to do more than merely represent an absent body; they had to possess a body of their own. Their physical presence was required to denote another presence, that of the dead, in community ritual. In the Greek concept of the image, this palpable bond between body and image dissolved. When the world of the senses was declared mere appearance, there was no longer any incentive to embodiment, and images were stripped of their primal function. The sculptures that the artists produced for the grave were no longer expected to provide a *real presence*, one that should be thought of as in symbiosis with the soul. *Real presence* was replaced by remembrance, and the final seal was set upon the absence of the dead. *The image that the living already bore within themselves emancipated itself from the artifact.*

The Greek attitude toward funerary images had no noticeable impact on Roman funerary cult. As early as the second century BCE, Greek travelers could but marvel at the public funeral ceremonies they encountered in Rome. An astonished Polybius described a procession in which a deceased nobleman was escorted to the site of his public by the masks of all of his ancestors (*Histories* VI.53). On the rostra of the forum, the dead man, “propped upright upon it so as to be visible to all,” received the *laudatio* upon his life and accomplishments. He was surrounded by his ancestors via their images ([Fig. 4.13](#)). “The image (*eikon*),” Polybius

explains, “is a mask or face (*prosopon*) that faithfully renders the shape of his face and his features.”<sup>82</sup> The masks were usually kept in wooden shrines in the family’s home and were brought out for each appropriate occasion. During a funeral procession they were “put on men who resembled the deceased as much as possible in height and figure.” The funeral oration, which immortalized the exploits of the deceased, also invoked the ancestors, who thus became present again in image and word.




Fig. 4.13. Statue of a Roman senator with portraits of his ancestors, first century ce. Musei Capitolini, Rome. Photo: Archivio Fotografico dei Musei Capitolini.

Funerary images were without exception “images of the ancestors” (*imagines maiorum*), as Sallust first referred to them. Their importance was considerable: in order to belong to the equestrian class, for example, one had to have inherited images, a requirement that Marius challenged when he campaigned for the consulship in 107 BCE. Why should a lack of images prevent one from being a soldier? Sallust, who tells

this story, quickly adds that the wax likenesses had no effect unless the deeds of the dead were recalled in words and writing (*Bellum Jugurt*, 4.5 and 85.25) as well. Less than a century later, Pliny was already looking back with a sense of nostalgia to the good old days when wax masks were the exclusive prerogative of great families and funeral rites were conducted with genuine Roman gravitas (35.I.6). Masks worn by actors (who were sometimes the real, living descendants of the deceased) were effective at portraying the dead not only because of their physical resemblance to the dead, but also because they were exemplars of the old and venerable medium of embodiment that was given this particular expression in Rome. Mask dances, which we know from other cultures, had turned into official state spectacles staged in order to restore the deceased to public life. In so-called “primitive cultures,” the community of ancestors constituted an *institutional Hereafter* to which the dead asked humbly to be admitted. In Rome, in a telling variation on this theme, the ancestors of privileged families made such powerful claims for special rights in public life that the ceremony eventually had to be outlawed for political reasons.

Suetonius recounts the funeral of Vespasian (79 BCE), which took place at a date when funerary rites no longer celebrated the ancestral family but consisted of honors paid to the emperor alone (VIII.19). When Suetonius noticed a principal actor (*archimimus*) wearing the mask of the deceased, it suddenly dawned on him that there was a kinship between the theatrical spectacle and funerary cult. He introduces the mask with the much-discussed word *persona*. But the analogy with the theater goes further. We are told that the actor portraying the dead emperor “imitated him, as was the ancient custom, in word and deed” (*imitans*). Diodorus tells us that actors of the period really did learn to give lifelike imitations of prominent Romans in order to represent them at their public funeral rites (31.35). The only new element is the staging: the deed makes an appearance as a citizen still participating fully in public life. In the process, representation and embodiment merge into one. But both belong still to the venerable lineage of the old “double.” It is as though the Platonic rupture had never occurred.

Private funerary cult in Rome of course took place at the tomb, where families tendered sacrifices to their dead. The funerary images on Roman tombstones strike us as more archaic than those on the chronologically older image stelae of the Greeks. In Greece, the ancestral cult—families looking after their dead—remained the only anchor connecting those on either side of the grave. The Hereafter no longer played a role in cult, for in the social life of the community Olympian state religion, centered on a pantheon of distant and deathless gods, had replaced earlier earth-bound religion with its chthonic powers that ruled over fertility and death. In the Olympian heavens death was unknown, and the notion of a Hereafter for humankind thus became as distant as its counterimage, the “underworld,” where the dead wandered about as anonymous “shadows.” With perfect consistency, Olympus ruled only over the living; its power no longer reached into dark Hades, whose lord it was better not to mention by name.<sup>83</sup>

Christianity further deepened the divide in the topography of the Hereafter. Heaven and hell, two places of terrible dissimilarity, would become home to the dead when at last their souls were reunited with their bodies. The meaning of an individual’s death was now postponed until the Last Judgment, and it was therefore not death itself that was the real threat, but damnation, the “second death.” Painted visions of the blessed in heaven and the damned in hell filled Christian churches. They were a warning to the living that it was up to them to secure the salvation of the dead through their unceasing prayers and donations.<sup>84</sup>

Under the impact of secularization this ecclesiastical iconography was lost, as were in fact all depictions of the Hereafter. Scenes of cemeteries, images of November days, and death chambers took their place.<sup>85</sup> The state, meanwhile, advanced as a new ideal its own secular duration, and the individual death ceased to matter. Christian utopias of the Hereafter yielded to modern social utopias, where it is only the social body that is immortal.

## Silhouette and Shadow Painting in Antiquity

A Greek legend has it that art originated with a departing body, a body that left its shadow on a wall. The Roman writers Pliny and Quintilian agree that the first drawing of a human being was a tracing of the outline of a shadow. According to the philosopher Athenagoras, that very drawing could still be seen in Corinth in the second century ce. Athenagoras also relates the story of the Corinthian maid who traced the shadow of her lover in his sleep before their parting ([Fig. 4.14](#)). The maid's father, a potter, later cast the image in clay, which confused Pliny when he retold the legend elsewhere, this time relating it to sculpture.<sup>86</sup> A connection between the shadowy silhouette and death is not attested in ancient literature, but it could not but be present in a gaze that beheld a shadow without a body. As soon as the Greeks looked upon a shadow missing its body, they fell under the spell of a metaphor that brought death into play. After all, the dead in Hades lived as shadows, immaterial images that were no more than reminders of their lost bodies. Lucian, with characteristic irony, elaborates on this old notion in his "true story" of the Island of the Blessed, where "it would appear that their naked souls go about in the semblance of their bodies. Really, if one did not touch them, he could not tell that what he saw was not a body, for they are like upright shadows, only not black."<sup>87</sup>

It would appear that the Greeks for a long time shied away from working with shading when they painted the living. Around the time of Socrates, "shadow painting" (*skiagraphia*), as this revolution in two-dimensional art would come to be called, broke this taboo. Until then, the dark—later colored—profile figures in ancient Greek painting did indeed look so much like silhouettes that they may have inspired the Corinthian legend explaining the origin of painting. The explanation offered by the legend could not, however, have been invented until a time when pure outline drawings of human figures were viewed as archaic. It is an explanation suited to a theory of art that is concerned with artistic progress. "Shadow painting," however, has nothing to do with silhouettes: it is illusionistic painting that strives for the fiction (*mimesis*) of life, in other words for the production of



appearance, which is why an angry Plato compares it to sophistry. Rather than detaching shadows from the body, painters set out to simulate the shadows on the body, with the result that the painted body looked deceptively like a living body. This shading was only one part of a larger project, however. A correctly shaded body would only make sense if one detached the figure from a flat surface and moved it into the mirror of a three-dimensional space in which real bodies live. Perhaps panel (*pinax*) painting was the final consequence of abandoning the surface plane and, even more than the fixed mural, the first step toward the painting as mirror.<sup>88</sup>



Fig. 4.14. Daniel Chodowiecki (1726–1801), “The Invention of Painting,” 1787. Drawing, 15.3 x 19.2 cm. Kupferstichkabinett, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. Photo: Jörg P. Anders, Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/Art Resource, NY.

Plutarch praises Apollodorus “as the first man to discover the art of mixing colours and shadow painting... . Upon his productions is inscribed: It is easier to blame than to make the



same.”<sup>89</sup> The blame might arise from the fact that the shadows in a painting of life appear to contradict death by increasing the life-likeness of figures. Lexicographers said of Apollodorus that he was no longer called a scene painter (*skenographos*), but a shadow painter (*skiagraphos*).<sup>90</sup> The scene painter Agatharchos boasted to Zeuxis the shadow painter that he painted his sets more quickly, to which the latter replied that his panel paintings lasted longer. Shadow painting may have taken some cues from the theatrical stage, which was after all a medium that aimed at producing a world of illusion. The more images approached the appearance of things, the more they were apt to be judged by how close to appearance they managed to come. The stage, on which many “deaths” took place, was a kind of transitional world between life and death, one in which the dead did not have to return to life because they were played as living.<sup>91</sup> But one can in the end only speculate about cross-pollination between the theater and the pictorial arts. There is perhaps a distant echo this in Plato, when he couches his objections to the pursuit of appearance (*mimesis*) as a defense of the truth.<sup>92</sup>

The terms “shadow” and “shadow painting” may give rise to some confusion. They designate quite different things. The shadow in Homer is a paradigm for image and death, akin to the silhouette, which is also a kind of shadow without a body. A Greek understood his shadow as a premonition of his shadowy existence in the underworld, when he would no longer be able to cast a shadow but would himself *be* a mere shadow. So-called “shadow painting,” by contrast, produced the illusion of life, as 3-D animation is said to do today. Shadows in illusionistic painting were not clues to death, but completed the fiction of corporeal life. Consequently they were also used in the depiction of the deceased, who were portrayed by the artist as he remembered them from life. Every art form strives for its own language and grammar; it cannot deviate from its own rules without doing damage to the world of appearance that it seeks to duplicate. The theme of image and death could of course only emerge in the genre of portraiture, which in Greece we know only from texts and from Greco-Roman mummy portraits. The better a portrait

captured appearance by depicting the age of the model, the more it fell victim to the irreversibility of that depicted age. The portrait then inevitably became a memory image; at the same time, however, it did duty as a double of the shadow soul that lived in the underworld, equally disembodied and equally untouchable.

## Epilogue: Photography

In recent times photography has reawakened interest in the topic of the image and death, for photography, like the ancient silhouette, captures the visible token of a living body. In both cases, light directs the process, but in photography the tool of the tracing hand has been replaced by the camera. Like the shadow on the wall, the light impression on the film is a sort of footprint of a body, which generates its own copy in the lens of the camera (as the body did in antiquity when it cast its shadow on a wall). The photographic image duplicates the body with a truthfulness that only technology can guarantee. And where technology cannot err, its product is infallible as well. In antiquity the silhouette yielded ground to illusionistic painting; and now roughly two and a half millennia later, we observe the process in reverse. After centuries of illusionistic painting, the photographic light impression, an auto-reference of the body, strikes us as a flight away from illusion. It will make for a fitting epilogue to this chapter.

William Henry Fox Talbot, who invented photography, initially experimented with photograms, in which he created light tracings, as it were, on photosensitive paper. It took some time before he was able to fix the “lovely shadow pictures” his sister-in-law thanked him for in 1834 in such a way that they did not, like shadows, disappear again when exposed to light. In 1835 he noted: “In the Photogenic or Sciagraphic (Greek: *skia* ‘a shadow’) process, if the paper is transparent, the first drawing may serve as an object to produce a second drawing, in which the lights and shadows will be reversed.” This reversal process anticipated negative-positive photography, in which the natural relationship of body and shadow is reversed. Four years later, in a presentation to the Royal Society, he

expressed his wonder at the phenomenon he was describing: “The most transitory of things, a shadow, the proverbial emblem of all that is fleeting and momentary, may be fettered by the spells of our ‘*natural magic*,’ and may be fixed for ever in the position which it seemed only destined for a single instant to occupy.” The oldest negative, which he produced in 1835, was only 1.6 x 1.6 cm in size. Talbot, however, did not call his invention skiagraphy, but “sun pictures” or “words of light,” because, similar to a written text, they captured forever what was past.<sup>[93](#)</sup>

A modern brand of archaism shows itself in our effort to banish death. For banishing death was the original goal that mankind hoped to achieve through the image, but now, in spite of all, the image leads us to a new experience of death. The subject, in the moment when his lighted image is frozen by the camera, is like a living dead person. The new picture that gives such abundant evidence of life, can in fact only produce a shadow. One can no longer escape one's own image: it drives the very life that it records out of the body. Every movement of the body is like an act of speaking which, rendered motionless by the image, leaves only a memory behind. The very moment in which the body has been exposed, at that very moment it begins to yellow on the sheet of photographic paper. That is why, in the face of this new medium that loses the body to time, the question of being arises anew, and with such urgency. Absence, an original precondition for the image, looms larger now the more it forces an empty presence upon us. And so the pendulum swings to the other side.

At the precise moment of exposure, every photograph falls into the trap of time. Death is different, of course: it prevents the possibility of taking another image from life. But there is a sense in which, during our lifetime, we die the moment we are photographed. The finger on the release pushes down only once. Roland Barthes therefore said that in photography, “I have become Total-Image, which is to say, Death in person.” He was looking at a photograph of his mother dating from a time when he did not yet know her, and yet he animated it with a secret life that was the product of his own memory.<sup>[94](#)</sup>

From the very beginning, modernity sought to escape the death that lurked under this mask of life, and yet it was unable to free itself from this token of death. Photographs could be multiplied in prints and pass through many hands like a book, and yet all these copies reproduced only a single negative, and behind it stood one single mortal body. Faster exposures, which record ever thinner slices of a movement, still represent only a segment in the flow of life, which never repeats itself. It made perfect sense when Talbot, as early as 1852, predicted that he would eventually, with an electric flash, a “snapshot,” capture life like a hunter. The chronographers, who at the end of the century made sequential photographs of a movement (indeed “shooting” a bird in flight), and the cinematographers, who shortly thereafter converted the *picture of movement* into the *moving picture*, went further down this path that culminated eventually in the film.<sup>95</sup> But, howsoever many single frames the film used to produce its illusion of life, it never accomplished its goal of freeing the image from the frame and allowing it to break out into life.

In the meantime, however, we are witnessing the auto-destruction of photography. Its boundaries, which were drawn by “analogy” to the body, are everywhere being transgressed. The digital construction of body images via the data set abolishes all resemblance to a real body, and as a result the distinction between death and life as well. *Post-photography* is inventing artificial bodies that cannot die.<sup>96</sup> We are looking for escape routes out of photography, which has tied us so firmly to our bodies. But it is only with the body, it would seem, that we can rid ourselves of death through the use of images, images that transform us into beings without mortality. With this the hunt for life enters yet another stage. We deny our mirror image so that we can invent ourselves at will. Electronic images rob us, however, of more than the analogy with the body, which was in any case always subject to time and space. They also exchange the mortal body for the invulnerable body of simulation, which conveys immortality upon us. But this immortality is only a new fiction with which we conceal death. In the sweep of historical cultures, the impulse to banish death by means of the image was probably

always the flipside of the impulse to capture the body in the image.

So-called “memorial photography,” which was popular in the United States in the nineteenth century, saw not life but death as the only motivation for capturing a person in a picture ([Fig. 4.15](#)). We shy away from looking death in the face, so we mask its visage with an image of life. A dead person in a picture seems to us doubly dead. Photographers therefore specialized in ways of staging the dead as a sleeping person, thereby imparting to him a pose natural to life. Through his image he remains within his family, remains in the picture as he was when he was last seen and for the last time.<sup>97</sup>



Fig. 4.15. Anonymous photographer, mother and son with a photograph of their dead, ca. 1900. From Jay Ruby, *Secure the Shadow: Death and Photography in America*, MIT Press, 1999.

The cemetery photographs familiar to us from Southern Europe continue the tradition of funerary images, very much in the old sense. Looking out at us is a living person, whose

picture is a part of his grave. The evidence of life that we wish to encounter in the picture depends on the symmetry of experience and time between the picture and its observer, so that the gaze is persuaded by the life in the picture. A picture lays claim to its specific aura at the intersection of life and death. But only death invests our memory with the fundamental meaning that once called images into life. The snapshots with which we merely interrupt the flow of time for a moment are exchangeable mirror images of the fleeting Self. One's own memories are only a preliminary exercise; they do not conquer death.

In other cultures, photography long held onto a place in archaic traditions, which—heedless of the fact that this was a modern medium—continued to openly demand the death-reference of images.<sup>98</sup> Where a cult of the ancestors was still in existence, only a single image of a life was required in order to spur remembrance, while in the West images were multiplied in a constant battle against the death reference. The cult of the ancestors also called for a different kind of resemblance. We see this in Marguerite Duras's description of her childhood experience in Saigon.<sup>99</sup> The mother of the narrator had always insisted on group pictures of the family, but when she had grown old, she went to the photographer alone. "The better-off natives used to go to the photographer's too, just once in their lives, when they saw death was near. Their photos were large, all the same size, hung in handsome gilt frames near the altars to their ancestors." But the resemblance of the photographs was disconcerting. They were all retouched: "All the faces were prepared in the same way to confront eternity, all toned down, all uniformly rejuvenated. This was what people wanted. This general resemblance, this tact, would characterize the memory of their passage through the family, bear witness at once to the singularity and to the reality of that transit. The more they resembled each other the more evidently they belonged in the ranks of the family... . And they all wore an expression I'd still recognize anywhere."



# Media and Bodies: Dante's Shadows and Greenaway's TV

The power of the image “lies in light, and in its transcendental  
flipside, the shadow.”

—Louis Marin, *Des pouvoirs de l'image*

The question of what images are and how they work has taken on unprecedented importance in our world. It was once a concern only in the fields of art criticism and literary theory; but today, thanks to the role that the mass media play in our age of globalization, images pervade our daily life to such an extent that they have become central to human experience. In what follows, I have chosen to discuss only one aspect of the image; namely, the relation of the image to the shadow. The shadow we cast has a dual character: it both defines and contradicts our bodies, thus linking presence and absence. Light is necessary to produce shadows, but they are its opposite, the absence of light.

I have chosen as the vehicle for examining this topic Dante's *Divine Comedy*, in which the poet describes the dead whom he encounters in his travels as shadows. As a visitor to the Underworld he himself still lives in his body, while the dead exist only as shadows. This means that they have become images of what they once were in life. It is only as images that they are visible for Dante. He can recognize them and he can talk to them, but he cannot touch them, for like most images, they offer nothing to touch. They allow of seeing only. In Dante's fiction, shadows furnish a medium (a kind of infernal

TV) for images; that is, for those who have lost their bodies and only exist as images.

As Dante begins his journey into the Underworld, he finds himself “in a dark wood,” where he comes upon someone, “who appears mute from long silence.” This is our introduction to the poet Virgil, who has come forward out of the realm of the dead to act as Dante’s guide. In this, their first encounter, Dante asks Virgil whether he is “a shadow or a real human” (*od ombra od uomo certo*.)” Virgil’s answer leaves no doubt that Dante is seeing not a body but only a shadow: “Not man, once I was man” (Inf. 1.67). Virgil himself once described deceased friends and ancestors as shadows, who, lacking bodies, could exist only through that medium (*Aeneid* 6.700).

The experience of shadows in the world of the dead, was given visual form, albeit an inverted visual form, when, in 1982, the Vietnam War Memorial was opened on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Visitors to the memorial step down into a kind of hollow; the sun is at their backs so that the shadows of their bodies are projected onto the surface of the memorial ([Fig. 5.1](#)). Maya Ying Lin, a young art student of Chinese parentage, designed the monument as a wall with a shiny, mirror-like surface engraved with the names of Americans who lost their lives in the Vietnam War. Relatives searching for a particular name suddenly discover that their living bodies have become insubstantial shadow, mirroring the dead whom they have in their minds. Dante used the same metaphor to represent his dead, though for a different reason.

Today, however, the absence of bodies is no longer a proof of death but is instead the very condition of the images we experience in the mass media. On TV, we consume images whose life lacks a body. While Dante’s images conjure the absence of real life, we today believe paradoxically in the absence of death, in images that cannot die. Life is traded for “live” images that talk and act like Dante’s shadows. The absence of life makes images of the living nowadays indistinguishable from images of the dead (except when we recognize that the latter are old images). The “thanatos effect” that Roland Barthes once discovered in photographs,

disappears in live images, the nature of whose presence masks their essential absence. Thus, presence has become the mode of images rather than of bodies. But an iconic presence is, in turn, produced by shadow images, whether they depict the living or the dead. As a result, Dante's equation of image and shadow also applies to visual media today, however effectively our awareness of death may be covered up by life-like effects.

In Dante's imagination, as in the imaginations of Virgil and Homer, shadow and image possess a secret analogy in their shared mimesis of our body. Through death, images were once entangled in the mystery of that final absence to which they owed their deepest meaning. The image was the chosen medium for making good the absence of life. For Plato, our living memory was the better alternative to picture-making. Yet memory, too, is the creating of images, mental images as against artificial, exogenous pictures. The image was once ontologically rooted in a body's death, and unmistakably so. Without this link, images merely simulate life and therefore fall into the empty circularity that Jean Baudrillard has so aptly described. Deprived of their ontological underpinnings, they celebrate this new territory of our perception that is technology. One could now speak of a technology of perception.

In sunlight our body duplicates itself in the shadow that it casts upon the ground. The presence of the shadow is visible proof of the presence of a body. Without a body, a shadow turns into the mere trace of a body that *had been there*. It is no longer the double of a present body, but a medium for a missing body. All the same, though, it requires human intervention to fix the fleeting shadow. According to Pliny, the very first human picture was produced by tracing a shadow on a wall.<sup>1</sup> It was, like photography much later, an index of reality, and yet it bore within it that absence that is constitutive for the image. While the shadow on the wall in Corinth existed, much like a tomb, in the world of the living, the ancient poets spoke of shadow images in the world of the dead. In Dante's view, the shadow images in his poetry were animated, and thus superior to the lifeless shadow pictures of the visual arts. Dante uses the word "virtual" (*virtualmente*) in

Purgatory 25.96. He knew that he created *virtual* bodies, not unlike the ones we encounter today in cyberspace. Dante's images were living shadows, with a voice of their own. Their fictive bodies (*corpo fitizio*, Purg. 26.12) endow the dead with a medium that simulates their existence as beings or persons.



Fig. 5.1. The Vietnam War Memorial, Washington D.C., 1997. Photo: H. Belting.

When in 1465 the Florentines commissioned from Domenico di Michelino a wall painting of Dante for the two-hundredth anniversary of his birth, an unusual expression of civic pride, their idea was to substitute an image for a real grave ([Fig. 5.2](#)). Dante had died in exile in Ravenna and his bones could not be transferred to his native Florence, so the

wall painting would serve as a kind of cenotaph, framed and positioned above a tomb in Florence's cathedral. We see in the picture a painted Dante who has no body and yet represents a body. The painting becomes, under inverted premises, a mirror of the shadow images that inhabit the *Divine Comedy*.<sup>2</sup> Dante, holding his *Divine Comedy* in his hands, stands outside the walls of the hometown from which he had been expelled while alive, and he points to the gate of hell that he had entered in that fictitious journey to the other world that he undertook in his lifetime.

In his picture theory Dante pursued the double strategy of defining the image both in *analogy to the shadow* and, equally, in *opposition to the body*. Both definitions live from their reference to the body, which the shadow itself implies. In short: The image is like a shadow and therefore unlike a body, but it simultaneously resembles the body, just as the shadow does. Time and again the shadow, as a natural image of the body, has guided the human production of images. It is both the affirmation and the negation of the body, it both denotes and obscures the body. For Dante, even our living bodies were primarily phenomenological, *appearing* bodies, even as they served to embody the *persona*: Thomas Aquinas had already used the term "persona" to describe someone who was living in his body.<sup>3</sup> As Dante journeyed, he still possessed his *persona*, but not so the dead Virgil or Dante's friend Casella (Purg. 2.110). In the second circle of hell, shadows lying on the ground were merely "emptiness, which seemed living bodies" (*vanità che par persona*, Inf. 6.34). An image instantly became a mirage if one took it for a body and failed to define it *against the body*.

In his 1959 Dante cycle, Robert Rauschenberg took the shadow images that populate his hell from news photos in the contemporary American mass media ([Fig. 5.3](#)). In thirty-four massive, panoramic drawings—equal in number to the cantos in Dante's "Inferno"—the denizens of hell look like our contemporaries. The special technique of transfer by "rubbing" allowed Rauschenberg to integrate the theme of reproduction into his drawings, echoing the fact that the

photographs themselves had been reproduced many times over in the illustrated periodicals from which they were borrowed. The printer's ink, which the artist took over into his drawing, had thus already transformed the figures, visibly and metaphorically, into the shadows that they truly are. They are decals and clichés, not the people that we see in them even though we have never encountered them *in corpore*. We know public personalities only as transformed into shadows that circulate bodiless in the mass media. Thus the media give us back *our own world* in the image world of the beyond, just as Dante saw his own times mirrored in the images of his journey through hell. We however are accustomed to taking the images we see in the media for the *living* while Dante *distinguished* them from the living.<sup>4</sup>

We note here once again how the image has lost its symbolic power, how death has become an abstraction and the analogy between the image and death, which seems as old as image-making itself, has fallen into oblivion. In the preceding chapters we saw that the history of the image, when traced back far enough, led us to the great absence that is death. The contradiction between presence and absence, which still dominates our images today, seems to have had an important precedent in the experience of death. This raised the question whether it was death that inspired image-making in the first place. Even today, images depend on our animation, without which they remain dead artifacts. "Animation" often is confused with "animism," a magical world-view. But it is not that. It is a symbolic act whereby we give life to images that we want to believe in as living. Tom Mitchell's question "What do pictures want?" is in fact the question "What do we want *from* pictures?" The answer is that we want them to be alive even though we know very well that it is we who are lending them a life, a life that is none other than our own. Images, as we have seen, find their true meaning in the fact that what they represent is absent *except* as image. They manifest what *is not* there, what can only *appear*. Images of the dead were therefore not an anomaly. Quite the contrary, for they are the product of humankind's earliest impulse toward picture-making. Death, an unbearable absence, became



endurable when an image substituted for the absence, a *symbolic body* replacing a *mortal body* that had dissolved into nothing. Pictures of the dead took on a counter-meaning to the corpse after the latter became, as Maurice Blanchot so aptly put it, “its own image.” Nobody can resemble himself. We do so only in the image or only as a corpse.



Fig. 5.2. Domenico di Michelino (1417–1491), Dante and his *Divine Comedy*. Duomo, Florence. Photo: Scala/Art Resource, NY.




Fig. 5.3. Robert Rauschenberg (1925–2008), “Canto XIV: Circle Seven, Round 3, The Violent Against God, Nature, and Art,” from the series “Thirty-four Illustrations for Dante’s Inferno,” 1959–60. Transfer drawing, watercolor, gouache, pencil, and red chalk on paper, 36.7 x 29.2 cm. Given anonymously. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Art © Estate of Robert Rauschenberg/Licensed by VAGA, NY. Digital image © The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by SCALA/Art Resource, NY.

The scandal of death lies in the fact that a body suddenly turns into an image, an inconstant image at that, bound to dissolve forever. It thus makes sense that primitive cultures sought to replace it with a durable image: an image that would make death comprehensible for the living. Picture-making was a counteraction against the passive suffering of death. Consequently, the enigma of the image lies in its capacity to turn *absence* into a borrowed *presence*. *Image-making* restored, as it were, the social order, repairing the disruption caused by death. On the other hand, when a body becomes an image we face an “ontological transformation,” as Louis Marin has termed it.<sup>5</sup> For the image is not a mere substitute, its presence is symbolic and therefore in a sense surpasses the presence of the living body. Through images and their

performance in rituals, the social realm is expanded, for dead members remain present in their image.

In Dante's *Divine Comedy*, the poet-narrator encounters the dead in images, but they are in fact images that he has created himself, poetic images that pretend to exist in an imagined other world. Like the images in the ancient poetry of Homer and Virgil, these images cannot be touched the way bodies can. Virgil describes Aeneas's desperation when he threw his arms in vain around his dead father and his father's "form ... fled from his hands" (*manus effugit imago*: *Aeneid* 6.700). In his encounter with his dead friend Casella, Dante himself laments over "shadows empty but in appearance" (*ombre vane, fuor che nell'aspett*: *Purgatorio* 2.67).

The boundary between body and image once was tantamount to the boundary between life and death. In Virgil's epic, the speaking images are disappointed when Aeneas misunderstands their "bodiless life" (*sine corpore vitas*: *Aeneid* 6.290-94). Ovid takes up this theme in his telling of the myth of Narcissus, when the nymph Echo deceives him with the "image of his own voice" (*imagine vocis*: *Metamorphoses* 3.385).<sup>6</sup> Narcissus, however, loves an unsubstantial hope "which is only shadow" (3.416). In this confusing interplay of perception and imagination, the shadows belong to the other side of the borderline between being and appearance. Dante knew the danger of crossing that line, and so he turned *transgression* into a vision of *transcendence*.

The film "La nouvelle vague" that Jean-Luc Godard presented in Cannes 1990, is a secret homage to Dante, whose first Canto is recited by a voice off-screen as the film begins. It is a story of love, death, and resurrection—or repetition ([Fig. 5.4](#)). In two scenes with fatal outcomes, the boundary between life and death coincides with the surface of a lake, a *Wasserspiegel* (water mirror), to use the German metaphor.<sup>7</sup> Here, the myth of Narcissus turns into a drama between two lovers that is repeated mirror-like. One lover is drowning before the eyes of the other, and initially with no help from the other. Above water, they are loving, weeping bodies, while under water they disappear like silent shadows into another

world. The surviving lover looks on motionless, while the other is drowning: *la main sort juste de l'eau, disparaît, réapparaît*, to quote Godard's description in the third scenario. The water closes over the disappearing body that loses contact with the world of the living, in which he will live on only as an image of memory; and out of that memory image he will be recognized when he returns again as the story repeats.

To sum up at this stage, it is the analogy between image and shadow, which consists in their mimetic relationship to the body, that leads Dante to consider, as a quite logical next step, the ontological difference between shadow and body, a difference that we, in today's media culture, so often tend to ignore. The dead no longer *throw* a shadow because they have become shadows themselves. What is true of the shadow is also true of the image: it cannot produce images of its own the way the body does, because it already *is* an image, and as such is different from a body. Dante, in his own body, is received into the world of shadows merely as a traveler from the world of the living.

The antithesis between his real body and the virtual bodies of the dead literally "comes to light" only when Dante, accompanied by Virgil, leaves the dark abyss of hell and steps into bright sunlight at the foot of the Mountain of Purgatory. Because the sun is at his back, he casts a shadow on the ground: "The sun ... was broken [*rotto*] before me," but not it was not "broken" before Virgil, who was walking by his side (Purg. 3.16). His guide therefore had to reassure him that he was still with him. Virgil reminds him that he has lost the "body ... within which I cast a shadow" (*facea ombra*: Purg. 3.26). Later, during the ascent of the mountain, the situation is reversed. Now it is the shadow souls who ask Dante in astonishment, "How it is that thou makest a wall of thyself to the sun" (*che fai di te parete al sol*: Purg. 26.22). Now it is the cast shadow that is the distinguishing mark of the solid body (*cosa salda*: Purg. 21.136). But what about those who do not cast a shadow? What does Dante see when his gaze falls upon Virgil?



Fig. 5.4. Jean-Luc Godard, page from the screen book for the film “La nouvelle vague,” 1990; lover with a drowning partner. From Jean-Luc Godard, *Jean-Luc Godard par Jean-Luc Godard*, Vol. 2: 1984–1998, ed. Alain Bergala, Cahiers du cinémas livres, 1998.

At this point, Dante becomes entangled in an unresolvable conflict between image theory and the theological doctrine of



the soul. Initially he plays it safe, leaving it to the pagan Virgil to answer the question about living shadows. Virgil warns him against trying to understand something that will forever remain one of God's secrets. God's creative *virtù* had created "bodies such as these" (*simili corpi*) or body images that could yet suffer and speak like bodies: with Virgil's words, Dante thus reminds the reader of the mirror in which our "image" moves with us as we stand before it (Purg. 25.26). The mirror image, a natural experience, is connected in Canto XXV of the *Purgatorio* with the creation of shadow bodies as a creative act of God. But as Etienne Gilson has shown in his study of this Canto, there is no room for shadows in the theological universe. They are in reality poetic creations that Dante has taken over from Virgil.

In this sense, Dante himself has become a "shadow painter," who admits to his own artist's pride and feels sympathy for the artists who are atoning for their arrogance in the lowest circle of the Mountain of Purgatory. There the painter Oderisio laments the "empty fame" (*vana gloria*) of human deeds, just as the poet Guido has deprived the other poets of the "glory of language" (Purg. 11.91). Only in the Hereafter are there images that surpass all mortal limits, for they are the product of a divine art. Thus the Angel of the Annunciation in a marble relief on the same level was depicted with such verisimilitude that he seemed to be speaking and no longer resembled "a silent image" (Purg. 10.39). Only God himself could fashion this "visible speech" (*visibile parlare*) in the visual arts (10.95). Dante is walking a very fine and dangerous line here in justifying his own poetic fiction by reference to a world of the Hereafter in which it is transformed into a supramundane reality.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, Dante creates shadows that mirror his own mental images, i.e. the images that fill his memory. This becomes most apparent whenever he recognizes a friend or a fellow citizen, long dead, from his features or from his voice. Such pictures are not physical in the common sense, but are hybrids that are immaterial and yet visible. The poet externalizes his own internal images when he talks with the shades of the dead. We are reminded of the photographs of



people whom we knew when they were alive, or, better, of videos where the deceased still see and speak. In the same way, memory invades Dante's shadows. In his case, however, the deceased live not in another time, but in the world hereafter. Still, Dante's invention is rooted in our self-experience, in the fact that we recognize people from pictures that we animate when we remember the ones who are represented.

Dante's image theory could not be ignored by contemporary painters, who were dealing with similar issues. They had to admit that their craft was, after all, the making of pictures that, as such, could never turn into real bodies. But for too long, Dante's importance for Italian painting has been seen mainly in illustrations of Dante's text, while mural painting received less attention, although it was here that the problems raised by Dante's image concepts emerged more emphatically and openly. However, Dante's shadow bodies could be avoided on murals so long as the painter was representing bodies of those who had died, as those bodies would reappear *after* the resurrection on the day of the Last Judgment. This was of course impossible for Dante, who could only describe his own fictitious journey.<sup>9</sup> But once Dante had brought the problem of image and body so masterfully to awareness, it remained. I shall therefore look at three painters who in their own work came to terms with Dante's image theory: namely, his fellow Florentines Giotto, Masaccio, and Michelangelo.

Vasari described Giotto as a friend of Dante's.<sup>10</sup> And from Dante himself we have the testimony of a famous *terza rima* about Giotto's fame (Purg. 11.94), which once triggered the writing of art history via Dante commentaries.<sup>11</sup> Giotto, however, seems to undercut Dante's separation of body and image when he depicts the corporeal world of objects and spaces so accurately that his figures appear like real bodies. In her history of space, Margaret Wertheim therefore sees Giotto as a painter of "physical space," of the body, while she thinks of Dante as a poet of "soul-space," which is a different world.<sup>12</sup> And yet, in spite of this difference and in spite of the otherness of the two artists' tasks (for Dante, souls in the

realm of shadows; for Giotto, bodies in Biblical history), we can detect a certain ambivalence in Giotto's technique that establishes an analogy.

Dante depicted living shadows with so many corporeal qualities that he at one point expressed his own, rhetorical wonderment at how it was possible that shadows could waste away. Giotto, on the other hand, enhances his body illusion to the point of deception and yet avoids shadows. Unlike real bodies, Giotto's figures cast no shadows. The rich orchestration of light and shade on the surface of the body ends where the body ends. What makes this phenomenon all the more striking is that Dante sees the cast shadow as the *only* evidence of a body. It is highly improbable that Giotto omitted shadows out of accident or ignorance. It is more likely that he is applying a dualism that Dante anticipated. The poet described an encounter between two contradictory beings: a corporeal narrator and mere body images of the dead. Giotto's figures, on the other hand, possess an intensified corporeality and yet at the same time are not in any sense real bodies. They thus bear a different kind of contradiction within themselves. One could think of Giotto as inverting Dante's equation of image and shadow (shadows not in the sense of a black surface, but in the sense of a doubling of the bodily form) to make the point that an image is and remains a shadow if one compares its substance with that of an actual body.

Giotto was eager to demonstrate the possibilities offered by his new, highly illusory style of painting, and finding a uniform language for dealing with the body would aid his cause. In the scene in which Mary Magdalene kneels before the risen Christ, he was dealing with three kinds of bodies, though he could not distinguish them as to kind in the scene: there were the living bodies of the woman and the guards, the body of the incorporeal angel, and, finally, the glorified body of Christ, who prevents the woman from touching his body (as do Homer's shadows in evading vain embraces) on the mysterious grounds that he had not yet gone to the Father (John 20:17). Mary Magdalene, however, was charged with telling the disciples that she had seen the Lord. The white color of the garments is in Giotto's rendering the sole

characteristic that distinguishes the heterogeneous bodies, which, incidentally, are similarly composed in terms of shading.<sup>13</sup>

Their philosophical analogy notwithstanding, illusion in the art of painting and shadow existence in the realm of the dead were different things, even for Dante. The illusory image of the painters could be heightened to the point of deception, and yet in spite—or perhaps because—of this, it remained, as illusion, a thing apart from the world of bodies. In a passage that anticipates Alberti's theory of art, Dante praises a depiction of Troy that he saw in Purgatory: "The dead seemed dead and the living living. He who saw the event in person could have seen no more than I saw." But Dante fictionalized painting by giving it in the Hereafter a status it did not have on earth, so that he could surpass it as a poet: "What master of brush or chisel could have portrayed the shapes and outlines here (*che ritraesse l'ombra e i trait*), that fill with wonder all who know the arts [of man]?" (Purg. 12.64). No living painter, of course, and yet Dante indicates the principle of Giotto's painting when he draws attention to the shading within the outline of the body as a contemporary practice in painting.

Cennino Cennini, who describes Giotto's technique in his studio manual,<sup>14</sup> calls shading (*ombrare*) the body a way of giving bodies flesh, and further emphasizes this point by speaking of the "incarnation" of the painted body. Nowhere, however, does he mention the cast shadow. What seems then to be a gap in Giotto's grammar, in fact is a deliberate response to Dante's picture theory. As Cennini says at the beginning of his treatise, painting depicts things "under the shadow of natural things" (*sotto l'ombra de naturali*), which means nothing more or less than that the painter's art is to produce shadow images.<sup>15</sup>

A century after Giotto, Masaccio again confronted the issue of body and image. Should he, a good Florentine, remain loyal to the tradition of Dante or perfect the body illusion by adding a cast shadow? The ontology of the image in the philosophical sense is something quite different from an artist's technique which aims to reproduce in pictorial perspective the

contingencies of the world.<sup>16</sup> Masaccio opted to surrender the image to perceived appearance, to the way of seeing that the laws of optics dictate. The perceived image would be a fictive perception of the world. The appearance of the image would leave behind in the beholder the impression that what he was seeing was not a picture, or was more than a picture. Aesthetics became a strategy of unmasking this appearance and revealing it as the self-reflection of the image. The immanence of Being and Appearance was marshaled against the transcendence of Life and Death.

Masaccio, accordingly, decided in favor of the cast shadow in his frescoes for the family chapel of the silk merchant Brancacci in the church of Santa Maria del Carmine in Florence (before 1428). The shadows that Adam and Eve cast are not true to their status as painted images, for they simulate real bodies, which, according to Dante, “make a wall to the sun.” However, the sunlight that breaks on their bodies is not generated within the painting itself but falls from the real chapel window, as though the light of the sky could continue on into the painting without obstacle. We see thus a fiction that ignores the boundary that separates the image from the beholder and his world. If the natural light turns into fictitious light, the fictitious body, in turn, becomes a real body, which can, therefore, cast a shadow. The two-fold fiction was necessary to justify this transgression.<sup>17</sup>

On the legendary wall in Corinth, it was a living body, standing apart from the wall, that cast its shadow *on the wall*. Now we see bodies casting shadows *in the wall*. Masaccio goes much further now than Greco-Roman *skiagraphia*, which had attempted to create fictive bodies through the play of shadows. In the Brancacci frescoes the line between the image and the body seems on the point of dissolving. The visual image has become capable of successfully simulating the body—a success that can be mathematically calculated and constructed (the archetype of our screen<sup>18</sup>)—and images begin to trespass into life. Now a medium of life, the image legitimizes itself through its technology of deception and no longer through its ability to evoke the remembrance of death. But for all that, Masaccio’s Adam and Eve have in their

expulsion from Paradise acquired *mortal* bodies ([Fig. 5.5](#)). They hasten toward their own death, which awaits them in the world. And it is because they are going to die that we must make images of them, by which we can remember them.

It is hardly a coincidence that Masaccio painted the rarely depicted shadow-healing of St. Peter, described in the Acts of the Apostles, immediately next to the window that shed its light on Adam and Eve ([Fig. 5.6](#)). According to the story, the sick and crippled were brought close to the Temple “so that even the shadow (*umbra*) of Peter might fall on one or another (*obumbraret*) as he passed by” and heal them. Here the shadow was not only an extension of Peter’s body, but also of his field of action.<sup>19</sup> The subject matter of course compelled Masaccio to depict the cast shadow, but his choice of the scene may also reflect his desire to create a preliminary opening here to a pictorial world that would make use of the same principle. For it is not only the two apostles—Peter and John—who cast shadows; the cripples do as well, and the balcony—as a *cosa salda*—likewise darkens the sunlight underneath its overhang. Leonardo, in the third book of his treatise on painting, notes that a shadow is the privation (*privatione*) of light and is therefore necessary to depict opaque and solid bodies convincingly (no. 111).<sup>20</sup> Vasari, finally, praises Masaccio’s verisimilitude: it was once necessary to say that a picture was painted, he wrote, but in Masaccio’s art things appear so “living, realistic, and natural” that they seem to be more than painting.<sup>21</sup> Over time the bodies in the image usurped the life of the bodies standing in front of the image.




Fig. 5.5. Masaccio (Maso di San Giovanni) (1401–1428), “The Expulsion from Paradise,” post-restoration. Brancacci Chapel, St. Maria del Carmine, Florence. Photo: Scala/Art Resource, NY.

We have reached a point now where Dante’s antithesis of image and body seems to have been abolished. Masaccio might respond to this charge by pointing out that Dante had sharpened the concept of the image in the same way that he sharpened the concept of the body: henceforth, an image had to first conjure up the fiction of a body; no longer would every representation automatically possess a body. Moreover, Dante



himself was working with the fiction of having encountered living images, which he called shadows and distinguished from his own body. What he had described in his journey into the Hereafter now finds expression in a this-worldly journey of images, where *trompe l'oeil*—and we may now think into the future, as far ahead as animation technology—will be continually demanded of the image. What had been a poetic vision in Dante now becomes a painted fiction, though the latter remains dependent on new privileges granted to it by a new understanding of art. Today we know that images unsettle our sure perception of the corporeal world. In fact, the closer they come to life, the more severely they can rattle us. Through their very fiction of life, they bring death into the world. But the “incarnation” that so profoundly affected the image had another modern consequence. It made impossible the depiction of the dead as supernatural, non-corporeal, and transcendent in their nature. A painting was now a unity, subject to the laws of empirical perception, and there was no longer any place in such a painting for two kinds of bodies; namely, actual corpses and bodies depicting the dead in another world. Painting had lost the capacity to operate on two levels. The dead could no longer appear as shadow souls in another world; instead, they could be held up to the gaze of the beholder only if they were depicted as corpses. The skull and the corpse confirmed the terrible face of death that the living confronted in the world. The skull was introduced in the Renaissance simultaneously with the lifelike portrait and as its indispensable pendant.<sup>22</sup> It was a perception of the immanent world that paintings now reproduced, as if they were painted mirrors. Death caught up with the portraits of the living, whose death, like their life, took place in the realm of the living; the artist could no longer follow them further, into the Hereafter. Art had lost its ability to transcend the boundaries of this world (though in time people found rhetorical and visionary fictions for doing so). Painting soon began to take the measure of the physical universe (the sky instead of heaven) as well. It had its limits, it seemed, and there was no way out.

In the end, the body drove shadow images out even from the Hereafter. Michelangelo's "Last Judgment," celebrated as the Renaissance answer to Dante's poetry, looks at the ontological question of image and death as it impacts the resurrected body.<sup>23</sup> Michelangelo had the advantage over Dante in that, as the recipient of a papal commission, he was privileged to compose a scenario depicting the absolute future when the shadow souls, having returned into their own bodies, would be visible as bodies and no longer as shadows. Such resurrected bodies, however, which had passed through death, called for images more corporeal than the human norm; that is, for images with an added measure of corporeality as if to balance their incorporeal appearance as shadow images. The first mention of the project, in February of 1534, speaks not of a Last Judgment, but of a "Resurrection," which puts the issue of the body—the eventual immortal body of the future dead—front and center.<sup>24</sup> Michelangelo, unlike modern artists, had the sanction of the Church for his artistic fiction, which meant of course that his vision rested on ground more solid than that of an artist's imagination. In his version of the graveyard, corpses emerge from their graves in front of our eyes, as it were, pushing their way out from under slabs of stone and unwinding themselves from their shrouds, and skeletons clothe themselves with new flesh ([Fig. 5.7](#)). They rise as muscular bodies in ecstatic movements of flight, movements that take place within physical space but seem also to transcend it. So aggressive did their corporeality seem to Michelangelo's contemporaries that they no longer saw these figures as belonging to the pictorial tradition of naked souls, but reacted to them as they would have to other naked bodies.




Fig. 5.6. Masaccio, "St. Peter Curing the Sick with His Shadow." Brancacci Chapel, S. Maria del Carmine, Florence. Photo: Scala/Art Resource, NY.

Images of bodies are unavoidably reminders of bodies, just as shadows presuppose a body that can cast a shadow. But Michelangelo, in an unprecedented tour de force, reversed the usual “model to copy” relationship by painting images of bodies that did not even exist yet. His *prospective bodies* anticipated a second creative act on the part of God by showing us *immortal* bodies, which for now could be depicted in painting only as virtual bodies. The artist’s role as imitator of the divine demiurge finds extraordinary expression—mixing pride and terror—in Michelangelo’s self-portrait that appears on the flayed skin of St. Bartholomew.<sup>25</sup> In one hand the apostle, whose skin has been restored after his resurrection, holds the knife that made him a martyr for his faith, while his other hand presents to our gaze his old skin and on it an image of the painter with flaccid, dead hands—a martyr to art. Michelangelo here succeeds in incorporating himself into the picture without presuming to give himself a resurrected body. His portrait on the flayed skin reminds us of the legend of Marsyas, the satyr who lost a flute-playing contest with Apollo and was punished for his hubris by being flayed alive. In Ovid, Marsyas turns into one giant wound and cries out to Apollo: “Why do you tear me from myself?” (*Quid me mihi detrahis*: Metamorphosis 6.385). What is at first a story about artists becomes a story about the body when the competition with a divine rival ends in the artist’s loss of his body. Michelangelo is here referring to Dante, who began the third book of the *Divine Comedy* by recalling the competition between Apollo and Marsyas (Paradiso 1.13). In this introduction Dante begs the god of the Muses for inspiration for his *ultimo lavoro*. The seventy-year-old painter appropriates Dante’s appeal by subtly turning the metaphor of Dante’s appeal into an image, whereby he calls upon the divine poet to aid him in his “final work.”<sup>26</sup>






Fig. 5.7. Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475–1564), “The Last Judgment,” detail: Resurrection of the Dead. Sistine Chapel, Vatican Palace. Photo: Scala/Art Resource, NY.

Like Dante, Michelangelo invoked poetic license for his vision, a liberty that freed him from the need to struggle with theological truths. His real struggle would be waged with Dante (Michelangelo had in fact devoted several sonnets to Dante), and so he introduced into his painting motifs from Dante that have no real bearing on his theological subject of divine judgment: motifs such as the boatman Charon, who ferries the dead to hell. They are poetic turns that refer to Dante without illustrating his Hereafter. Rather, Michelangelo invites the beholder to think of the painted panorama of his Hereafter as a poetic vision in the *sense* of the *Divine Comedy*. The artist’s contemporaries were well aware of this conceit. So much so that the “divine Aretino” in Venice offered, as a poet, to write a script for Michelangelo’s painting. Michelangelo turned down his offer with the excuse that his work was already half finished. Had he accepted he would have had to deny his own poetic ideas.<sup>27</sup>

After Dante, the images that lead us into the realm of death became images of the artist’s imagination. Whether in literature or painting, we would see death now through the

filter of art. What images might lack in truthfulness they would make up for with their fiction. And fiction there would always be, even when the art was at its least “artful,” when it tried to do no more than reflect empirical reality, as in a mirror. For the visual inspection by which we reassure ourselves about the world cannot be freed from the preconceived appearance that is already embedded in our gaze. Shadows, too, as soon as they move within our gaze, detach themselves from the bodies to which they belong. Even the bodies themselves do not appear to us in the way they *are*, but in the way we *see* them; that is, through our external gaze that we trustingly declare as fact.

Today, we have reached a new turning point, one that pushes the mainstream of art theory from premodern and modern times into the background. It is what Gottfried Boehm has called the “iconic turn” and Tom Mitchell the “pictorial turn.”<sup>28</sup> Our visual media have made necessary a return to picture theory as a guide into our new picture world. The matter becomes clear when we look at the “TV Dante” that Peter Greenaway, together with Tom Phillips, produced for London’s Channel 4 in 1990.<sup>29</sup> The *Divine Comedy* has been illustrated multiple times in the visual arts, but we encounter here the first translation of the poem into a medium of the digital age, namely TV. “TV Dante” blends spoken word, written text, a soundtrack, and the layering of multiform pictures on the screen. It is “technology as symptom and dream,” to quote the title of Robert D. Romanyshyn’s book. The result strikes us as more distant from Dante’s work and, paradoxically, also closer to the poet’s working style than any illustration ever done in a pictorial medium. More distant, because “TV Dante” no longer takes us to a superhuman and theological realm, but to a virtual world where shadows are produced by living actors. And closer to Dante, because we again are enveloped in a kind of hypertext in which narrative, commentary, vision, and imagination merge in such a way that we hear, read, and look at the same time, one picture blending into another, text and commentary merging, as does the visual with the aural.



The issue here is not whether Greenaway has produced the equal of Dante's text (anyway he went only as far as the first eight cantos of the "Inferno"). What interests me is what he can tell us about the nature of electronic pictures and how, in unexpected ways, they stimulate (and also simulate) our mental images. Their free flow contradicts the experience we have of reading a linear text. Visual technologies today not only rival the printed book but in a way surpass it, at least for a mass audience. The "TV Dante" comes closer to Dante's method of stimulating imagination than any printed edition ever has, but it nevertheless fails to transmit the complexity of Dante's thought. Only a close reading can accomplish that. Even the Florentine audience that listened to Dante's poem needed commentators. Peter Greenaway, however, uses a new visual grammar that is addressed specifically to a TV audience and so changes our perceptual experience. The commentary, for example, is provided by blending in pictures of speaking commentators. Media language of this kind was first analyzed by Marshall McLuhan, who began his exploration of media theory with a critique of the "Gutenberg Age." Its emphasis on the written word McLuhan saw as consonant with Reformation and Protestantism. By contrast, as he wrote in his 1970 *Counterblast*, "post-literate man" is guided by electronic communication."Print culture" isolated readers one from another, while the new media fuse the world into one consciousness and simultaneously blend all the senses. It is a theory that bears the unmistakable stamp of Catholicism, reminding us that McLuhan, who began his academic research with medieval manuscripts, was himself a Roman Catholic convert.

While the "TV Dante" still offers us the experience of images that are like shadows, they do not guide us to heaven and hell. They are shadows in a different sense, shadows that blur the clear boundaries between physical pictures and mental imagery. With their immaterial appearance, they create a world beyond, a virtual world that mirrors unexpectedly our mental world of imagination, dream, and memory with their unstable and disembodied motion. We often forget that we possess within ourselves a virtual world of images and therefore are able to dwell comfortably in the virtual world of the new

technologies. The analogy between the brain and virtuality rests in the virtual media's use of such techniques as editing and the recycling of video materials, a process first explained by the Korean-born video artist Nam June Paik.

This is a topic that Margaret Wertheim addressed, in a broader context, in her book *The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace*. Cyberspace, as she writes in her introduction, "is not a religious construct per se, but one way of understanding this new digital domain as an attempt to realize a technological substitute for the Christian space of heaven."<sup>30</sup> She does not speak of technology as such, but of our use of technology to create what borders on utopia and dream. This mysticism of cyberspace derives, she believes, from the "loss of any kind of spiritual space," after "we have mapped the physical universe at every level." Out there in space, there is no longer a place for a world of the "beyond" but only for a world of dust and gas. We have to admit at last that the transcendental world always has been the creation, or mirror, of our own mental world of beliefs and dreams. It comes as no surprise that Wertheim begins her book with a chapter on Dante's work in which, she says "body-space and soul-space mirror one another."<sup>31</sup>

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## The Transparency of the Medium: The Photographic Image

The photographic image is usually understood as either an *objet trouvé*, a thing that the camera finds in the world, or else as the product of a camera. In other words, a photograph is seen as is either a kind of replica of the world or else as an expression of the medium that created it, its boundaries defined by what technology accomplishes between the moment when the picture is snapped and the print produced. Some clarification is necessary, therefore, if we are to speak of photographic images in the anthropological sense; i.e., as images of memory and imagination with which we interpret the world, as we did with images before photography and as we do today with the products of digital technologies. It is, after all, not enough to say, as did Roland Barthes, that “every photograph is contingent” and can only depict what it encounters in the world.<sup>1</sup> In our gaze, the world is not pure contingency. It is—as Susan Sontag has said of photography—represented by images, including our own.<sup>2</sup> Images, as Villem Flusser has remarked, “interpose themselves between us and the world... . Instead of representing the world, they block it so as to make us a function of the images we create.” What is more, for Flusser the image ultimately ends up in what he calls

the “circular time of magic,” but he accords a different status to the technological image and thus to photography.<sup>3</sup> In what follows, I will—to a certain extent—challenge this distinction.

Barthes set out to find what he called the specific “evidence of photography”; that is, what distinguished it “from any other kind of image.” And yet he had to concede that the way in which he experienced time when looking at a photograph—that is, the paradoxical experiencing of a past time—was an anthropological experience that raised an old question, What is the “truth of the image” for the one who beholds it? That is why he sought out photographs of people he had known and of whom he already had an internal image that he could compare to the photograph. And in so doing he refuted his own assertion that photography was “an anthropologically new kind of object.” In the end he proposed to reflect “on the anthropological relationship between death and the new image ... which produces death while trying to preserve life.” He goes on to quote Maurice Blanchot’s observation that “the essence of the image consists in that hidden yet manifest absence-as-presence which constitutes the lure and the fascination of the Sirens.”<sup>4</sup>

Barthes did not develop an actual theory of photography; instead, almost against his will, he opened up the medial boundaries of photography, which so fascinated him, in such a way that it might be considered in the broadest context of the image. The collecting of photographs, their exchange, or their function as symbols of memory follow anthropological patterns for the use of the image that are far from new; namely, the use of the image as a means of taking possession of the world and making sense of it. It is from this perspective that I will approach the subject here. My intent is in no way to challenge the theories of photography which in their guise as theories of pictorial media have been most successful, but I do intend to take a different path. I want to relate photographs to the beholder and to life experiences and concerns that he expresses in images, in his own images, even when it is through photography that they are expressed.

When an image finds its way into this technological medium, it is a symbolic product of the imagination that has already come a long distance. To force the issue, one might say that what is at issue is the journey of the image to the photograph. From this perspective, photography, the quintessential modern medium, operates like a new mirror in which images of the world appear. Human perception has repeatedly accommodated itself to new pictorial technologies, but in keeping with its nature it transcends such medial boundaries. Like perception, images too are inherently intermedial. They transcend the various historical media that are invented for them, pitching their tent in one new medium after another and then moving on to the next. It would be a mistake to confuse the image with these media. For a medium is but an archive of dead images until we animate the images with our gaze. Photographic images likewise take their place in this ancient spectacle that we might see as a kind of ever-changing theater of images. In the course of this spectacle, many media have made their appearance on the stage, but it was always a limited engagement.

Like images in other media, photographs, too, symbolize our perception of the world and our remembrance of the world. The internal development that photography has undergone since its invention has in no way been inevitable, but is, rather, symptomatic of the free play that takes place as image and medium interact. The two have different origins: the medium as a technology and the image as the symbolic meaning of the medium. Modernity's conception of the world has changed fundamentally since the early years of photography. In the course of those years photography passed through a series of fashions: realism, naturalism, and symbolism.<sup>5</sup> Industrial society in the classic sense came and went. The photograph marched in step with this evolution, furnishing the mirrors in which contemporary beholders wished to look.

Flusser insisted on a rigid distinction between the old image and the technical image, but his distinction is in fact only meaningful when we see that it in fact distinguishes between image and medium. "Images are magical." They

belong to “a world in which everything is repeated” and therefore everything conforms to anthropological patterns. Distinct from this is the “historical linearity” of media and techniques. What the photographer “locks away in images” are his own concepts of the world, transmitted through the immanent technology. It is not the world *out there* that is real,” but the photograph, in which we internalize it. “Change is informative, the familiar is redundant.” Hence the challenge for the photographic is “to oppose the flood of redundancy with informative images.” Information, however, means information about the world, new information, that is, information that is guided by the technological capabilities of the camera. “To be in the photographic universe means to experience, to know, and to evaluate the world as a function of photographs.” Flusser’s “philosophy of photography” undertakes a “critique of functionalism in all its aspects—anthropological, scientific, political, and aesthetic.” His aim is to promote the freedom of the image against the tyranny of the photographic medium, “freedom to play against the apparatus.”<sup>6</sup> That is not the purpose of this essay. My intention in what follows is to retrace the interplay of image and medium in photography against the larger horizon of the image.

## The Image of the World

Photography was once considered the *vera icon* in modernity, a reputation that it has tried to justify ever since. But the “world out there” became increasingly suspect and uncertain as modernity unfolded, with the ultimate result that so-called reality no longer attracted the imagination. At that juncture there was no more use for photographic realism; that is, for capturing external reality. Every new technique looks old when its motives look old. Photography no longer shows us what the world is like, but what the world was like at a time when people still believed that they could possess it in the photograph. The contemporary gaze prefers to look at the imaginary, and pretty soon it looks even further afield at a virtual world, and as it follows this path the real world become nothing but an obstacle. Photography was once sold as reality.



But even then, it did not capture the reality of the world, but rather synchronized our gaze with the world: photography is our changing gaze upon the world—and sometimes a gaze upon our own gaze.

A new argument against photography alleges that it is merely a token of what is real.<sup>7</sup> This, too, photography can be: a copy or a kind of footprint of everything with which we ever have come into contact, the proof that such-and-such things and events must have existed when they were photographed. On the photographic plate, however, these things and events are torn away from the flow of life and “fixed” in an image that is like a left-over from past reality. But photography can only have this meaning if we are looking for a trace of reality. The loss of reference in today’s photography has its origins in our selves. We prefer to dream of virtual or unseen worlds—and also of the sort of shadows that no longer need a body in order to come into being.

Technology is willing. From the very beginning, photography was deployed against its pretended or real meaning. In fact, one can even use it to picture what cannot in fact be pictured but only imagined. It is useless to direct the camera at the world: there are no images out there. We make (or have) them always and ever only within ourselves. Hence the perpetual discord between pictorialism and documentarism, which like a swinging pendulum has driven the photographic image in pursuit of two different intentions: now the pursuit of beauty and now the quest for truth (now the subjective impression, now the objective record of the world).<sup>8</sup> When photography emulated painting, it did not do so merely via the rivalry with the other medium.<sup>9</sup> While acknowledging painting as its precursor in the business of image-making, photography did not imitate painting but only its chosen tried-and-true images. Instead of repeating here the old comparison with painting, which in the end only served to secure photography’s status as art, it makes more sense to probe the meaning that the photographic image possesses for its producers and beholders. That meaning could consist either in rescuing a pleasing image from the world, or, conversely, in analyzing the world through images. In the former case, the

world delivered the motive, in the latter, the image was the key to the world. The perception of the photographic image is substantially different in the two cases. If an image bears its meaning within itself, it is a composition. If on the other hand it shows us something of which our plain-and-simple vision is unconscious so that we are able to grasp the world with greater visual acuity than our eyes possess, then it is a medium that we interpose between ourselves and the world.

Photography constitutes a short episode in the old history of representation. But even so, the world changed in our eyes when it began to be photographed. “The world after photography,” as the American conceptual artist Robert Smithson calls it, turns into a kind of museum of itself.<sup>10</sup> Photography geometricizes, ranks, and classifies the world. Places become photographic places and as such are captured in the square of the print with no way out; what was observed by the camera at that moment is locked within a past time, as Régis Durand put it, following Smithson.<sup>11</sup> It is thus only logical that Smithson tried to create new places in nature instead of representing places. Today, we possess an archive of photographs that remind us not only of the time when the picture was taken but also of the motif; i.e., a person or thing that falls back into a lost time and ages along with time. The world quickly and thoroughly ceases to resemble the photograph, though it was taken, after all, for the very sake of resemblance. Only in photography does the world remain the way it once was.

In the days when photography was invented, the world already offered to the photographer two very different kinds of sights. There was the world of the present day of course. And then there was also the ancient world of geologists and archaeologists, in which structures might be thousands of years old when they were photographed for the first time. Maxime Du Camp turned to these monuments as his photographic subjects during the journey that he took to Egypt with Gustave Flaubert in 1850. Flaubert sent letters home, intending to publish a travel journal in which he would describe this exotic world that was as old as stone. In a letter to his mother, he wrote that “Max’s days are entirely absorbed

and consumed by photography.” Maxime Du Camp, he tells us, “used up his days documenting Egyptian monuments in photographs and compiling a beautiful album of them” (Fig. 6.1). Of the great Sphinx, which the two men approached impatiently on horseback, he wrote that “no drawing I know conveys an idea, but that will change now thanks to the excellent picture [*épreuve* in the dual sense of proof and print in French] that Maxime has made of it.”<sup>12</sup> The temple of Abu Simbel at which the camera was pointed in those days has been today rebuilt in a completely different location. The place we see in the picture no longer exists.

In photography the world becomes an archive of images. We chase after it like a phantom and yet possess it only in the images from which that world has always managed to escape. Photographic images, too, remain mute remains of our transitory gaze. We animate them only when they bring back our own memories. The gazes of two beholders looking at the same picture diverge where memory separates them. The remembering gaze of the current beholder is different from the remembered gaze that led to the photograph and is reified in it. But the aura of an unrepeatable time that has left its trace in the unrepeatable photograph leads to an animation all its own, which presupposes affective sympathy in the beholder. The difference between image and reality, wherein lies the mystery of absence made visible, is manifest in photography in the form of the distance, from us, of the time that the photograph post factum brings before our eyes. To be sure, we exchange in photography “the logic of mimesis and analogy, which is metaphorical in nature, with the logic of contact and the trace, which is of the nature of metonymy. And yet the photograph cannot be separated from the act that produced it, it is an *image-acte*; that is, a sharp incision in a spatial and temporal sense.”<sup>13</sup>

## Photography in the World

The place of the image in photography is certainly rife with questions, but there are just as many questions about where we should store or collect our photographs. We never know quite

what to do with them once they are printed. Should we set them up on a desk, hang them on the wall, paste them in an album to make a kind of visual journal? Rosalind Krauss reminds us that in the early period of photography, stereographic “views” were mass produced.<sup>14</sup> By 1857, the London Stereoscopic Company had sold 500,000 stereoscopes, and two years later it offered for sale more than 100,000 views. Campaigns were undertaken at the time to produce documentary photographs. Albums were a luxury item available only to commercial photographers, and it was not until the twentieth century that the reproduced photograph was introduced, which made it possible to disseminate large numbers of photographic images via the mass media, albeit as reproductions of themselves and in another medium. The illustrated magazine became the place for the public photograph, the album for the private photo. In public we see the photograph only in a secondary use, as a print or a filmed image.<sup>15</sup>




Fig. 6.1. Maxime Du Camp (1822–1894). Photograph of the westernmost Colossus of the Temple of Ra before sand was removed, 1850. Photo: Adoc-photos/Art Resource, NY.

The “Great American Magazine,” founded in 1936 and published under the title *Life*, shaped the photographic gaze of an entire generation with its unique brand of photojournalism. It reached a circulation of eight million, but in the end lost out to a younger medium—television. When it came to documenting the Vietnam War, the printed picture was simply too expensive and too slow. In 1972 *Life* ceased publication.<sup>16</sup> Television altered our perception of the individual photograph, for it was at one and the same time a kind of album in which pictures could be viewed and an archive in which they were stored, ready to be recalled. It was a passe-partout for transitory images, a wide open space that could accommodate a constant stream of ever-new pictures, which we did not keep and need not buy because they were offered to us and then immediately removed, as a package deal. The news became widely available, for free, nightly, and soon in real time. There was a fullness to its documentation that soon eclipsed the individual photo, which had to condense the totality of the information it conveyed into a single symbol. For the TV viewer there was no time in which a photo could exist by itself.<sup>17</sup>

Given this change in our way of perceiving, it was predictable that the photograph would find its way into the art museum. This process should not be confused with the old quest to make an art of photography. It was, rather, a retreat by photography into a place where it could avoid competition with the mass media. We look at photographs like we once looked at paintings, and in the same kinds of settings: on museum walls or reproduced in the pages of an exhibition catalogue. But this is not where the “forme tableau” of which Jean-François Chevrier speaks culminates.<sup>18</sup> That happens or, rather, that *is* the print itself, which is so representative of photography. In this transformation, from negative to paper print, the photograph hides itself like the fetish that it truly is. As an object (a paper print) it needs a place where it can rest



or hang, a place of storage. Not only does the old link between negative and positive—the evidence of an uninterrupted technical process—dissolve; but now we let the erstwhile photograph disappear both in its enlarged format in the museum and archived in digital data storage, where it “lies” ready to be retrieved and turned on. It seems as if the problem of the storage and presentation of photographs has been solved. Not only do photographs no longer portray the world, but we have decided to move them out of the world altogether, to hide them away in the black box of the database.<sup>19</sup>

We discover here the symbolic and sometimes magical aspects of our engagement with photographs. We conceal their physical existence as though we wanted to make of them immaterial images dwelling in our imagination. Since we tend to mistrust the real, we delude ourselves into believing that we can remove the old barrier that separates images of our own making into those that are visible and those that are invisible. Moreover, we are afraid that the photographic picture, as a proof of the world, might give us a bigger dose of reality (*Bonjour dans la Réalité*) than we are willing to swallow. Photography was and still is a marketplace where images are displayed and traded: both our own images and those that we receive from the world. This is the source of the ambivalence of gaze and subject, which cannot be abolished by any technique, by any pretense to objectivity, so long as it is we ourselves who wield the camera. For the most part we no longer ask what it is that photographs show us, because the “what” that concerns us now is the meaning of moving images (live images).

We would rather encounter in the photograph a world converted to an image, artfully staged. But this is more than an artistic strategy; it reflects the way we go about perceiving when we stand in front of an exhibited photograph. We search there for a mystery, one that would escape our customarily quick and superficial gaze. The photograph functions for us not so much as a document but as the reminder of our nearly lost sense that the world possesses hermetic meanings. This the photograph can act in two opposite ways: by either making a bold and deliberate theatrical gesture, or by taking an



unconventional look at subject matter that seems on the surface quite ordinary, chosen as if at random. In the process, photography itself becomes a form of remembrance. It recalls painting or theater—or indeed its own past, when it was still the *dernier cri* of pictorial media.

## Crossing Media

Photography did more than plagiarize or, to put it more mildly, assimilate aspects of painting—which painting did as well, in reverse—it actually borrowed the gaze of the other medium to endow its images with more depth and significance. And in so doing, it transcended the technical boundaries of the medium. In the early days of photography, Gustave Le Gray's seascapes appropriated the contemporary gaze that Romantic painting had cast on nature. Painting had monopolized the period eye for the rendering of natural scenes, until photography took the lead. Much the same holds for the portraiture of the period.<sup>20</sup> The pictorial media have always measured and defined themselves against one another, so as to pursue not merely reproduction but also the production of a gaze that both symbolized and shaped the perception of a given period.

We become conscious of our own gaze when we see a photograph in which several media overlap like strata in a sediment. André Kertész produced a series of still life photographs whose motifs derived from painting and which demand a gaze that is trained in painting. Sometimes, as in a 1951 photograph, he brought another genre into play and offered it for comparison, in this case juxtaposing an old landscape painting and a bowl with apples ([Fig. 6.2](#)).<sup>21</sup> He thus interposed between the painting and the still life a time gap that acts as a check on their being seen at the same time and in the same space. De facto we are looking at nothing but a photograph, and yet several pictorial media enter our gaze, among which painting (in the guise of a traditional easel picture) is only invoked as a view of itself, a picture *of* a picture and *in* a picture. We only use photography to recognize yet another medium in its mirror. The image that arises in the beholder transcends medial boundaries and is made up of a

synthesis of perceived image and remembered image. The primary and the secondary medium (the factual photograph and the quoted painting) liberate the image from the strictures of a single medium.

Thomas Struth's "Museum Photographs" represent the gaze that visitors cast on paintings in the museum. We look at people looking at pictures, people who in the process become themselves part of the picture. When we stand in front of Struth's photographs, which are in turn exhibited in museums, our gaze exerts a strong pull, summoning us in to take a position behind the beholders in the picture ([Fig. 6.3](#)). We communicate as much with those who are looking as with what they are looking at. This split second of hallucination, together with our loss of place, draws us into the free flow of images that are no longer enclosed in their media. One could sum up this experience with a formulation by the American painter Alex Katz: "The image comes before the painting."<sup>22</sup>



Fig. 6.2. André Kertész (1894–1985), "New York City, February 25, 1951." Photo: © Estate of André Kertész/Higher Pictures.



Fig. 6.3. Thomas Struth (b. 1954), "Art Institute of Chicago II, Chicago," from the series "Museum Photographs," 1990. Chromogenic print mounted to acrylic, 184.1 x 219 cm. Restricted gift of Susan and Lewis Manilow, 1991.28. The Art Institute of Chicago. Courtesy of The Art Institute of Chicago. Photo: Bob Hashimoto.



Fig. 6.4. Cindy Sherman, “Untitled,” 1980. Courtesy of the artist and Metro Pictures.

Cindy Sherman employed a similar intermedial strategy to draw the film experience of her beholders into their experience of her photographs and in doing so to confound and to explore the nature of the photographic gaze. Her “Untitled Film Stills,” created in the 1970s, are not, as one might think at first glance, stills from a film, but rather fictive, contrived stills that we nevertheless take to be images from a film.<sup>23</sup> They are staged as though they were shot on the set following scenario directions ([Fig. 6.4](#)). We cannot help animating them as the action of a film, which we supplement forwards and backwards from the depicted situation and interpret as a slice out of a continuum that cannot really be captured in a single photograph. To achieve this effect it matters that the artist behaves like an actress and not like a person posing for a portrait (that is to say, she seems to be posing for a film camera). More important, however, is the fact that the photograph employs a film cliché. We perceive photographs

differently than we do filmed images, and we assign to them representational tasks that are quite different. So much so that we do not need to see actual films to identify cinematic images. The mental image production (and image memory) of the beholders is deceived, confusing one medium for another, but at the same time affirming both of them by appropriating the images as their own vis-à-vis the contradiction between different media. In the process, the interaction of gaze and medium sets free images that no longer fit into any technical schema.

### Time in the Image

Photography reproduces the gaze that we cast upon the world, although we know that an unseeing camera; i.e., without gaze, has captured the image that we are seeing. To be sure, we know that the camera was operated by a photographer, who was guiding it with his gaze. But we would not hesitate to recognize a gaze in a photograph even if the camera's view of the world had been undirected, entirely random. We cannot but take a photograph for the medium of a gaze—not, in the first instance, our gaze, but the gaze of the photographer, which transfers itself onto our gaze when we stand before the finished picture. The symbolic act of perception in front of a photograph consists in an exchange of gazes. We recall the gaze, which is in turn recalled in the photograph. In this sense, photography is a medium between two gazes, and a part of this mediality consists in the time that lies between the recorded and the recognizing gaze. We see the world with the gaze of another, a past gaze, but we trust that it could also be our present gaze. The same world always looks different when it is seen at a different time. We look upon the world in an image that represents the same gaze with which we, too, experience the world. The difference is that it has now achieved permanence.

The interaction of gaze and medium, which translates a picture into a mental image, can be explained by way of two examples that capture time in very different ways. Although the technique employed in both photographs is very similar,

the nature of time as symbolized is virtually antithetical. Jacques Henri Lartigue's 1912 "Grand Prix Automobile Race" is a snapshot; it captures time, which we experience as the speed of the automobile exceeding the shutter speed of the camera (Fig 6.5).<sup>24</sup> A very different view of time is offered by the ward of the old Hospice of Beaune, in which Kertész photographed an elderly bedridden woman reading (Fig. 6.6). The photo was taken in 1928, but the bed dates to the Middle Ages.<sup>25</sup> Here we experience time as duration, which resides in the subject matter, and which borders on timelessness. As soon as we appropriate these two images as our own, they reveal a contradiction that transcends the technological parameters of the medium. The exposure times of the two photographs, as different as they may have been, do not account for this. Rather, it is solely the subject matter—"speed" or "stillness"—that the camera captures on the plate. The reason we see these two pictures as so different is not because they were photographed at different speeds, but because they possess in our memory and imagination a different quality of time; that is, in the one permanence and in the other its opposite. We have already stored in memory exaggerated duration and exaggerated brevity of time as images, and now we find them again in the photograph as easy-to-decipher memory images.




Fig. 6.5. Jacques Henri Lartigue, "Automobile Delage, Grand Prix de l'ACF, Juin 1912." Photograph by J. H. Lartigue © Ministère de la Culture–France/AAJHL.





Fig. 6.6. André Kertész, “Hospice de Beaune, France, 1929.”  
Photo © Estate of André Kertész/Higher Pictures.

Once death has taken hold of the memory in a photograph, the loss of time is absolute. Christopher Pinney in his book about Indian photography has reproduced the picture of a couple, perhaps taken on their wedding day and probably intended to serve as the model for a painting commemorating that event, an image in which the couple could live on forever ([Fig. 6.7](#)).<sup>26</sup> An image cannot die, and therefore lends permanence to the mortal body. In our case, however, the photograph is not the vehicle that will convey the couple into eternity, but merely a study that will enable a painter to produce a true-to-life portrait of them. In local tradition, painting evidently possessed a symbolic significance that photography, as a modern import, still had not acquired—this in spite of its early introduction to India. Consequently, the two media were accorded a different status. We thus encounter two different cultures of the gaze. Photographic time, which

documents the moment when the image was taken, and memory time, which is held fast in the couple's gaze, stand in contradiction to one another, a contradiction that surprises the Western beholder.




Fig. 6.7. Painted memorial image, together with the (inset) original photographic referent, ca. 1975. From Christopher Pinney, *Camera Indica: The Social Life of Indian Photographs*, Reaktion Books, 1997. Photo: Vijay Vyas (Saga Studio, 1996).



Fig. 6.8. Manoharlal Bharatiya worshipping a photograph of his father, 1991. From Christopher Pinney, *Camera Indica: The Social Life of Indian Photographs*, Reaktion Books, 1997. Photo: Christopher Pinney.

The relation between photography and painting, which converge in the gaze of memory, is, however, more complex than this description suggests. The couple, to whose gaze we are supposed to respond with our own gaze of memory, is not posing for a photograph, but for another medium, although photography in India was already recognized as a pictorial medium in its own right. In another example, taken from the same book, we see a man in front of a framed photograph of his deceased father, whom he honors with folded hands (Fig. 6.8).<sup>27</sup> His gaze is a gaze directed at the father. It is tantamount to an act of faith that accepts the father as present, in a ritual sense, in the photograph. What we see here is nothing other than the old cult of the image, transferred now into the medium of photography. Here is proof positive that a medium

can adapt to support the symbolic uses that we require of our images.

The intercultural function of photography is illustrated by a photograph that the Englishman William Johnson shot in 1863 of a group of Indian men.<sup>28</sup> Johnson's intent was to create an album of the "Oriental races," and it was for this purpose that the men were posing. They are not seen as individuals here but as representatives of a race. The backdrop against which they were photographed is in keeping with the custom at the time and reinforces the cliché that Johnson was after. That is also why he resorted to the unusual device of arranging his models to look like an ancient Indian book illumination: we see dignified men depicted in strict parallel to the picture plane, like the figures in a two-dimensional manuscript illumination. The picture creates a deliberate harmony between subject matter and style: we see Oriental men in the way that was customary in traditional art. The stereotypes are transferred to the modern medium, where they are, in essence, on loan. In order to produce a picture in the two-fold sense of an Indian motif and an Indian gaze upon the world, Johnson played down the new medium.

## The Gaze upon the World

We see images as they are brought forth by visual media, which succeed each other in history, giving way one to the next; but within the lifespan of a medium there are internal transformations as well. Moreover, the history of media is linked to the history of the gaze, which in turn can be read from this media history. Changes of media and changes of gaze have kept each other in motion. Perception, in terms of the styles and patterns to which we respond is shaped by the pictorial media to which humans are exposed in their time, but influence must travel in the other direction as well; that is to say, perception must influence media, however difficult this is to demonstrate. Images cannot impart authority to a gaze until that gaze seeks confirmation from them. The gaze that never rests and never repeats itself can change images even when all that it demands of them is an objective account of the world—

of the way it is. Reality, as is well known, is a construction of our own making.<sup>29</sup> Changes in the gaze produce change in the way people handle the media that they use, at a given time, to embody their images.

In the 1950s, the exhibition “The Family of Man” traveled around the world ([Fig. 6.9](#)). It was a project that Edward Steichen put together late in his life, and it purported to represent the final word in objective photography.<sup>30</sup> The exhibition’s credo was that the global solidarity of mankind might be illustrated by means of pictorial documentation that was absolutely true to life. The Magnum photographers who carried out the project also paid service to the illusion that it would be possible to explicate the world in a story told through photographs, a linear narrative. Each individual photograph would advance the pictorial story of humankind in an unbroken continuum. By achieving the ideal of a universal gaze by which to look at the world, photography would prove that it was indeed Truth.

This ideal provoked a polemical response from the photographer Robert Frank when, in 1955, he traveled the United States on a Guggenheim grant with the intention of creating a “pictorial report” on the country. The result was an extensive series of photographs made public not in an exhibition, but in a book entitled *The Americans*. It came out in 1959 (after some attempts to forestall the publication of such an unwelcome and critical view of the United States) and carried an introduction by Jack Kerouac.<sup>31</sup> Frank, who had himself contributed seven images to the exhibition “The Family of Man,” directed a subversive gaze at the United States, drawing its subculture into the harsh light of day. The world struck the artist as too complex to be represented in pictures that generalized reality. An example is one of his best-known photographs, which deconstructs the symbolic pretensions of the American flag ([Fig. 6.10](#)). It conceals, as it were, our view of two women who stand in the shadows behind their windows. The photograph casts a brutal gaze upon a banal setting—and yet it is a flawless photograph that reveals to us the dissonance between the image and the gaze. Any illusion we might have had that the image possesses a



single truth collapses upon itself. The world does not offer convenient, ready-made images ripe for the photographer's plucking. Images arise from a gaze that seeks a new and personal vision.

The camera is bound to what it is given, and what it is given is independent of our will. And yet our will is involved in picture-making, for the process is guided by our personal attention. Paradoxically our attention plays its most prominent role when photography is asked to provide an unvarnished look at what is real in the world. Photography's alleged ability to establish fact is a snare for the unwary in an allegedly incorruptible medium. Images ultimately appear ambivalent and can be misused, and this is no less true of photographic images. Here one need not even think of the ideological abuse that totalitarian regimes perpetrate by retouching official photographs, exploiting the "truthfulness" of the medium to conceal a lie.<sup>32</sup> Images can also contradict and make reference to one another, a phenomenon that in literature is referred to as intertextuality. We have seen how Robert Frank's series "The Americans" vies with other photographic projects to produce a credible "picture" of the American world.





Fig. 6.9. Ezra Stoller, “The Family of Man” exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1955. Ezra Stoller © Esto.

The impatience of those who look upon the world and hunt for what is genuine and has never before been seen, these were the forces that drove famous photojournalists to use their cameras like weapons to bag their prey. They were the heroes of the photographic adventure, until they were displaced by live news broadcasts. The metaphor of the hunt (for the picture) is already reflected in the expression that one “shoots” pictures. The traditional male role of bringing home the “kill” is thus revived in the photographic arena. In the famous picture that Erich Salomon took in 1931 of the French politician Aristide Briand, the latter thrusts his finger at the photographer, who has aimed his weapon at him, and calls him “Le Roi des Indiscrets” (the king of indiscretion), who has intruded unbidden into his protective sphere ([Fig. 6.11](#)). The drama that we witness here does indeed have the look of an encounter between hunter and hunted.<sup>33</sup>



Fig. 6.10. Robert Frank, “Parade—Hoboken, New Jersey,” 1955 © Robert Frank, from “The Americans.”

We find what might be termed a pendant to Salomon's image, albeit a thoroughly involuntary one, in the last picture taken by the Swedish photographer Leonardo Hendricksen. Here the roles of victim and perpetrator are reversed. During preparations for a military coup in Chile in 1973, the photographer raised his camera to photograph a soldier standing opposite him, and the soldier responded to this photographic trespass with a deadly shot that hit Hendricksen just as he snapped the picture. The photograph, in which rifle and camera (two weapons) are aimed at each other, thus records the final moment (the last gaze) in the life of the person who took it. The image-hunter lost his life in bagging the image.<sup>34</sup>

In his film "Blow Up" (1966), Michelangelo Antonioni filmed a scene in which a fashion photographer almost literally invades the body of a female model with his camera ([Fig. 6.12](#)). The photographer occupies a space that would be private if the so-called "model" were not offering her own body as the anonymous matter for his picture. In the film, the camera work makes unmistakable the analogy with a sexual assault. The photographer is not recording a body but rather making a conquest, capturing a series of photographs for which the body furnishes raw material. The photograph seizes mastery over its object. It rapes the world in order to transform it into a picture. In Salman Rushdie's words, the pornography in Lady Diana's death lay in the fact that she died during a sublimated sexual attack. By her flight she asserted her right to remain herself. She set out to escape her hunters, and so "she met her death."<sup>35</sup>



Fig. 6.11. Erich Salomon (1886–1944). Aristide Briand discovers the photographer who had procured for himself unauthorized admission to a reception at the Quai d’Orsay. Briand comments: “Ah, le voilà! Le roi des indiscrets!” Also pictured: Paul Reynaud, Alexandre Champetiers de Ribes, Edouard Herriot, and Léon Bérard. 1931. Berlinische Galerie, Berlin. Photo: Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/Art Resource, NY.

The picture-taker seems to lay claim to the right of being the only subject, and from that vantage point he directs his gaze upon the world. His claim rests on authorship, his personal power over the picture, whereby he makes himself an autonomous observer of the world. And yet he still depends on the reality of the motif and on the technical process of making the image, parts of the agenda without which any reproduction of the world would be impossible. The conflict between the gaze and its object is negotiated anew every time, for each picture. Authorship in image-making usually consists in the

author proving himself as either a visual artist or a storyteller. Given the indexical character of the photographic medium, the photographer's claim to authorship is not so clear-cut. That is why photographic artists have for generations sought liberation from the visual fact in an effort to detach the picture from its condition of being contingent upon the world. They deliberately stage the world so as to appropriate it for themselves not only as image, but also as subject matter for an image. In the process, the world becomes raw material for the imagination. But this change became possible only when photography questioned its status as index and began to explore its own character as a medium. In so doing it shed the quality that had separated it from the other arts.



Fig. 6.12. Michelangelo Antonioni, still from the film “Blowup,” 1967. BLOWUP © Turner Entertainment Co. A Warner Bros. Entertainment Company. All Rights Reserved.

### The Mise-en-Scène of the Gaze: Jeff Wall

According to Canadian artist Jeff Wall, the conceptual art of the 1960s was responsible for this shift. Until then,

photography “had not yet fulfilled the precondition of its self-dethronement or deconstruction, which the other arts had introduced as an element of their development.” In its flirtation with conceptual art, photography reintroduced to its own brand of image-making a new level of reflection and an open intentionality that enabled it to produce fiction, a capability that analogous media had long enjoyed.<sup>36</sup> In his lightbox pictures, which play photography off against painting and film, Wall carries on a dialogue with painting, photography’s precursor, and with film, which has to some degree become its heir.<sup>37</sup>



Fig. 6.13. Jeff Wall, “Eviction Struggle,” lightbox photograph, 1988/2004.

By transcending the boundaries that would separate these media, Wall triggers a migration of images, which he means to bring under his control. Their liberation is brought about by freeing them from the strictures imposed by any one medium. Painting lends its freedom to invent images to photography, which thereby loses its contingent indexicality. Film lends its power of narrative to photographs, which cease to resemble film stills and acquire the ability now to present an entire story in a single picture. The still image in Wall’s photos engages in a narrative competition with the moving image. “I am



interested in the play between what photography is and what appears as photography,” Wall said in an interview.<sup>38</sup> The “arrested movement has a heightened intensity compared to film.” The staging adds to the power of the photograph as image to the extent that it refuses to concede an unambiguous meaning to the narrated story (Fig. 6.13). “Only the play of the uncertain” constitutes the essence of the image, a criterion that Jeff Wall, incidentally, equates simply with the history of tableau composition in Western art.<sup>39</sup> The interaction of media results not only in photography’s drawing closer to other media; it also grants the beholder a new freedom to interchange the images he receives and those he projects onto a medium.

Wall’s well-known work “The Storyteller,” which he exhibited for the first time in 1986, uses his customary format: a large transparency mounted in a lightbox. The theme here is narration itself; namely storytelling about the world, an age-old domain of the image.<sup>40</sup> Native Americans from British Columbia are seated under a highway overpass in Vancouver, literally on the margins and in the shadows of the modern world, to tell stories from the world’s past. The spontaneity of Wall’s gaze is deceiving. In actuality, he proceeds like a film director. He “stages pictures to define the truth that lies behind images.” Or perhaps one should say rather that we are dealing with a truth that lies only in images. “Fiction is rehearsed to let the mute pictures speak. The main actors take their places.” The *mise-en-scène* becomes a “reconstruction of reality.” Every pose is part of a script. Wearing the mask of a neutral, technological medium, fiction is endowed with a subliminal truth for the simple reason that the eye of the beholder places its trust in the veracity of this medium. With this the photographic *gestus* makes itself independent. Because it can only show what exists in front of the camera, it produces reality in whatever way that reality came into being. The world must be staged so that it will deliver images that explain it. The female narrator, a storyteller who stands in the margin of the photographed scene, is both the embodiment and the living medium of the images that are created in his Jeff Wall’s narrative. In its telling, which we cannot hear but only observe



from a distance, the narrative engenders in the beholder images that are at home beyond the horizon of the photographed situation. What we see, the visual record within the photographic space, thus invites our imagination to transcend it.

### The Image as Question: Robert Frank

In his album-like autobiography, first published in 1972 under the title *The Lines of My Hand*, Robert Frank raises the issue of the image as he looks back over his own oeuvre as a photographer: “Thinking of a time that will never return. A book of photographs is looking at me.” At the time of writing he had not worked as a photographer for more than ten years, but had turned to filmmaking. At the end of the book he confesses that he did want not to remain an uninvolved observer behind the shutter release; he wanted to intervene actively in the picture that is happening “in front of the lens.” And yet his work as a film director was in the long term no solution but merely an escape into another medium.<sup>41</sup> In photography Frank had already begun to free himself from the constraints of the single picture by deconstructing it with a sort of rebellious abandon. He tore photographs, printed them repeatedly on the same sheet of paper, made them into collages, scratched writing into the negatives, arranged strips of contact sheet into picture stories that staged a personal story, which is what his photo biography actually did. The former photojournalist worked over his own oeuvre, editing it in ways similar to what video artists were doing at the time.

Some have seen Robert Frank as a representative of “subjective photography,” but in what follows the focus will not be on his photographic style, but rather on his conception of the image. It is a question that relates only obliquely to the art of photography. Rather, Frank’s reflections on the image explore the relationship between the medial image (the photograph) and the mental image (experience, feeling, and self-expression). He is interested in the transparency of photography for a different kind of image, one that has its locus in himself and in his imagination. The usual analogy of

picture and subject matter is replaced by an analogy of the picture and the image of the author, who symbolizes the world in gaze and image. To paraphrase the title of his autobiography, Frank sees his own photographs, taken over a period of more than two decades, as the lines of his hand.<sup>42</sup> In this staging, the images are given a melancholy animation. They return as images of a bygone gaze that Frank once directed at the world. Therein lies the admission that no gaze is repeatable. Frank could remember his own gaze only when he recognized it again in his old pictures. The pictures store the time of their making, initially in an invisible way, which then becomes visible when it is examined with the eyes of remembrance. In retrospect, the evolution of his photography mirrored his biographical evolution in the course of which his concept of the image changed. The first two-page spread in the book presents a collage of snapshots of deceased friends, whereby the memory images, like our own, present themselves in fluid transition from image to image, from person to person. The actual picture sequences then begin with a new selection of photographs from an early, private photobook titled *Black, White and Things* that Frank compiled in 1952. Only three copies were produced, each illustrated with original photographs; one copy he gave as a present to Edward Steichen.<sup>43</sup>

These pictures were followed in the book by a second retrospective, this one devoted to the famous series “The Americans.” Here, pictures alternate with contact strips from the series, which attest to the spontaneity of the photographing process that went into the project, revealing it as part and parcel of his ongoing life as he traveled around America. By means of montage and collage Frank detached these pictures from their connection to the 1959 photobook in which they were first published so that he now had them once again at his disposal. Next in the book, in chronological order, is the cycle “Bus Photographs” from 1958. These were taken at a time when Frank had grown disenchanted with the personal gaze and had taken refuge in the automatism of the camera, which he set up in a New York City bus and aimed blindly at the street as the bus passed by. The results attest in their own way

to the conflict between apparatus and gaze. What better way to demonstrate his struggle with a personal, signature perception of the world than by this self-denial whereby he seems to want to become no more than a moving camera? “These photographs represent my last project in photography,” he declared in a commentary written more than ten years later.<sup>44</sup> “When I selected the pictures and put them together I knew that I had come to the end of a chapter.” That is why the book closes with a look at the films that the author had since produced.

But the last two illustrated pages bring photography in again, through the back door. They show two panoramic views of the landscape in Nova Scotia, where Frank was living at the time. Each is made up of cut-and-pasted photographs, compositions that challenge the equation of image with gaze as much as the equation of image with subject matter.<sup>45</sup> To put it another way: Frank abolishes the equation of the photographic print with the image that is seen on it. Until 1952, Frank told an interviewer, he had continually tried to make a picture that would truly say it all.<sup>46</sup> But before long he found that he was not content to remain “dependent on that one, single photograph any more.” As he said elsewhere, “You have to evolve.”<sup>47</sup> So he furiously manipulated and edited his photos into collages and whole series “so I wouldn’t be stuck with that one image” that would forever remain a fragment left behind by the flow of memory and nothing more. “[F]or me, the picture has ceased to exist.”<sup>48</sup> This comment can only be understood if we read it in terms of the picture fetish that the camera produces. The animating gaze should keep its distance from the medium that reifies it. Frank thus works with his medium but against the tyranny of that medium. “There simply had to be a number of pictures present” so that an image could arise in the beholder. Although he declared that “pictures are a necessity,” “it depends on how you present them. Something has to be left for the beholder to do” so that he can recreate what the photographer experienced when he operated the camera.<sup>49</sup> In this scheme, the photograph becomes a medium in a new sense, mediating between the image in the producer and the image in the beholder.

The landscape in Nova Scotia with which the book ends recalls in this sense not merely a place in the world. Rather, it was intended “to show my interior against the landscape I’m in,” without, that is, Frank’s actually appearing in the picture in person.<sup>50</sup> The two views of the same bay, once in winter and once during the warm season of the year, both hold fast to the two vantage points from which Frank saw his subject. The same two panoramas open the updated edition his autobiography that Frank published almost two decades later, in 1989. But now the two photographs are set, like an objet trouvé from another time, within a picture frame that is hung from a clothesline along with the photographer’s calling card. In addition, the picture sequences in the 1989 edition present views of various installations (the photos serve here as a record) in which Frank exhibited and staged his own photographs. Prints of video images are now also included in the book, as are micro-histories, stories told in text and image, for which the book provides a biographical framework.

The question here is not whether Frank’s work is representative of photography; rather, I am interested in how Frank liberates the “image” from the rigid conception of what the photographic medium is. His undertaking culminates in the 1989 volume in a second picture with which he continues his autobiography. It comes from his 1977 series “Words, Nova Scotia.”<sup>51</sup> In this self-reflective picture, Frank invites the viewer to compare photography to writing. (Fig. 6.14). Even before our gaze reaches the landscape, it encounters in the middle of the picture an old photograph from “The Americans” next to a sheet of paper with “words” written on it. Both the photograph and the sheet of paper hang from the kind of line that is used to dry prints in the photo lab. In another pictures from the same series, two photographs of various dates hang in front of the same landscape. The sheet with the writing was originally also a photograph, taken before his departure from New York in December 1971 and betraying its origins in the darkroom by the fact that the “word” appears in white on a dark ground, like a negative.”<sup>52</sup> It is a picture in a both literal and a figurative sense, for writing is a picture of language: we do not see words, after all, but letters. The

individual written “word” here escapes the analogy of writing and content through the use of the plural form “words.” We see a single word, but it signifies an indefinite number of words.




Fig. 6.14. Robert Frank, “Mabou,” 1977 © Robert Frank.

In like manner, the “found photo” from the series “The Americans” fixes a moment that stands for many moments in the continuum of the pictures. We are looking at a picture of a photograph that recalls a moment from Frank’s 1950s trip through the United States. The picture of the word invites comparison with the picture of an old gaze. This dialogue points to the reification of what one sees or speaks: images and spoken words have become objects. Between a photograph and its presence as a picture lies a difference similar to that between writing and language. But in the case of the photograph there is no linear connection between the two media, even if the two are suspended on the same line of narration. The memory image from the America series remains, as a narrative, as ambiguous and dislocated as the writing with its vague collective term “words.” The old photograph has now for its part become subject matter for the camera. In the process the equation of gaze with medium, just

like the equation of image with print, is abolished. The intent behind this picture within a picture is the liberation of the image from the primary materiality and technology of the photographic medium. Reflecting on the image, even if it comes into being only through photographic means, opens up the boundaries of the photographic medium. We sense that we animate the medium, give it life, in order get our own images back from it.



## NOTES

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### A New Introduction for the English Reader

[1.](#) Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie. Entwürfe für eine Bildwissenschaft* (Munich: Fink Verlag 2001).

[2.](#) Coote and Shelton, eds., *Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992) 1–11.

[3.](#) Gebauer, “Überlegungen zur Anthropologie,” in Gebauer, ed., *Anthropologie* (Leipzig 1998) 7–21; Wulf and Kamper, *Logik und Leidenschaft. Erträge historischer Anthropologie* (Berlin: Reimer 2002) 1–8.

[4.](#) Schmitt, *Le corps, les rites, les rêves, le temps. Essais d'anthropologie médiévale* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2001); Augé, *An Anthropology for Contemporary Worlds* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999a [1994]).

[5.](#) Augé, *La Guerre des rêves. Exercices d'ethno-fiction* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997a); Gruzinski, *La guerre des images* (Paris: Fayard 1990).

[6.](#) Carlo Severi, “Pour une anthropologie des images,” *L'Homme. Revue française d'anthropologie* 165 (2003) 7–9.

[7.](#) Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris: Gallimard 1990) 349ff.; Vernant, *Figures, idoles, masques* (Paris: Julliard 1990) 13.

[8.](#) Vernant, *Figures, Idoles*, 25–30, 34–41.

[9.](#) Belting 2001, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 7–9, 11–18. Cf. Belting et al., *Quel Corps? Eine Frage der Repräsentation* (Munich: Fink Verlag 2002), ix–x (on the research program of the Karlsruhe group).

[10.](#) Hans Belting, “Aus dem Schatten des Todes. Bild und Körper in den Anfängen,” in Constantin von Barloewen, ed., *Der Tod in den Weltkulturen und Weltreligionen* (Munich: Diederichs 1996) 92–136. Cf. the revised and expanded version in Belting, *Bild-Anthropologie*, 2001, 143–88.

[11.](#) Baudrillard, *L'échange symbolique et la mort* (Paris: Gallimard 1976).

[12.](#) Debray, *Vie et mort de l'image. Une histoire du regard en Occident* (Paris: Gallimard 1992) 12, 16–41.

[13.](#) Bachelard, *La Terre et les rêveries du repos* (Paris: Corti 1948) 312.

[14.](#) Freedberg, *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989).

[15.](#) Bryson, “The Gaze and the Glance,” in Bryson, *Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1983) 87–132.

[16.](#) Debray, *Transmettre* (Paris: O. Jacob 1997).

[17.](#) Bernard Stiegler, “L'image discrète,” in Derrida and Stiegler, *Échographies de la télévision* (Paris: Galilée 1996) 165–82.

- [18.](#) Augé 1997b, 45–50, 91–110.
- [19.](#) Hans Belting, “Beyond Iconoclasm: N. J. Paik, The Zen Gaze, and the Escape from Representation,” in Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, ed., *Iconoclasm* (Cambridge: MIT Press 2002) 391–411.
- [20.](#) C. Bringuier, “La mystique du directe,” *Cahiers du Cinema*, April 1961, 30.
- [21.](#) Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994).
- [22.](#) Hans Belting, “Die Herausforderung der Bilder” (1ff.) and “Blickwechsel mit Bildern. Die Bildfrage als Körperfrage” (49ff.) in Belting, ed., *Bilderfragen. Die Bildwissenschaften im Aufbruch* (Munich: Fink Verlag 2007).
- [23.](#) Hans Belting, “Der Blick durch das Fenster. Fernblick oder Innenraum?” in K. Corsepius et al., *Opus Tessellatum. Modu und Grenzgänge der Kunstwissenschaft* (Olms, Hildesheim 2004) 17–31; and “Himmelsschau und Teleskop. Der Blick hinter den Horizont,” in Ph. Helas et al., *Bild/Geschichte. Festschrift Horst Bredekamp* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2007) 205–17.
- [24.](#) Belting, *Florenz und Bagdad. Eine westöstliche Geschichte des Blicks* (Munich: Beck Verlag 2008).
- [25.](#) Hans Belting, “Perspective: Arab Mathematics and Renaissance Western Art,” *European Review* 16, no. 2 (May 2008) 183–90.
- [26.](#) Hans Belting, *Das echte Bild. Bildfragen als Glaubensfragen* (Munich: Beck Verlag 2005).
- [27.](#) Hans Belting, “Image, Medium, Body: A New Approach to Iconology,” *Critical Inquiry* 31, no. 2 (Winter 2005) 302–19; “Toward an Anthropology of the Image,” in *Anthropologies of Art*, Mariet Westermann, ed., *Clark Studies in the Visual Arts* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2005) 41–58.

## Chapter 1. An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body

[1.](#) From a philosophical perspective: Scholz 1991; Barck 1990; Müller 1997; Hoffmann 1997; Recki and Wiesing 1997; Wiesing 1997; Brandt 1999; Steinbrenner-Winko 1997. From a more historical perspective: Barasch 1992; Marin 1993. From the perspective of technology and media history: Aumont 1990; Flusser 2000; Durand 1995; Sachs Hombach 1998. From the perspective of art history and iconology: Panofsky 1939; Kaemmerling 1979; Mitchell 1994a; but also Oexle 1997; Gombrich 1960 and 1999. See also Belting and Kruse 1994; Stoichita 1997a. For general analyses and interdisciplinary questions, see Didi-Huberman 1990; *Destins de l'image* 1991; Gauthier 1993; and above all the contributions in Boehm 1994 (including his own essays). See also Debray 1992. On “visual culture,” see Mitchell 1994; Bryson, ed. 1994. On the image in the natural sciences, see note 29 below. From the perspective of media history: Crary 1996; Stafford 1996; Breidbach-Clausberg, ed. 1999.

[2.](#) See Chapter 2: “The Locus of Images.” For an anthropological perspective that is close to my own, see especially Freedberg 1989; Didi-Huberman 1996, 1998; Macho 1996b, 1999; Reck 1996; and within the narrower confines of the discipline of anthropology, especially Turner 1987; Gruzinski 1990; Augé 1999a, 1999b; as well as Plessner 1982. See also Müller-Funk and Reck, ed. 1996.

[3.](#) I owe this expression, with its implicit polemic against a metaphysics of the image, to conversations with P. Weibel. See also W. Seitter, *Physik des Daseins* (Vienna 1997).

[4.](#) Stiegler 1996, 182.

[5.](#) On this see Schlosser 1993, 119–20, who refers to Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851) § 209. German idealism has left behind a potent tradition in the concept of the image.

[6.](#) U. Fleckner, ed., *Die Schatzkammern der Mnemosyne* (Dresden 1995), with a collection of texts about memory theory. See also the works of A. and J. Assmann on this topic, and, with respect to Plato’s theory, Därmann 1995, 19ff.

[7.](#) The discussion of media is still highly fragmented. See the works of Rötzer 1991; McLuhan 1996 (Benedetti and DeHart, eds. 1997); Reck 1996; Faulstich 1997, 1998; Bredekamp 1997; Boehm 1999; Spielmann-Winter 1999. On the body as a determinative part of the self, see M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith, trans. (New York 1962), 178ff. and *Das Auge und der Geist* (Hamburg 1964), 13ff.

[8.](#) On this see Eco 1976; Scholz 1991; Schäfer-Wimmer, ed. 1999; Kaemmerling, ed. 1979; M. Iversion, “Models for a Semiotics of Visual Art,” in A. Rees and F. Borzello, ed., *The New Art History* (London 1986); G. Mayo, ed., *The Verbal and Signal Sign* (Word and Image 6.3, 1990); M. Schapiro in Boehm 1994, 253ff.

[9.](#) Panofsky 1939; Panofsky in Kaemmerling 1979, 207ff.

[10.](#) Mitchell 1986; 1994a, 4 and 11ff.

[11.](#) Hetzer 1998, 27ff.

[12.](#) Diers 1997, 30–31. See C. Schoell-Glass, “A. Warburg’s Late Comments on Symbol and Ritual,” *Science in Context* 12/4 (1999): 621ff. See also Warburg 1991, with additional literature.

[13.](#) See the new edition of the text in Warburg 1979, 401ff. and esp. 414.

[14.](#) See E. Cassirer in *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* 1, 1921–1922 (Leipzig 1923):11ff. On Cassirer, see P. A. Schilp, ed., *Ernst Cassirer* (Stuttgart 1966), and the volume *Science in Context* 12/4 (1999), which is devoted to Cassirer.

[15.](#) See note 6.

[16.](#) See Chapter 4, “Image and Death.”

[17.](#) Didi-Huberman 1994, 383ff.

[18.](#) Baudrillard 1976; 1981. For a different discourse within the theme of virtuality, see Barck, ed. 1990; Flessner, ed. 1997; Flusser 1995; Grau 1999; Kittler 1990; Krämer 1997; Quéau 1993; Reck 1997.

[19.](#) R. Bellour in Sansonow-Alliez 1999, 79; E. Alliez, *ibid.*, 21f.

[20.](#) Derrida 2002, 31ff., esp. 38.

[21.](#) On this see Augé 1997a, 82ff., esp. 102ff. (the chapter “From Narrative to the All-Fictional”).

[22.](#) Derrida 2002, 11ff., with a distinction between “artifactuality” (*artefactualité*) and “actuvirtuality” (*actuvirtualité*).

[23.](#) On this see the literature in notes 1 and 8.

[24.](#) See note 6 and H. Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York 1971), with a philosophical-historical critique of this dualism.

[25.](#) On this see, at one end of the range of methodologies, Augé 1999b, 26ff., and on the other end, Derrida 1996 and Stiegler 1996.

[26.](#) Breidbach 1999, 107ff.; Breidbach and Clausberg, ed. 1999.

[27.](#) Elkins 1996, 553ff. See Jones and Gallison, ed. 1998; Weibel 1995, 34ff.; Breidbach and Clausberg, ed. 1999, with several essays on methodology; Sachs-Hombach and Rehkämper, ed. 1998.

[28.](#) This situation was already pondered by Plato (Därman 1995), who decided in favor of the living medium that is capable of its own recollection and against the dead media of writing and painting: on this see Chapter 4 “Image and Death”: Plato’s Critique of the Image.

[29.](#) Philosophical anthropology in the Kantian sense, medical anthropology, and the anthropology of other peoples (see, however, its revision at the hands of J. Clifford and M. Augé, who advocate an ethnology of Western culture) have become recognized disciplines that defend their turf. To this we must add “cultural anthropology” as articulated by American scholars (Coote and Shelton, ed. 1992 and Marcus and Myers, ed. 1995). On historical anthropology, see note 34; on my personal preference, note 2. The position of A. Gehlens (1961) still requires further development. For a general overview of the situation within anthropological research today, see Affergan 1997 and Augé 1999a. For a look back over the changes in ethnological research and scholarship, see the autobiography of Geertz (1995). See also Müller-Funk and Reck, ed. (1996) for a historical anthropology of media.

[30.](#) On this see already Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms (note 16).

[31.](#) On historical anthropology or cultural anthropology in its European incarnation in recent years, see above all Plessner 1982; Marschall, ed. 1990; Süssmuth, ed. 1984; Kamper and Wulf, ed. 1994; Gebauer, ed. 1998, and Gebauer and Kamper, ed. 1989; and the publications of the Special Research Division “Anthropologie der Literaturwissenschaften” in Koblenz.

[32.](#) See Chapter 4, “Image and Death.”

[33.](#) See the epilogue on photography in Chapter 4, “Image and Death.”

[34.](#) On the mirror, see Baltrusaitis 1986; Haubl 1991. The mirror was a privileged medium already in Egyptian culture and then in Greek culture, beginning in the sixth century BCE. See also Marin 1993, 40ff. On the topic of Narcissus, see Belting 1995b and Belting 2008, 246ff. (the chapter “The New Narcissus”).

[35.](#) See Chapter 4, “Image and Death,” with note 86.

[36.](#) McLuhan 1964; 1997, 45ff.

[37.](#) Kubler 1962.

[38.](#) Kerckhove 1995, 45ff. See also Dencker, ed. 1995; Kittler et al., ed. 1994; McLuhan 1962; Vattimo and Welsch, ed. 1997.

[39.](#) McLuhan 1964 and Benedetti and DeHart, eds. 1997. McLuhan took the lead in looking at media in this way.

[40.](#) On this see Augé 1999b, 82ff.; Caillois 1987, 17ff.; and, of course, the works of Lacan (e.g., Lacan 1977). Within ethnology, see the work of Lévi-Strauss (1955 and 1958); in psychoanalysis, see the volume *Destins de l'image* (1991).

[41.](#) On the medium in spiritual séances, see W.H.C., *Kontakte mit dem Jenseits?* (Berlin 1973); W. Horkel, *Geist und Geister: Zum Problem des Spiritismus* (Stuttgart, 1963); F. W. Haack, *Spiritismus* (Munich 1988), and the catalogue *Victor Hugo et le Spiritisme* (Paris 1985). Necromancy in other cultures requires a different discourse altogether.

[42.](#) The “here and now” was demonstrated above all by Walter Benjamin for the artwork and its aura, from which he distinguished the modern mass media. In the case of the image, the situation—as I hope to show—is different, as it is found in the dialogue between the medium and the observer, through which the “here and now” is created in the first place. On the question of visibility and touchability, see M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible: followed by Working Notes*, Alphonso Lingis, trans. (Evanston 1968), as well as the literature in note 8.

[43.](#) Belting 1994, 297ff., 436ff.

[44.](#) Debray 2004 (English trans. of Debray 1997) 1ff. (Chapter: “The Medium’s Two Bodies”).

[45.](#) Freedberg 1989, 54ff.; Belting and Kruse 1994, 146ff.; Besançon 1994, 253ff.; Gamboni 1997.

[46.](#) D. Rosand, *Painting in Cinquecento Venice* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1982), 16ff.

[47.](#) C. Greenberg, *Art and Culture* (Boston 1961), 3ff. (“Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” 1939). On this see Belting 2001, 366ff.

[48.](#) Thevoz 1985; G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, “Das Jahr Null. Die Erschaffung des Gesichts,” in Deleuze and Guattari, ed., *Tausend Plateaus* (Berlin 1992), 229ff.; G. von Wysocki, *Fremde Bühnen. Mitteilungen über das menschliche Gesicht* (Hamburg 1995). See also notes 58, 60, and 61.

[49.](#) Lévi-Strauss 1955 [English 1973], and 1958 [English 1963].

[50.](#) A. Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, Anna Bostock Berger, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993).

[51.](#) Macho 1986, 95 ff.; 1996b, 87ff.; 1999, 121ff.

- [52.](#) Macho 1996b, 100f.
- [53.](#) P. Lunenfeld in *Ausstellungskatalog. Fotografie nach der Fotografie* (1995), 94.
- [54.](#) That is why one often comes across the thesis of a “beyond the image.” It is evident that the concept of the image is not secure enough for there to be consensus about its use.
- [55.](#) Manovich 1996, 132, 135.
- [56.](#) E. Alliez in Samsonow and Alliez 1999, 7, 17.
- [57.](#) R. Bellour in Samsonow and Alliez 1999, 80f., 86.
- [58.](#) Ibid., 93f.
- [59.](#) Stiegler 1996, 165ff.
- [60.](#) Flusser 2000; 1995, 81ff.
- [61.](#) Didi-Huberman 1997.
- [62.](#) H. L. Kessler and G. Wolf, eds., *The Holy Face and the Paradox of Representation* (Bologna 1998).
- [63.](#) Manovich 1996, 124ff.
- [64.](#) Panofsky 1991.
- [65.](#) On this see Belting 1996b. On the media history of film see the representative anthology of Segeberg 1996.
- [66.](#) R. Bellour in Samsonow and Alliez 1999, 124.
- [67.](#) Deleuze 1990; 1991. On the sensory-motor problem from the art historical perspective, see E. H. Gombrich, “Standards of truth: The arrested image and the moving eye,” *Critical Inquiry* 7.2 (1980):237ff.
- [68.](#) Manovich 1996, 130ff.
- [69.](#) Bill Viola, *Unseen Images* (catalogue, Düsseldorf 1992), 130; Belting 1995a, 94ff. On the installation as an image type, see Belting 1998b, 462ff. On Viola’s interview with J. Zutter see B. Viola, *Reasons for Knocking at an Empty House: Writings 1973–94*, R. Violette, ed. (London 1995) 239ff.
- [70.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 555–56.
- [71.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 484ff. See also I. von zur Mühlen, *Bild und Vision. P. P. Rubens und der ‘Pinzel Gottes’* (Frankfurt am Main 1998).
- [72.](#) Galassi 1981.
- [73.](#) Durand 1995, 123ff.
- [74.](#) Reprinted in Benedetti and DeHart, eds. 1997.
- [75.](#) Belting 1998b, 37ff., 388ff.
- [76.](#) U. Raulff, ed., *A. M. Warburg. Schlangenritual. Ein Reisebericht* (Berlin 1988) 16f., 54ff., 65. Originally: “A Lecture on Serpent Ritual,” *Journal of the Warburg Institute* 2/4 (1938):277–92.
- [77.](#) Gruzinski 1990, 26ff.
- [78.](#) Ibid., 66ff., 76ff.
- [79.](#) Ibid., 83.



## Chapter 2. The Locus of Images: The Living Body

[1.](#) Kamper and Wulf, eds. 1994; Gebauer, ed. 1998; Geertz 1995; Augé 1999a; Coote-Shelton, ed. 1992.

[2.](#) Proust's madeleine is the most often-cited example of a trigger that summons up the recollection of an image. See also note 29. On ephemeral images, see Chapter 1, "An Anthropology of Images."

[3.](#) On this topic, see Stiegler 1996, 165ff.

[4.](#) On analysis and synthesis, see Chapter 1.

[5.](#) On this see Belting and Haustein 1998, 7ff.; Belting 1996b, 214ff.; Hörning and Winter (as note 8), 393ff., with contributions by S. Hall, D. Morley, J. Clifford, and I. Chambers.

[6.](#) On transmission, see Debray 1997. On the afterlife of collective memory, see the anthropological studies by E. B. Tylor (e.g., *Anahuac, or: Mexico and the Mexicans, Ancient and Modern*, London 1861), and the works of A. Warburg and his *Atlas Mnemosyne*. On the theme of the afterlife in pagan antiquity, see most recently H. Bredekamp and M. Diers, eds., *Aby Warburg. Die Erneuerung der heidnischen Antike* (Berlin, 1998). Incidentally, the afterlife of collective memory also became a theme of ethnology (*Volkskunde*).

[7.](#) See note 2.

[8.](#) On this see Belting, "Naipaul's Trinidad," in Belting and Haustein 1998, 42ff., and S. Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands* (London 1991). See also S. Hall, "Kulturelle Identität und Globalisierung," in K. H. Hörning and R. Winter, eds., *Widerspenstige Kulturen*, Frankfurt-am-Main 1999), 393ff., 434ff.

[9.](#) Augé 1999b, 4ff.

[10.](#) Augé 1999b, 27.

[11.](#) Augé 1999b, 58–59; S. Gruzinski in J. M. Sallmann, *Visions indiennes, Visions baroques: les métissages de l'inconscient* (Paris 1992). See also Gruzinski 1990.

[12.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, *passim*.

[13.](#) The virtual museum is an allegory, as it were, of the museum of old. See the contributions in Dencker, ed. 1995 and Breidbach and Clausberg, ed. 1999. On the new situation of museums, see also P. Jeudy, *Die Welt als Museum* (Berlin 1987) and Belting 1996b, 216ff.

[14.](#) H. von Amelnunxen and U. Pohlmann, ed., *Les lieux du Non-lieu. Eine Bestandsaufnahme der zeitgenössischen französischen Fotografie* (Dresden 1997).

[15.](#) Augé 1994, 44ff.

[16.](#) P. Nora, *Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis* (Berlin, 1990) 11ff., and *idem* in U. Fleckner, ed., *Die Schatzkammern der Mnemosyne* (Dresden 1995) 310 ff.; P. Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, with a foreword by Larence D. Kritzman; Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (New York 1996–1998).

[17.](#) J. Meyrowitz, *Die Fernseh-Gesellschaft. Wirklichkeit und Identität im Medienzeitalter* (Weinheim 1987) 112f. See also D. Morley, "Wo das Globale auf das Lokale trifft," in Hörning and Winter (as note 8), esp. 452ff.

[18.](#) Augé 1995, 1999a; Affergan 1997.

[19.](#) The phrase “global village,” which was coined by M. McLuhan, is increasingly challenged by local counter-movements. On the theme of the “translator,” see Rushdie (note 8).

[20.](#) M. Augé, *In the Metro*. Translated with an introduction and afterword by Tom Conley (Minneapolis 2002), 4.

[21.](#) M. Foucault, “*Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias*.” *Rethinking Architecture*, ed. E. Leach (London 1997). An English translation is also available on the Internet at: [foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html](http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html). This is the version used here.

[22.](#) I. Calvino, *Invisible Cities*, translated and introduced by William Weaver (San Francisco 1999).

[23.](#) On the theme of Arcadia, see W. Iser, *Spensers Arkadien* (Cologne 1970) and idem, *Das Fiktive und das Imaginäre* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1991).

[24.](#) J. Ruskin, *Modern Painters* (1840ff.). (New edition in *Complete Works of J. Ruskin*, vols. 3–7 [London 1999]).

[25.](#) S. Sontag, *On Photography* (New York 1973; 3rd ed. 1977) 51ff., 153ff.

[26.](#) E. Edwards, ed., *Anthropology and Photography* (New Haven, CT 1992), especially the contributions by C. Pinney and B. Street.

[27.](#) For a detailed discussion, see Belting 2003.

[28.](#) On this see note 7 in Chapter 1, “An Anthropology of Images,” and Chapter 4, “Image and Death,” the section titled “Plato’s Critique of the Image.”

[29.](#) F. A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (Chicago 1966); Belting 1989, on the tree of life in Santa Croce, Florence as a visualized *Ars Memoriae*. On memory in contemporary art, see K. H. Hemken, ed., *Gedächtnisbilder* (Leipzig 1996).

[30.](#) See note 16.

[31.](#) Foucault (as note 21).

[32.](#) Augé 1999b, 2ff., 118ff.

[33.](#) R. E. Strasberg, *Inscribed Landscapes: Travel Writing from Imperial China* (Berkeley, CA 1996).

[34.](#) References to China with additional literature in Strasberg (note 33). On modernday tourism, see M. Augé, *L'impossible voyage. Le tourisme et ses images* (Paris 1997b).

[35.](#) On the means by which dreams are depicted: S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. J. Crick, with an introduction and notes by Ritchie Robertson (Oxford 1999) 236ff., 254ff.

[36.](#) S. Freud, *Die Traumdeutung* (Frankfurt am Main 1972), 38 f., 41 (the Padua episode); *Interpretation of Dreams* (as note 35), 14 (note that the English edition does not contain the passage on the Padua episode).

[37.](#) Augé 1997a, 48.

[38.](#) Augé 1999b, 54.

[39.](#) Augé 1999b, 59ff; E. Benz, *Die Vision. Erfahrungsformen und Bilderwelt* (Stuttgart 1969).

[40.](#) Gruzinski 1990, 166–67.

[41.](#) M. Meiss, *Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death* (Princeton 1951); S. Ringborn, *Icon to Narrative* (Abo 1965), 18ff; Belting 1990, 56f., 71f., 165.

[42.](#) Stoichita 1995, *passim*.

[43.](#) C. Adam and P. Tannery, ed., *Oeuvres de Descartes*, vol. 10 (Paris 1986), 179ff. (esp. 184–85), based on the text of A. Baillet, *Vie de M. Descartes* (1691); D. L. Sepper, *Descartes' Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking* (Berkeley, CA 1996) 1ff. and esp. 72ff.; R. Zons, “De(s)c(k)art(e)s Träume. Die Philosophie des Bladerunner, in *Ohne Spiegel leben. Sichtbarkeiten und posthumane Menschenbilder*, M. Fassler, ed. (Munich 2000) 271ff.

[44.](#) W. Iser, *Das Fiktive and das Imaginäre. Perspektiven literarischer Anthropologie* (Frankfurt am Main 1991) 292 ff., 377ff.

[45.](#) Augé 1997b, 132ff., esp. 137, 143 (“The Screen Phase”), with his reading of C. Metz, *Le signifiant imaginaire* (Paris 1997).

[46.](#) Augé 1999b, 97ff.

[47.](#) Augé 1999b, 97–99.

[48.](#) See Th. Kellein, *Hiroshi Sugimoto. Time Exposed* (Basel 1995) 30ff.; P. H. Halpert, “The Blank Screens of H. Sugimoto,” *Art Press* 196 (1994):51ff.; H. Belting, “The Theater of Illusions,” in H. Sugimoto, *Theaters* (New York 2000).

[49.](#) Quotes from H. Belting in conversation with A. Bonnet, “Histoires d’Images,” in *Le Siècle de Jean-Luc Godard. Guide pour ‘Histoire(s) du Cinéma,’* special edition of *Art Press* (November 1998), 60ff.

[50.](#) M. Augé in *Le Siècle de Jean-Luc Godard* (as note 49) 83f.

[51.](#) The title of Augé’s 1997a book.

[52.](#) Ibid., 102ff.

[53.](#) Ibid., 119.

[54.](#) Pinney 1997, 126.

[55.](#) A. C. Danto, *After the End of Art* (Princeton, NJ 1997), xiff. and cover illustration.

[56.](#) Exhibition catalogue, *Fotografie nach der Fotografie* (1995), 301.

[57.](#) Wertheim 1999, 223ff.

[58.](#) Ibid. 236.

[59.](#) W. Gibson, *Neuromancer* (New York 1984), 5. See Wertheim 1999, 25, 230ff.

[60.](#) S. Turkle, *Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of Internet* (New York 1995).

[61.](#) Wertheim 1999, 27ff.

### Chapter 3. The Coat of Arms and the Portrait: Two Media of the Body

[1.](#) On this see G. Kamper and Wulf, ed. 1982, 313ff. On the image of the body and man, see Chapter 4, “Image and Death.”

[2.](#) M. Warnke, *The Court Artist: On the Ancestry of the Modern Artist*, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge 1993); Belting and Kruse 1994, 40ff. On the portrait in general, see G. Boehm, *Bildnis und Individuum* (Munich 1985), esp. on the Italian Renaissance portrait; A. Gentili, ed., *Il ritratto e la memoria* (Rome 1989); R. Brilliant, *Portraiture* (London 1991); L. Campbell, *Renaissance Portraits* (London 1998); Preimesberger et al., ed. 1999. See also notes 17, 21, and 35ff. below, as well as G. Didi-Huberman in Mann and Syson, ed. 1998, 165ff., with reference to Warburg.

[3.](#) For the most recent essay on this well-known topic, see H. Scieurie, “Überlegungen zu den Stifterfiguren im Naumburger Westchor. Herrschaft zwischen Repräsentation und Gericht,” in H. Ragotzky and H. Wenzel, ed., *Höfische Repräsentation. Das Zeremoniell und die Zeichen* (Tübingen 1990) 149ff.

[4.](#) W. Seitter, “Das Wappen als Zweitkörper und Körperzeichen,” in Kamper and Wulf 1982, 299ff.

[5.](#) M. Pastoureau, *Traité d’Heraldique*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1997) 47ff. (social history), 91ff. (shield of arms), and 99ff. (historical terminology). See also W. Paravicini, “Gruppe und Person. Repräsentation durch Wappen im späteren Mittelalter,” in O. G. Oexle and A. von Hülsen-Esch, *Die Repräsentation der Gruppen. Texte—Bilder—Objekte* (Göttingen 1998) 327ff.

[6.](#) C. Stroo and P. Syfer d’Olne, ed., *The Master of Flemalle. Rogier van der Weyden* (The Flemish Primitives, vol. 1, Brussels 1966) 87ff., no. 5 (also p. 93, documentation of the portrait donation by Marie de Pacy); L. Campbell, “Campin’s Portraits,” in S. Forster and S. Nash, ed., *Robert Campin: New Directions in Scholarship* (London 1996) 123ff. and esp. 128 with figs. 7 and 8.

[7.](#) See the documentation in the catalogue: Belting and Kruse 1994, 155, Nos. 49–50.

[8.](#) Dülberg 1990, 107ff. on coats of arms and supports on the backsides and covers of portraits. On Dürer’s portrait of Holzschuher, see *ibid.* no. 47 and figs. 441–44.

[9.](#) On the heraldic panel and the portrait panel, see Belting and Kruse 1994, 45ff.; on the shield of arms, see Pastoureau (note 5 above) 91ff.

[10.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 47, 64, and 66.

[11.](#) *Ibid.* 44, fig. 19.

[12.](#) The coats of arms of the Order of the Golden Fleece, whose treasure is today in the Wiener Schatzkammer, were kept in Sint-Baafs Cathedral in Ghent between 1445 and 1529 (see the relevant catalogues). On the problem of the image and the heraldic “face” in the coat of arms, see Pastoureau (note 5 above) 315ff. and Seitter (note 4) 303–304.

[13.](#) G. Chastellain, *Oeuvres*, K. de Lettenhove, ed., vol. 7 (1865), 219–20, 228–29.

[14.](#) Olivier de la Marche, *Mémoires*, H. Beaune and J. D’Arbaumont, ed., vol. 2 (Paris 1884) 83ff. See also Belting and Kruse 1994, 46–47.

[15.](#) Seitter (note 4) 300–301.

[16.](#) On representation, see Ginzburg 1992, 2ff., and W.J.T. Mitchell in Hart Nibbrig, ed. *Was heisst 'Darstellen'?* (Frankfurt am Main 1994) 17ff.

[17.](#) On the rivalry between bourgeois and courtly portraits, a conflict that gave considerable impetus to the genre, see Belting 39ff. On Dutch portraits, see also L. Cambell in Mann and Syson, ed. 1998, 105ff.

[18.](#) On the devotional image, see Belting 1990.

[19.](#) Dülberg 1990, 87, no. 260, figs. 628–630. See also the catalogue *Luther und die Folgen für die Kunst* (Hamburg 1983), 204–205, no. 79.

[20.](#) J. B. de Vaivre, *Cahiers d'heraldique* 2 (1975):179ff.; and F. Baron, ed., *Catalogues du Louvre: Sculpture française I, Moyen Âge* (Paris 1996), 208ff., no. RF 795.

[21.](#) On the face, see Macho 1996b, 87ff.; 1999, 121ff.

[22.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 48–49, fig. 36.

[23.](#) Ibid. 51ff.

[24.](#) On the concept of the subject, see Boehm (note 2), 15ff., with reference to Italy.

[25.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 41, fig. 39.

[26.](#) Ibid., 46–47, figs. 20–21; Dülberg 1990, no. 30.

[27.](#) On this, see Pastoureau (note 5) 91ff. (the écu), 170ff. (the heraldic face), and 218ff. (badges, devises, impressions, emblems). On the device, see Dülberg 1990, 127ff.

[28.](#) D. Gordon, ed., *Making and Meaning: The Wilton Diptych* (London [National Gallery] 1993), a comprehensive study by the editor with a contribution by C. M. Barron.

[29.](#) E. Corradini, “Medallic Portraits of the Este,” in Mann and Syson, ed. 1998, 22ff.

[30.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 56–57, fig. 29.

[31.](#) Ibid. 196 and fig. 97 (back), as well as plate 125.

[32.](#) Ibid. 188ff., fig. 93, and plates 112–13.

[33.](#) Hendrik van Wueluwe, the “Master of Frankfurt,” held the post of dean of the Luke Guild in Antwerp several times. The coat of arms of the guild is also found on his tombstone. On the work and the artist, see B. Hinz, “Studien zur Geschichte des Ehepaarbildnisses,” *Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft* 19 (1974):139ff., esp. 163, fig. 25; P. Vandenbroeck in *Jahrbuch des königlichen Museum voor Schone Kunsten* (1983):15ff.; S. H. Goddard, *The Master of Frankfurt and His Shop* (Brussels 1984) 13ff., 45ff., and no. 38. On the question of blazoners and the coats of arms of painters, see Belting and Kruse 1994, 33 and 47–48.

[34.](#) Dülberg 1990, 236, no. 208.

[35.](#) Dülberg 1990, 126, no. 172, also 130f. on mask and persona; and H. Baader, “Anonym: sua cuique persona. Maske, Rolle, Porträt,” in Preimesberger et al., ed. 1999, 239ff. On persona, see also E. Rebel, *Die Modellierung der Person. Studien zu Dürer's Bildnis des H. Kleberger* (Stuttgart 1990) 15ff.

[36.](#) Boehm (as note 2) 71ff. See also A. Heller, *Der Mensch in der Renaissance* (Cologne 1982) 220ff.

[37.](#) N. Thomason de Grummond in *Art Bulletin* 57 (1975):346ff.; D. Rosand, "The Portrait, the Courtier, and Death," in R. W. Hanning and D. Rosand, eds., *Castiglione: The Ideal and the Real in Renaissance Culture* (New Haven, CT 1983) 91ff.

[38.](#) L. B. Alberti, *De pictura*, translated with notes by C. Grayson, rev. ed. (London 2004) 60.

[39.](#) W. Hofmann, ed., *Köpfe der Lutherzeit* (Exhibition catalogue, Hamburger Kunsthalle) (Munich 1983) 90, no. 30, with the inscription "opera eorum seguuntur illos" (their works outlive them).

[40.](#) Ibid. 164, no. 67; P. K. Schuster, "Individuelle Ewigkeit. Hoffnungen und Ansprüche im Bildnis der Lutherzeit," in A. Buck, ed., *Biographie und Autobiographie in der Renaissance* (Wiesbaden 1983) 121ff.; Belting and Kruse 1994, 464–65; Preimesberger 1999, 220ff. ("A. Dürer: Das Dilemma des Porträts"), and 228ff. ("A. Dürer. Imago und effigies"). See also E. Panofsky, "Erasmus and the Visual Arts," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 32 (1969):218f.; and 14 (1951):34ff., on Erasmus's praise of Dürer.

[41.](#) See his letter to Spalatin, in which he specifies what is to happen to his portrait, dated 1521; M. Warnke, *Cranachs Luther* (Frankfurt am Main 1984) 36ff.

[42.](#) Hofmann (as note 40) no. 42; Warnke (as note 42).

[43.](#) Hofmann (as note 40) no. 44.

[44.](#) Ibid. no. 66.



## Chapter 4. Image and Death: Embodiment in Early Cultures

[1.](#) This is a revised and expanded version of the chapter that appeared in 1996 (Belting 1996a).

[2.](#) On this see Barloewen, ed. 1996; Macho (1987), “Vom Skandal der Abwesenheit,” in Kamper and Wulf, ed. 1994, 417ff.; Guthke 1997; and especially Taylor 1998, on the contemporary media image of death.

[3.](#) On this see chapter 2 in the present volume.

[4.](#) This antithesis was first articulated by Plato. See also Därmann 1995, *passim*.

[5.](#) *L'espace littéraire* (Paris 1955, 2nd ed. 1993) 340ff.: Les Deux Versions de l'Imaginaire.

[6.](#) Aries 1984; Binski 1996; Schmölders 1993; Llewellyn 1997, 53 on the corpse and effigies. The corpse as an image of the body is not the same theme as a picture of the corpse.

[7.](#) On this see Barthes 1985. On the corpse and the anatomical gaze see Romanyszyn 1989, 114ff.; for a different perspective Baudrillard 1976.

[8.](#) Usually, the question of Being vs. Appearance is treated outside of the theme of death and therefore truncated. On the hierarchy of Being and Appearance, see the illuminating juxtaposition in H. Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York 1971) 23ff.

[9.](#) Marin 1993, 9ff.

[10.](#) Baudrillard 1976.

[11.](#) The ethological literature on this subject is extensive. On the cult of the ancestors in Rome, see note 12.

[12.](#) Attested especially in Cicero. On the Roman death cult and its use of images, see notes 82 and 83. On effigies in the modern period, see Bredekamp 1999, 97ff. On effigies in the Middle Ages, see Bauch 1976, 249ff., and Brückner 1996.

[13.](#) See note 48.

[14.](#) A comprehensive account of this discussion is in Conkey, ed. 1997.

[15.](#) See the literature in note 25 as well as Neolithic finds (note 29).

[16.](#) *The Histories* 3.38.

[17.](#) C. Einstein, “Aphorismes méthodique,” in *Document 1* (Paris 1929). See M. Schmid and L. Meffre, *C. Einstein Werke*, vol. 3 (Berlin 1985). On Einstein, see H. J. Dethlefs, *C. E. Konstruktion und Zerschlagung einer ästhetischen Theorie* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1985).

[18.](#) On this see Belting 1996b, a discussion with Diawara.

[19.](#) E. Kris and O. Kurz, *Die Legende vom Künstler* (1939; reprint Frankfurt-am-Main 1980).

[20.](#) Even psychoanalysis was unable to eliminate this schema, from which the discourse of the image legitimated itself by differentiating itself from animism.

[21.](#) Conversely, J. H. Martin, in his Paris exhibit in 1989 entitled “Magiciens de la terre,” used the term in a general sense for a global community of artists.

[22.](#) “P.P.N.B” in the terminology of the archaeologist Kathleen Kenyon.

[23.](#) H. de Contenson, "Les coutumes funéraires dans le Néolithique syrien," *Bulletin de Société Préhistorique Française* 6 (1992):184ff.

[24.](#) K. M. Kenyon, *Excavations at Jericho*, III (London 1981) plates 51–60; and J. Cauvin, *Religions néolithiques de Syro-Palestine* (Paris 1972) 62ff., and his *Les premiers villages de Syrie-Palestine* (Lyon 1975) 105ff. See also G. Didi-Huberman, "Le visage et la terre," *Artstudio* 21 (Paris 1991) 6ff.; and the essays by Thomas Macho.

[25.](#) On this see M. S. Cipoletti, *Langsamer Abschied* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1989) fig. 78.

[26.](#) H. Contenson in *Syrie: Mémoire et Civilisation*, catalogue (Paris 1993) 43, 63.

[27.](#) Leo Frobenius, *Monumenta Africana* VI (Berlin 1929) 457. On Frobenius, see H. Straube in Marschall, ed. 1990, 151ff.

[28.](#) See Macho 1996, 1999.

[29.](#) On the material, see G. O. Rollefson, "Ritual and Ceremony at Neolithic Ain Ghazal," *Paléorient* 9.2 (1983):29ff; Cauvin 1972 (as note 24) 65.

[30.](#) See the catalogue *Der Königs Weg. 9000 Jahre Kunst und Kultur in Jordanien und Palästina* (Mainz 1988) 63.

[31.](#) See the catalogue *Treasures of the Holy Land* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art 1986) 47, no. 5.

[32.](#) Israel Museum: *Treasures of the Holy Land* (as note 31) no. 6 and fig. 22. On the crosscultural comparison of masks, see Lévi-Strauss 1955; and A. Schweeger-Hefel, *Masken und Mythen. Sozialstrukturen der Nyonyosi and Sikomse in Overvolta* (Vienna 1980).

[33.](#) On this and what follows, see N. Tacke, "Frühe Porträtkunst in Ägypten? Zur Entwicklung der Muminemaske im Alten Reich," *Antike Welt* 30/2 (1999):123ff.

[34.](#) L. V. Thomas, *Rites de mort* (Paris 1985); Cipoletti (as note 25); G. Konrad et al., eds., *Asmat. Leben mit den Ahnen* (Glashütten 1981). On the cemetery, see the work of Ph. Ariès.

[35.](#) Frobenius (as note 27) provides a wealth of examples. See also J. S. Mbiti in Barloewen, ed. 1996, 201ff.

[36.](#) Herodotus, *Histories* 6.58.

[37.](#) G. Pfohl, *Inschriften der Griechen* (1972), and K. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (London 1971). See also the literature in notes 62–66.

[38.](#) On the "rite of passage," see A. van Gennep 1981.

[39.](#) On the "symbolic exchange," see Baudrillard 1976.

[40.](#) On anamnesis in Plato, see Därmann 1995, 123ff.

[41.](#) Plato, *The Laws* 12.959.

[42.](#) L. von. Falkenhausen, "Ahnenkult und Grabkult im Staat Qin," in L. Lederose and A. Schlombs, *Jenseits der Großen Mauer* (Munich 1990).

[43.](#) See the catalogue *Idole* (Munich 1985).

[44.](#) See C. Renfrew, *The Cycladic Spirit* (London 1991). See also C. Renfrew, *The Archaeology of the Cult* (London 1985).

[45.](#) In China archaeologists seem to have discovered a real Neolithic cult site where clay figures of a single female image type stood side by side in over-life-sized and very small formats: see the catalogue *Das alte China* (Essen 1995) no. 4.

[46.](#) H. D. Schneider, *Shabtis* (Leiden 1977); M. Rice, *Egypt's Making* (London 1990) 24ff.; C. Aldred, *Egypt to the End of the Old Kingdom* (London 1965) 21ff.; P. J. Ucko, *Anthropomorphic Figurines of Predynastic Egypt* (London Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Papers 24, 1968).

[47.](#) J. Assmann, *Maat. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im alten Ägypten* (Munich 1990) 92ff.; M. Görg, *Ein Haus im Totenreich. Jenseitsvorstellungen in Israel und Ägypten* (Düsseldorf 1998). See also note 49.

[48.](#) C. Andrews, *Egyptian Mummies* (London: British Museum 1984).

[49.](#) H. Kees, *Totenglauben und Jenseitsvorstellungen des alten Ägypten* (Berlin 1956); J. Assmann, *Stein und Zeit* (Munich 1991). On the Book of the Dead and its magical incantations, see R. O. Faulkner, *The Ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead* (London 1972); E. Hornung, *Das Totenbuch der Ägypter* (Zurich 1979).

[50.](#) This occurs in the tomb of Mereruka in Saqqara, as well as in the tomb of Redines from Giza, today in Boston, both of which date from the Sixth Dynasty.

[51.](#) See most recently A. Bolshakov in the *Journal of the Museum of Fine Arts* (Boston 1991/3) 5ff.

[52.](#) In the subterranean grave shaft of a single tomb in Giza, archaeologists found six such heads, which appear to have been placed alongside the mummy: *Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Expedition A. Reiner von 1913*. See also Marek (as note 50) 58, and Tacke (as note 33).

[53.](#) E. Otto, *Das ägyptische Mundöffnungsritual*, vols. I and II (Wiesbaden 1960); H. W. Fischer-Elfert, *Die Vision von der Statue im Stein* (Heidelberg 1998).

[54.](#) H. Zaloscer, *Porträts aus dem Wüstensand* (Vienna 1961), and K. Parlasca, *Mumienporträts und verwandte Denkmäler* (Wiesbaden, 1966). See Belting and Kruse 1994, 78ff., 98ff.

[55.](#) S. Smith, "The Babylonian Ritual for the Consecration ... of a Divine Statue," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1925): 37ff.; B. Alster, ed., *Death in Mesopotamia* (Copenhagen 1980); I. J. Winter, "Idols of the King," *Journal of Ritual Studies* 6 (1992): 13ff.; and W. W. Hallo, "Royal Ancestor Worship in the Biblical World," in M. Fishbane and E. Tov, *Shaarei Talmon* (Winona Lake, IN 1992) 381ff. See also J. Bottéro, *Mesopotamia* (Chicago 1992) 67ff. (writing), 268ff. (funerary cult).

[56.](#) A. Caubet and M. Bernus-Taylor, *Les antiquités orientales et islamiques* (Paris: Louvre 1991) 27; Winter (as footnote 55) 17.

[57.](#) See I. Winter (as note 55) 24.

[58.](#) Winter (as note 55) 24.

[59.](#) V. Haas, *Hethitische Berggötter und hurritische Steindämonen* (Mainz 1982); J. D. Hawkins, "Late Hittite Funerary Monuments," in Alster, *Death in Mesopotamia* (note 55) 213ff.

[60.](#) H. Otten, *Hethitische Totenrituale* (Berlin 1958).

[61.](#) J. P. Vernant, *L'individu, la mort, l'amour* (Paris 1989) 41ff. See also note 37.

[62.](#) E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Los Angeles 1979) 31, 68, 75.

[63.](#) J. P. Vernant, *Myth and Thought Among the Greeks* (Cambridge, MA 2006) 346ff; *Figures, idoles, masques* (Paris 1990) 51ff. See also B. Schmaltz, *Griechische Grabreliefs* (Darmstadt 1983), with additional literature; N. Blanc, *Au royaume des ombres. Les peintures funéraires antiques* (Paris 1998).

[64.](#) Vernant, *Myth and Thought* (note 63) 333ff.; *Figures* (note 63) 34ff.

[65.](#) Vernant, *Myth and Thought* (note 63) 323.

[66.](#) Vernant, *Figures* (note 63) 32, 75.

[67.](#) B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes* (Göttingen 1975) 18ff.

[68.](#) W. H. Schuchhardt, *Das Orpheusrelief* (Stuttgart 1964); F. M. Schoeller, *Die Darstellung des Orpheus in der Antike* (Freiburg 1969), and J. Warden, ed., *Orpheus. The Metamorphosis of a Myth* (Toronto 1982).

[69.](#) Verses 416–20. See the commentary by Jean Bollack, *L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle: le texte et ses interprétations* (Lille 1981).

[70.](#) S. P. Morris, *Daidalos and the Origins of Greek Art* (Princeton, NJ 1992) 224, with reference to Aristotle, *On the Soul* (406): Democritus was speaking much like the comedic poet Phillipos, who related that Daidalos had animated a wooden statue of Aphrodite by pouring quicksilver into it.

[71.](#) Därmann 1995, 129ff.

[72.](#) *Phaedrus* 276a-b.

[73.](#) *Cratylus* 432.

[74.](#) Därmann 1995, 18ff.

[75.](#) *Phaedo* 70c, 78.

[76.](#) Därmann 1995, 174ff.

[77.](#) J. Elbert, *Die Sunda-Expedition* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1911); H. Nooy-Palm, *The Sa'dan Toraja*, vols. 1–2 (The Hague, 1979, 1986).

[78.](#) E. Topisch, *Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik* (Vienna 1958, Munich 1972) 31ff.

[79.](#) The literature is vast. I shall mention Besançon 1994, 91ff.; Barasch 1992, 13ff.; J. Gutmann, *The Image and the Word* (Missoula, MT 1977) 5ff.

[80.](#) O. Keel, *Frühneuzeitliche Glyptik in Palästina/Israel* (Fribourg 1990) 406; see also K. Jarosch, *Wurzeln des Glaubens. Zur Entwicklung der Gottesvorstellung* (Mainz 1995) 72ff.

[81.](#) On Plato, see Topitsch (as note 78) 156ff.; on the “idea” see Erwin Panofsky, *Idea: A Concept in Art Theory*, Joseph J. S. Peake, trans. (Columbia, SC 1968).

[82.](#) C. Belting-Ihm, “Imagines Maiorum,” *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 17 (1995):cols. 995ff. On this and the following, see also A. Drerup, “Totenmaske und Ahnenbild bei den Römern,” *Römische Mitteilungen des DAI* 87 (1980):81ff.

[83.](#) Franz Cumont, *Afterlife in Roman Paganism* (Brussels 1922); Arnold Toynbee, *Death and Burial in the Roman World* (London 1971).

[84.](#) R. Hughes, *Heaven and Hell in Western Art* (New York 1968); J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (London 1984); D. Jezler, ed. *Himmel, Hölle, Fegefeuer. Das Jenseits im Mittelalter* (Munich 1994).

[85.](#) Llewellyn 1997, 131ff.; Macho 1987; Philippe Aries, *Geschichte des Todes* (Munich 1981).

[86.](#) Pliny, *Natural History* 35.15, 35.151; Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* 10.2.7; Athenagoras, *Legatio*, W. Schoedel, ed. (Oxford 1972) no. 17.3. On the portrayal of the legend in modern times, see Rosenblum, "The Origin of Painting," *Art Bulletin* 39 (1957) 279ff.; Stoichita 1995, 42ff.; N. Suthor in Preimesberger et al, ed. 1999, 117ff.

[87.](#) Lucian, 2.12, A. M. Harmon, trans. Loeb Classical Library, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA 1913).

[88.](#) On this and the following see E. Pfuhl, "Apollodorus der Skiagraph," *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* 25 (1911):12ff.; E. Pfuhl, *Malerie und Zeichnung der Griechen*, vol. II (Munich 1923) 674ff.; A. Rumpf, "Malerei und Zeichnung bei den Griechen," *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaften* (1952) 120ff.; R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *La pittura antica* (Rome 1980), 213ff.

[89.](#) Plutarch, *Moralia*, 346a, Frank C. Babbitt, trans. Loeb Classical Library, vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA 1965) 495.

[90.](#) A. Reinach, *Testes grecs et latins relatifs à l'histoire de la peinture ancienne*, A. Rouveret, ed. (Paris 1985) no. 195.

[91.](#) On the Attic stage, see S. Melchinger, *Das Theater der Tragödie* (Munich 1974, 2nd ed. 1990); M. Brauneck, *Die Welt als Bühne*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart 1993).

[92.](#) On painted image stelae of the fourth century BCE, see M. Andronicos, *Vergina: The Royal Tombs* (Athens 1984) 84f.

[93.](#) References in H. von Amelnunxen 1989, 23, 33, 60. The 1835 quote from his notebooks is from H.J.P. Arnold, *William Henry Fox Talbot: Pioneer of Photography and Man of Science* (London 1977) 108. The presentation to the Royal Society was printed in *The London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science*, vol. XIV, March 1939; the quote is found on p. 201.

[94.](#) Barthes 1985, 14, 98.

[95.](#) R. Bellour, *L'entre-images. Photo-cinema-vidéo* (Paris 1990).

[96.](#) See the catalogue of the exhibit *Fotografie nach der Fotografie* (Berlin and Munich 1996); Mitchell 1992. Surrealistic photography anticipated this project in its assault on the integrity of body and subject (R. Krauss and J. Livingstone, *L'Amour Fou: Photography and Surrealism* [Washington, DC 1985]).

[97.](#) Ruby 1995; Burns 1990.

[98.](#) Pinney 1997.

[99.](#) *The Lover*, Barbara Bray, trans. (New York 1985) 96–97.



## Chapter 5. Media and Bodies: Dante's Shadows and Greenaway's TV

- [1.](#) See Pliny, NH 35.15, 35.151 (the wall in Corinth).
- [2.](#) On Domenico di Michelino and his Dante picture, see R. Altrocchi, "Michelino's Dante," *Speculum* 6 (1931):15ff.; W. C. Wanrooij, "Dom. di Michelino," *Antichità Viva* 4 (1965), 24:12ff.; E. Loos, "Das Bild als Deutung von Dichtung," in *Festschrift für O. von Simson* (Berlin 1977) 160ff.
- [3.](#) Inferno 5.101; H. Rheinfelder, *Das Wort persona* (Halle 1928).
- [4.](#) G. Adriani and W. N. Greiner, eds., *R. Rauschenberg. Zeichnungen, Gouachen, Collagen* (Tübingen 1979) 25ff., with reproductions of all thirty-four cantos (figs. 13–46).
- [5.](#) Marin 1993, 9 ff.
- [6.](#) On the theme of Narcissus, see more recently Hans Belting 2008, 246ff. (the chapter "The New Narcissus").
- [7.](#) K. Silverman and H. Farocki, *Von Godard sprechen* (Berlin 1998) 225ff.; A. Bergala, ed., *J. L. Godard par J. L. Godard*, vol. 2 (Paris 1998) 189ff.; H. Belting and A. Bonnet in C. Millet, ed., *Le siècle de J. L. Godard*, Special edition of *Art Press* (November 1998) 60ff.
- [8.](#) Belting 1989, 38; R. Tarr, "Visible parlare: The Spoken Word in Fourteenth-century Central Italian Painting," *Word and Image* 13.3 (1997):223ff. See also A. Kablitz, "Jenseitige Kunst oder Gott als Bildhauer," in A. Kablitz and G. Neumann, eds., *Mimesis und Simulation* (Rombach Litterae 52, 1998) 309ff.
- [9.](#) Examples can be found in the Camposanto in Pisa, in the Strozzi chapel of S. Maria Novella in Florence, and in Orcagna's frescoes in S. Croce in Florence: Belting 1989, 52ff.; G. Kreyttenberg, "L'enfer d'Orcagna," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* 114 (1989):243ff.; U. Ilk, "Andrea di Cione's Fresko in S. Croce," *Pantheon* 56 (1998):10ff.
- [10.](#) G. Vasari, *Le opere*, ed. G. Milanesi (1878 2nd ed. = Florence 1973) I, 372: "Dante coetaneo ed amico grandissimo, e non meno famoso poeta che Giotto pittore." English edition: *Lives of the Artists*, trans. George Bull, vol. 1 (New York 1965) 48: "... his dear friend Dante Alighieri, who was no less famous as a poet than he was as a painter."
- [11.](#) Of course, the comment that Giotto surpassed his teacher Cimabue in fame refers to the transitory nature of the artist's renown, which Dante applied also to himself and his sinful artist's pride. On the tradition of art historiography, see M. Baxandall, *Giotto and the Orators* (Oxford 1971). See also Vasari (as note 10) 256.
- [12.](#) Wertheim 1999, 44ff. (Dante), 76ff. (Giotto). On Giotto's spatial and corporeal illusions, see J. White, *The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space* (London 1967) 57ff.
- [13.](#) J. H. Stubblebine, *Giotto: The Arena Chapel Frescoes* (London 1969) fig. 52. On the same theme in the Magdalene chapel, see J. Poeschke, *Die Kirche S. Francesco in Assisi und ihre Wandmalereien* (Munich 1985) fig. 218.
- [14.](#) On Cennini, see the detailed account in Stoichita 1997b, 48ff.; C. Kruse, "Fleisch werden—Fleisch malen: Malerei als *incranzaione*. Mediale Verfahren im *Libro dell'Arte* von C. Cennini," *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* (Munich 2000). See also E. Skaug, "Notes on C. Cennini," *Arte Cristiana* 81 (1993):15ff.
- [15.](#) F. Brunello, ed., *Cennino Cennini. Il Libro dell'Arte* (Vicenza 1971) 3f.
- [16.](#) On this see Hans Belting 2008, chapters 5 and 6.



[17.](#) U. Baldini et al., eds., *La Cappella Brancacci* (Milan 1990); R. Longhi, *Masolino und Masaccio* (Berlin 1992) 205ff., on Masaccio and Dante; S. Roettgen, *Wandmalerei der Frührenaissance in Italien*, vol. 1 (Munich 1996) 92ff., fig. 46 (Expulsion).

[18.](#) Manovich 1996, 124ff.

[19.](#) Stoichita 1997b, 54f.; L. Kretzenbacher, “Die Legende vom heilenden Schatten,” *Fabula* 4 (1961):231ff.; P. W. van der Horst, “Peter’s Shadow,” *New Testament Studies* 23 (1977):204ff. On the depiction in the Brancacci Chapel, see Roettgen (as note 17) fig. 55.

[20.](#) J. P. Richter, *The Literary Works of Leonardo da Vinci* (London, 1970 [1883]), p. 164 in the foreword to the six books about light and shadow.

[21.](#) Vasari (as note 10) 125.

[22.](#) Belting and Kruse 1994, 75f.

[23.](#) Ch. De Tolnay, *Michelangelo: The Final Period* (Princeton, NJ 1971) 19ff., 42ff.; C. Gizzi, ed., *Michelangelo e Dante* (Milan 1995); B. Barnes, “Metaphorical Painting: Michelangelo, Dante and the Last Judgment,” *Art Bulletin* 77.1 (1995):65ff.; B. Barnes, *Michelangelo’s Last Judgment: The Renaissance Response* (Berkeley, CA 1998).

[24.](#) De Tolnay (as note 23) with references.

[25.](#) Barnes 1998 (as note 23) 106f. See also E. Wyss, *The Myth of Apollo and Marsyas in the Art of the Italian Renaissance* (Newark, NJ 1996).

[26.](#) Barnes 1995 (as note 23) 69.

[27.](#) P. Aretino, *Lettere sull’arte*, ed. E. Camesasca (Milan 1957) vol. 1, 64f., 113, and vol. 2, 15f., 21; see also Michelangelo’s response in *Michelangelo Letters*, ed. R. N. Linscott (Princeton, NJ 1963) no. 53.

[28.](#) H. Belting, ed. 2007, 27ff., with the correspondence of the two authors about their terms.

[29.](#) Tom Phillips, ed., *A TV Dante: Notes and Commentaries* (London: Channel 4 Television and Talfourd Press 1990) esp. 12.

[30.](#) Wertheim (cf. note 12) 32f.

[31.](#) Ibid. 45.

## Chapter 6. The Transparency of the Medium: The Photographic Image

- [1.](#) Barthes 1985, 34.
- [2.](#) Sontag 1977, 153ff.: “The Image-World.”
- [3.](#) Flusser 2000, 10 (translation altered by author).
- [4.](#) Barthes 1985, 60, 92, 106.
- [5.](#) B. Newhall, ed., *Photography: Essays and Images* (New York 1980) 159ff.; B. Newhall, *The History of Photography* (New York 1964), 59ff.; W. Wiegand, ed., *Die Wahrheit der Photographie* (Frankfurt am Main 1981) 173ff.; W. Kemp, *Theorie der Photographie*, vol. 1, 169ff.
- [6.](#) Flusser 2000, 9, 13f., 36f., 65, 70, 78, 80.
- [7.](#) The indexicality of photography goes back to C. S. Peirce, “The Theory of Signs,” in J. Buchler, ed., *C. S. Peirce: Philosophical Writings* (New York 1955) 106ff. See R. Krauss, “Notes on the Index,” in R. Krauss, *The Originality of the Avantgarde and Other Modernist Myths* (Cambridge, MA 1985) 87ff. See also Durand 1995, 126ff.
- [8.](#) See note 5.
- [9.](#) J. A. Schmoll gen. Eisenwerth, in *Katalog: Malerei nach Fotografie* (Munich 1970); E. Billeter, *Malerei und Photographie im Dialog von 1840 bis Heute* (Zurich 1977).
- [10.](#) N. Holt, ed., *The Writings of Robert Smithson* (New York 1979); see also Durand 1995, 151ff.
- [11.](#) Durand 1995, 153f.
- [12.](#) G. Flaubert, *Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. J. Bruneau (Paris 1973) 519ff., especially 560, 570, 609; on M. Du Camp’s Egypt project, see B. van Dewitz and K. Schuller-Procopovici, ed., *Die Reise zum Nil. M. Du Camp und G. Flaubert in Ägypten* (Cologne 1977).
- [13.](#) Durand 1995, 74.
- [14.](#) R. Krauss, “Photography’s Discursive Spaces,” in R. Bolton, ed., *The Contest of Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography* (Cambridge, MA 1989) 288ff.
- [15.](#) On photography and the print media, see G. Freund, *Photographie und Gesellschaft* (Munich 1976) 149ff.; K. Baynes, *Scoop, Scandal, and Strife: A Study of Photography in Newspapers* (London 1971); F. L. Mott, *A History of American Magazines*, vols. 1–5 (Cambridge, MA 1968).
- [16.](#) See note 15. On print media and the picture print, see the foundational study by M. McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride* (New York 1951).
- [17.](#) On the exhibition of photography, see C. Phillips in R. Bolton, ed., (as note 14) 14ff.; T. Osterworld in J. B. Joly, ed., *Die Photographie in der zeitgenössischen Kunst* (Stuttgart 1990), 133ff. On television, see S. Zielinski, *Audiovisionen: Kino und Fernsehen als Zwischenspiele in der Geschichte* (Hamburg 1989); C. Doelker, *Kulturtechnik Fernsehen. Analyse eines Mediums* (Stuttgart 1989).
- [18.](#) J. F. Chevrier, “Les aventures de la forme tableau dans l’histoire de la photographie,” in U. Zeller, ed., *PhotoKunst* (Stuttgart 1980), 9ff.; but see also Chevrier in Joly (as note 17) 153ff.

[19.](#) On photography in digital media, see chapter 2, “The Locus of Images: The Living Body,” with notes 55–57.

[20.](#) E. P. Janis, *The Photography of G. Le Gray* (Chicago 1987); and the comments on Gray in the catalogue *Copier créer*, L. Posselle, ed. (Paris 1993) 416f. See also the catalogue *The Walking Dream. Photography's First Century*, M. M. Hambourg et al., ed. (New York 1993) fig. 64, no. 64.

[21.](#) On A. Kertész's still lifes see A. Kertész, *On Reading* (New York 1971) fig. p. 48.

[22.](#) On Struth, see H. Belting, *Thomas Struth: Museum Photographs* (Munich 1993); on Katz, see H. Belting, *Alex Katz. Bilder und Zeichnungen* (Munich [Galerie B. Klüser] 1989).

[23.](#) On the still of Cindy Sherman, see Cindy Sherman, *Untitled Film Stills*, with a foreword by A. C. Danto (Munich 1990).

[24.](#) Hambourg (as note 20) no. 196, fig. 156.

[25.](#) A. Kertész, *On Reading* (London 1971) fig. 63.

[26.](#) Pinney 1997, 139, fig. 78.

[27.](#) Pinney 1997, 145, fig. 83.

[28.](#) Pinney 1997, 28, 42ff., fig. 19.

[29.](#) P. L. Berger and Th. Luckmann, *Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Eine Theorie der Wissenssoziologie, mit einer Einführung zur deutschen Ausgabe von Helmuth Plessner* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1969).

[30.](#) *The Family of Man. The photographic exhibition created by E. Steichen for the Museum of Modern Art* (New York 1955). On this see C. Phillips, “The Judgement Seat of Photography,” in R. Bolton (as note 14), 28f.; C. Lury, *Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity* (London 1998) 41ff. On press photography, see note 15.

[31.](#) R. Frank, *The Americans* (New York 1959; 2nd ed. Zurich 1997) in the later edition the photo with the flag is on p. 11. See also S. Greenough and Ph. Brookman, *R. Frank*, catalogue (Washington: National Gallery of Art 1994) 110ff., fig. p. 175.

[32.](#) On retouching in political photographs, see A. Jaubert, *Fotos, die lügen. Politik mit gefälschten Bildern* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1989). On the photograph as a political instrument, see G. Freund (as note 15) 116ff.

[33.](#) E. Salomon, *Berühmte Zeitgenossen in unbewachten Augenblicken* (Stuttgart 1931). See also E. Barents, ed., *Dr. E. Salomon. Aus dem Leben eines Fotografen* (Munich 1981); G. Freund (as note 15) 116ff.

[34.](#) On L. Hendricksen, see CNN Cold War, Episode 18. See also E. M. Hagen in *Zeitmagazin* 22 (April 1999).

[35.](#) Salman Rushdie in *Die Zeit*, September 26, 1997.

[36.](#) J. Wall, *Szenarien im Bildraum der Wirklichkeit. Essays and Interviews*, G. Stemmrich, ed. (Dresden 1996) 376 (“Photographie und Konzept-Kunst”); see also Jeff Wall, “My Photographic Production,” in Joly (as note 17) 57ff.

[37.](#) Jeff Wall, *Transparencies* (Basel 1984); H. Friedel, ed., *Jeff Wall: Space and Vision* (Munich 1996); Jeff Wall, *Landscapes and Other Pictures* (Wolfsburg 1996); K. Brougher, ed., *Jeff Wall* (Zurich 1997).

[38.](#) Interview in *Neue bildende Kunst* 4 (1996):41.

[39](#) References in K. Brougher (as note 37); A. Pelenc, interview with Jeff Wall, in *Jeff Wall* (New York, London 1996); idem in *Parkett* 22 (1989).

[40](#) R. Linsey and V. Auffermann, *Jeff Wall. The Storyteller* (catalogue, Frankfurt-am-Main [Museum für moderne Kunst] 1992), with extensive references; see also H. Friedel, *Jeff Wall: Space and Vision* (Munich 1996) plate 5.

[41](#) R. Frank, *The Lines of My Hand* (Rochester, NY [Lustrum Press] 1972), page of text between the bus photographs and the pages about films at the end of the book. This is the second (first American edition) after the edition published in Tokyo. The third edition, by R. Frank and W. Keller, appeared in 1989 in New York and Zurich. I would like to thank Ilke Herrmann, who was preparing the first edition of a Master's thesis, for help in locating the literature. See also S. Greenough and Ph. Brookman (as note 31) 118ff., with many references; and C. Hagen, "Robert Frank: Seeing through the Pain," *Afterimage* 1:5 (1973):4f.

[42](#) See note 41.

[43](#) R. Frank, *Black, White and Things* (new edition, Washington 1994). These are twelve photographs from the series before 1952, which were incorporated into the 1972 autobiography in a different arrangement.

[44](#) Title page preceding the bus photographs; on the latter, see also S. Greenough and Ph. Brookman (as note 31) 204ff.

[45](#) See also S. Greenough and Ph. Brookman (as note 31) 230f.

[46](#) S. Greenough and Ph. Brookman (as note 31) 96ff., with many references; see especially R. Frank, "The Pictures Are a Necessity," in W. S. Johnson, ed., *Rochester Film and Photo Consortium Occasional Papers* 2 (1989) 38; see also the interview with D. Wheeler in *Criteria* 3.2 (June 1977):1ff., and with M. Glicksman in *Film Comment* 23.4 (1987):32ff.

[47](#) S. Greenough and Ph. Brookman (as note 31) 97.

[48](#) Interview with D. Wheeler (as note 46) 4.

[49](#) R. Frank, "The Pictures Are a Necessity" (as note 46) 164; Greenough and Brookman (as note 31) 107ff. and 119 with a reference to a conversation between Walker Evans and Robert Frank in *Still* 3 (New Haven, CT 1971) 2ff.

[50](#) Greenough and Brookman (as note 31) 120.

[51](#) R. Frank, *The Lines of My Hand*, 3rd ed. (1989), with title page "in Nova Scotia, Canada"; a different picture is in Greenough and Brookman (as note 31) 128f; L. Hall and G. Knape, *Framing by Robert Frank* (Göteborg 1997) 46f. (a third picture); see also C. Sullivan and P. Schjeldahl, *Legacy of Light* (New York 1987) 260, 261, with an installation from 1985 in the Boston studio, where one of the photos appears. See also W. S. DiPiero, "Not a Beautiful Picture," *TriQuarterly* 76 (1989):146ff., esp. 161f.; A. W. Tucker and Ph. Brookman, *Robert Frank: New York to Nova Scotia* (Boston 1986).

[52](#) Greenough and Brookman (as note 31) 228f., with reproductions of the film strip of December 23, 1971, which Frank sent to Mr. Brodovitsch as a farewell greeting.

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